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Abstract
This dissertation deals with the limits of regulation through the analysis of virtual and intangible
harm and the capacity of regulation to prevent or at least reduce such harm. The case study at
hand is the potential harm to children’s imaginative development in virtual worlds. A
comparison is drawn from the regulation of online advertising to children in Canada and the US.
Based on a review of the literature in chapter 1, it is suggested that there are serious and longterm consequences to an underdeveloped imagination, including pathological phenomenon and
lack of imaginative ability. As with other harms to children, the situation seems to call for
regulation. However, the harm posed to children's imagination by virtual worlds use is
challenging in two ways: it is virtual and intangible. Chapter 2 deals with regulation as a field to
provide the framework to deal with the said harm. Due to its virtual character, regulation in its
traditional form, reviewed in chapter 3, is unsuitable to address this harm. Technology regulation
reviewed in chapter 4 is unsuitable to address this harm as it is intangible. As this harm involves
speech thus dealing with constitutional implications, the 5 chapter reviews this aspect in Canada
and the USA. The 6 chapter then argues that there are similar characteristics between the
presumed harm to children’s imagination and the harm resulting from marketing to children
online. In fact, the literature argues that they are two sides of the same coin. Chapter 6 examines
the regulation of online marketing to children in Canada and United States and concludes that the
experience of regulating advertising to children is mainly unhelpful because it does not address
virtual and intangible risks in an efficient manner. Chapter 7 summarizes the findings of the
previous chapters and analyzes the limits of regulation in light of the case study at hand. The
dissertation concludes with a discussion of parental regulation, followed by a suggested future
research.
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Introduction
This dissertation deals with the limits of regulation through the analysis of virtual and
intangible harm and the capacity of regulation to prevent or at least reduce such harm. The case
study at hand is the potential harm to children’s imagination development in virtual worlds. A
comparison is drawn from the regulation of online advertising to children in Canada and the US.
The thesis makes two contributions: The first concerns the limitations of all the variants
of regulation applied to the types of harm discussed in this study. The second is more practical
and addresses what might be done about the potential harms of interest.
In chapter 1, I begin by outlining in brief the potential harm investigated in this
dissertation. Here I argue that, while there is much disagreement in the literature, there is
sufficient evidence to suggest that potential harm does exist. I identify the harm as being
connected to the development of imagination. The goal is to establish the reason that control
might be necessary.
The next section of the dissertation comprises three chapters and develops my
contribution concerning the limits of various approaches to regulation. I begin my discussion in
chapter 2 by clarifying that “regulation” has many definitions, and I conclude that the concept of
regulation is highly elastic. In theory at least, regulation would be able to address the types of
potential harm of interest. I then make the point that regulation is not a single phenomenon; the
term refers to different practices involving different policy instruments, all of which aim to
exercise control over private-sector behaviour, with the goal of supporting a public good.
In chapter 3, I review the different instruments of regulation and suggest that they exist
on a spectrum, between stiff “command and control” at one end and soft control, or information
regulation, at the other. Even so, and notwithstanding the potential benefits of the many different
regulatory instruments, I conclude chapter 3 by arguing that no form of regulation is suitable for
a virtual and intangible harm, in this case, the harm to children in virtual worlds. In chapter 4, I
conclude that, compared with the traditional types of regulation discussed in the previous two
chapters, “code regulation” is likely to be much more effective in regulating virtual space, but it,
too, is not sufficiently equipped to address intangible harm. Code regulation may account for the
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virtual aspect of the potential harm in virtual worlds, but the intangible nature of this harm does
not allow code regulation to prevent the harm. In the absence of identifiable and measurable
factors associated with the harm, code regulation cannot prevent it. The only factor directly
associated with the harm is usage time, and this factor is problematic for several reasons
discussed in chapters 5 and 7.
Any form of control over media content raises freedom-of-speech issues. In chapter 5, I
look at the interplay of media control and freedom of speech and, more specifically, the interplay
between law and regulation. Here the analysis is doctrinal, and the countries discussed are
Canada and the United States. The chapter concludes that the softer the regulatory instrument,
the more compatible it is with freedom of speech. Finally, in this section on regulation, I
examine in chapter 6 an instance of regulation where the potential harm involves speech and is
virtual and intangible. My case study involves the regulation of advertising and online marketing
to children in Canada and the USA. My goal is to assess the potential for the regulation of virtual
and intangible practices, taking into account the elasticity of regulation and law concerning the
freedom of speech. I conclude that the practice of regulating harm to children from media use is
limited.
Chapter 7 summarizes the discussion in the previous chapters on the limits of regulation
in general and more specifically, the limits of regulation when dealing with a virtual and
intangible harm, as the harm described in chapter 1. The theoretical discussion in chapter 2, 3
and 4 is compared and contrasted with the review of the regulation of online marketing to
children in chapter 6.
Finally, the dissertation concludes with my recommendation that, given the limits of
regulation, education in the children home environment is the most suitable regulatory tool for
this realm.
In appendix A, future research is suggested in order to further explore this field and apply
a regulatory regime that would help protecting children from the said harm.
It should be noted that chapter 1 dealing with the harm to children imaginative
development and chapter 7 on the regulation at home includes two methodological issues that
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requires explanation. The first issue is the use of dated literature. In light of the scarce research
on this topics (especially in chapter 1) and as long as the dated literature is not contradicted by
newer one, it is assumed that this literature is valid and relevant. Furthermore, the theory behind
the argument in chapter 1 assumes that all media has the same deleterious affects but the level of
these affects increase as the medium is more powerful and advance (e.g., radio is weaker than the
TV as it have only sound compared to sound and picture in TV).
This explanation is also relevant to the second methodological issue apparent mainly in
chapter 7. While most of the research reviewed in this chapter is based on TV and the Internet
but not on virtual worlds use, the reader may question the validity of the conclusions towards
virtual worlds. As explained above, the assumption guiding the media part of this dissertation
considers all media on the same spectrum. While this is a bold and general assumption, dealing
with it in more details is beyond the scope of this dissertation. For the sake of this dissertation
and within the scope of these chapters’ discussion, it is assumed that findings with respect to TV
would be relevant to the Internet much the same that findings with respect to the internet would
be relevant to virtual worlds. After all, virtual worlds are merely an Internet based application.
Throughout the dissertation I refer to harm that is both virtual and intangible. "Virtual
Harm" means that the harm originates from digital media, rather than that the harm is not
somehow 'real' (a discussion regarding the difference between digital and non-digital media in
this context is beyond the scope of this dissertation). "Intangible Harm" refers, in the context of
this dissertation, to harm which is either very difficult or impossible to identify and quantify. For
example, cyberbullying (bullying which takes place via social media) produces tangible
harms. A trained psychologist could identify with some precision the level of psychological
damage caused to the person who experienced cyberbullying. However, the harm to children’s
imagination resulting from their engagement with virtual worlds that I posit in this dissertation is
either extremely difficult or impossible at the present time to identify with precision and
therefore, impossible to measure. Similarly, scholars continue to argue over whether or not
advertising to children via various media produces harms, but it is possible to say that any such
harms remain very difficult or impossible to identify with any precision. These harms are
therefore both virtual and intangible.
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Chapter 1 - Potential Virtual and Intangible Harm
This chapter outlines one potential virtual and intangible harm, as a starting point for the
discussion in this dissertation regarding the limits of regulation in the context of a harm that is
both virtual and intangible. The harm identified here is the potential damage to children’s
creative imagination that arises from virtual-world play. The thesis focuses on the harm to
children’s creative imagination from specific types of virtual reality play games, but it also
makes reference in a lengthy chapter to the debates concerning potential harms arising from
advertising directed to children. It could be contested whether the harm that I describe as being
to children’s creative imagination is as serious as I suggest, but the problem that this thesis deals
with is not confined to my assessment. Other potential harms to children from media
involvement have been identified before, specifically the harm that might arise from exposure to
a steady diet of violence, or the harm that might arise from the promotion of unhealthy habits or
foods or the harm that might arise from exposure to obscenities. These harms have each caught
the attention of regulators either or both in Canada or the United States at some point in
time. Like the potential harm of primary interest here, all these harms are intangible, difficult to
establish scientifically and nonetheless significant in terms of both the public interest and public
opinion. The growth of the virtual world adds a further dimension to harms that have been
suggested as arising from media involvement. Here I am not alone in suggesting that the virtual
realities created by the new, seemingly social media, might have a negative impact that seems, in
some minds, to call for regulation. My task is therefore to examine the potential and limits of
regulation to deal with harms to children that are intangible and virtual.
The theoretical basis of the said harm is found in the Artificial Medium Laws theory
forth postulate. The chapter begins with a short explanation of the Artificial Medium Laws
Theory, its notion of perceived psychological dimensions and the five postulates that the theory
suggests. This explanation is followed by a discussion of the literature on imagination and how it
is best developed, especially the role played by creative imagination. Having established the
importance of creative imagination and how thoroughly it is grounded in children’s experience, I
turn my attention to the effects of media on children’s creative imagination. Furthermore, I
describe three virtual worlds marketed to children. Finally, I discuss why children’s play in
virtual worlds might not serve their interests with respect to the development of their creative
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imagination. I suggest that the harm is so severe that some form of response is called for. In
subsequent chapters, I discuss the limits of regulation in the context of this case study.

1. The Artificial Medium Laws Theory
The theory of artificial media Laws

1

includes two components: the perceived

psychological dimensions and the five Artificial Medium postulates. The theory should be
treated as a whole, working as a framework for understanding artificial media and as a method to
draw insights regarding the future of artificial media and their influence on humans and our
societies. The postulates and the perceived dimensions they refer to are intertwined: each
artificial medium poses one or more perceived psychological dimensions. For example, print
encompasses the visual dimension plus imagination; picture includes the visual dimension only;
radio includes the audio dimension only; television includes audio and moving picture; and
Virtual Worlds, which include audio, moving picture, time and social interaction. The
psychological dimensions are not equivalent, but are ordered based upon the tendency of
information gained through a stronger psychological dimension to affect that gained through a
weaker one.
The postulates of the artificial medium builds on the perceived psychological
dimensions. The first postulate, ‘The Truth in the Medium is Context Dependent’, argues that it
is the context that defines our perceptions of the credibility of the message; the more
psychological dimensions the medium engages, the more difficult it becomes for the user to
define the context and thus assess the credibility of the message.

1

Nachshon Goltz, The Artificial Medium Law Theory - Technopoly in Practice, Osgoode Legal Studies Research
Paper No. 47, Vol. 10/Issue 11 (2014), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2429899; Nachshon
Goltz, The Artificial Medium Laws – Technopoly in Practice, The Sixteenth Annual Convention of the Media
Ecology Association, Metropolitan State University of Denver, Denver, Colorado, June 11–14, 2015; Nachshon
Goltz, The Artificial Medium Laws Theory – The Foundations, Future Communications Symposium, York-Ryerson
Joint Program in Communication & Culture, York University, Toronto, Canada, November 14, 2014; Nachshon
Goltz, The Artificial Medium Laws Theory – iPhone as an Accomplice to Murder, the Alfred Korzybski Memorial
lecture/conference, Institute of General Semantics, New York City, October 24-26, 2014; Nachshon Goltz, The
Artificial Medium Laws Theory – KONY2012 as a Case Study, Media Ecology Association Convention, Ryerson
University, Toronto, Canada, June 19-21, 2014; Nachshon Goltz & Tracey Dowdeswell, Virtual Worlds Use and the
Harm to Children’s Imagination Development, in Matteo Stocchetti (ed.), Storytelling in the Digital Age, Media and
Education in the Digital Age [Forthcoming]; The SORT, patent application before the United States Patent and
Trademark Office, application number 14/074,715, filed on November 08, 2013; see also an in-depth discussion
held at the Media Ecology online list-serve 2014 [on file].
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The second postulate, ‘The Stronger Dimension Prevails’, argues that given the hierarchy
of the perceived psychological dimensions, a combination of low-level dimension (e.g. sound)
with a cognitively higher-level dimension (e.g. social interaction) will result in supremacy of the
higher dimension in its influence on the user. Complex forms of media, ones that cause us to
engage using a variety of psychological dimensions (e.g., virtual worlds), can be especially
effective at manipulating users.
The third postulate, ‘A Medium with Time Dimension Determines its Usage Length’,
states that the more dimensions a medium possess, the more control over time usage shifts from
the user to the medium. This law can be illustrated through the correlation between Internet
addiction, usage time, and high-dimensional media such as Virtual World video games.
The fourth postulate, ‘The More Dimensions the Medium Possesses the Weaker the
User’s Imagination’, is discussed in length in this chapter.
Finally, the fifth postulate, ‘The User is Bound to All the Laws’, argues that the user of
the artificial medium is inherently bound to all the rules outlined above. This is simply because
we are responding to the media in ways that are psychologically typical and predicable. It is
precisely this predictability that is used so effectively by those who would manipulate us through
artificial media. When the user is involved in creating the content, the influence of the medium
may be even stronger. Virtual Worlds engender more addiction because of their interactivity (see
the Interaction Dimension supra), while the high rate of suicide among reality TV participants
suggests that the urge to bridge the gap between the real and the virtual is taking its toll.2 Finally,
recent evidence suggests that knowing about a medium’s ability to distort our perceptions has no
effect on our ability to resist that manipulation, and may even increase it.3

2. The Imagination
This section lays the foundations for the argument regarding the harm resulting from
virtual worlds to the development of children’s imagination, as predicted by the Artificial
2

Seth Kaufman, Suicide Rate for Reality Contestants Three Times the National Average. TheKingofPain (2013,
April 1). Retrieved from http://www.thekingofpainbook.com/2013/04/01/tkop-exclusive-suicide-rate-for-realitycontestants-three-times-the-national-average/.
3 R. Epstein & R. E. Robertson The search engine manipulation effect (SEME) and its possible impact on the
outcome of elections. 33:112 Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 33(112), E4512-E4521 (2015).

6

Medium Laws Theory’s fourth postulate. The section begins with a review of the literature on
the definition of imagination, especially the creative imagination, and then discusses children’s
development and play in this context in terms of the theory and the research.
The essence of imagination lies in its generativity, in the fact that through our
imagination we can conjure up experiences and representations that are wholly novel to our lived
experiences. Imagination is critical to children’s mental development and abilities to learn, as
discussed further below. Despite its importance, it remains intangible and difficult to define.
Cohen & MacKeith4 described psychologists’ ambivalence towards it, stating that,
[o]n the one hand, it fascinates. Just as no other species can speak, no other
species can imagine or invent. On the other hand, it is extremely hard to study
imagination – especially experimentally.5
Despite this ambivalence, there have been numerous attempts to define and classify the
imagination, none of which has yet received widespread consensus. Vygotsky6 defined
imagination as,
[a] new formation which is not present in the consciousness of the very young
child, is totally absent in animals and represents a specifically human form of
conscious activity. Like all functions of consciousness, it originally arises from
action.7
One can imagine, for example, a bird turning into a snake while flying over a lake
without ever seeing such a transformation actually taking place. One can produce novel
representations in the mind by generatively combining past perceived representations. An
underlying assumption of the Artificial Medium Laws Theory’s fourth postulate is that only
unmediated perceived dimensions can nourish the creative imagination. Therefore, in the
example of the bird and the snake, it is assumed that a child who has only experienced the notion

4

David Cohen & Sephen Mackeith A., The Development of Imagination, London: Routledge 11-14 (1991).
Id., at 11-14.
6
L. S. Vygotsky, Mind in society: The development of higher psychological processes, Cambridge, MA: Harvard
University Press 79-91 (1978).
7
Id., at 537.
5
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of a snake through the media, will not be able to imagine the transformation. Supporting this
underlying assumption is beyond the scope of this chapter.
Elaborating on Vygotsky’s definition, Singer and Singer8 define imagination as,
[a] form of human thought characterized by the ability of the individual to
reproduce images or concepts originally derived from the basic senses, but now
reflected in one’s consciousness as memories, fantasies, or future plans. These
sensory-derived images, ‘pictures in the mind’s eye’, mental conversations, or
remembered or anticipated smells, touches, tastes, or movements can be
reshaped and recombined into new images or possible future dialogues.9
The emphasize is on the, “images or concepts originally derived from the basic senses,”
that are then, “reshaped and recombined.”10 But this raises the question of whether “images or
concepts” that are artificially mediated – and which are usually the product of the imaginary
process of a TV show or video game creator – will function in the same way as basic building
blocks for the user’s imagination. When perceived via a medium, these images and concepts are
already mediated and transformed to some extent, often drastically.
Other authors have defined the imagination in the context of the human spirit. For
Watkins,11 the imagination is, “the intermediate universe—the universe between pure spirit and
the physical, sensible world—which is the world of the symbol and of imagining.”12 According
to Latham,13

8

Dorothy G. Singer, & Jerome L. Singer, Imagination and play in the Electronic Age, Cambridge, Mass. Harvard
University Press (2005).
9
Id., at 16.
10
Id.
11
M. Watkins, Invisible Guests: The Development of Imaginal Dialogues, Boston, Mass.: Sigo Press (1990).
12
Id., at 75.
13
Christopher Lawrence Latham, High Tech Image Influences On Development Of Young Children's Imaginative
World Making (2003) Dissertation Abstracts International: Section B: The Sciences and Engineering Vol. 63(7-B),
pp. 3495 [ProQuest].
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[i]maginative capacity thus underpins our species’ ability to make sense and
guide us beyond ego-directed aims and conditions that life brings our way.
Creative fantasy freely expressed is our key to balance and wholeness.14
Dubos15 argued that,
[m]an’s propensity to imagine what does not yet exist, including what will
never come to pass…most clearly differentiates him from animals. The more
human he is, the more intensely do his anticipations of the future affect the
character of his responses to the forces of the present.16
The imagination bridges the time from the present to the future.
Ulanov and Ulanov17 point out that there is no life of the spirit without imagination,
Properly understood and pursued, the imagination is perhaps our most reliable
way of bringing the world of the unconscious into some degree of
consciousness and our best means of corresponding with the graces offered us
in the life of the spirit.18
In our spiritual lives, the imagination enables paths that cannot be travelled in any other
way, and its absence detaches us from the unconscious and the spirit. This is in stark contrast to
the superficial and artificial representations of children’s virtual worlds, with their flat and
fleeting images, a world in which everything is offered, but nothing can truly be experienced.
The child user is confined and constrained by the keyboard, mouse and screen on one hand, and
the game rules on the other hand. The complete opposite of unmediated, free and sensual
experience that the real world provides to the children and their imagination.

14

Id., at 91.
Rene Dubos, Man Adapting, New Haven: Yale University Press (1965).
16
Id., at 7.
17
B. Ulanov & A. Ulanov, The Healing Imagination, New Jersey: Paulist Press (1991).
18
Id., at 3.
15
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A more prosaic definition of the imagination claims that imagination is an activity of the
human brain, operating much like memory or logic or any other cognitive process.19 In this view,
there is nothing mystical about the imagination, it is simply working on the material present in
the brain.20 The critical character of the imagination lies in its generative and transformative
abilities, to take existing ingredients and bring them together to generate something novel. It is
perhaps for this reason that imagination is critical to learning. As Egan21 states,
[a]ll learning that is to be of educational value seems necessarily to involve an
imaginative-finite creative component. The imagination is the making,
composing, vivifying power that is required if the student is to reconstitute
codes into living knowledge.22
Central to consideration of the relationship among reality, imagination, and play is
Vygotsky’s23 suggestion that rich experiences create rich materials for the imagination. The
richer children’s experiences are, the more material they have to draw on to feed their
imagination and, in turn, to channel into their play,
If we want to build a relatively strong foundation for a child’s creativity, what
we must do is broaden the experiences we provide him with. All else being
equal, the more a child sees, hears, and experiences, the more he knows and
assimilates, the more elements of reality he will have in his experience, and the
more productive will be the operation of his imagination.24
Vygotsky25 suggests that it is critical that a “rich” reality support a powerful imagination,
The creative activity of the imagination depends directly on the richness and

19

Ray Misson, Imagination, The Individual And The Global Media, In Cross-Roads of the new millennium,
Proceedings of the technological education and national development (TEND) Conference 2nd, Abu Dhabi, United
Arab Emirates, April 8-10, 2000.
20
D. Feldman, M. Csikszentmihalyi & H. Gardner, Changing the World: A Framework for the Study of Creativity,
Westport, CT: Greenwood Publishing (1994).
21
Kieran Egan, Romantic Understanding, London: Routledge (1990).
22
Id., at 166.
23
L. Vygotsky, Imagination and creativity in childhood, 42(1) Journal of Russian and East European
Psychology 7–97 (2004).
24
Id., at 14.
25
Id.
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variety of a person’s previous experience because this experience provides the
material from which the products of fantasy are constructed. The richer a
person’s experience, the richer is the material his imagination has access to.
This is why a child has a less rich imagination than an adult, because his
experience has not been as rich.26
Generally, imagination has not been studied as a single concept. Valkenburg et al.,27 in a
review of the research on the influence of TV on daydreaming and creative imagination, found
three closely related but distinguishable imaginal processes, which they define as follows:
imaginative play – play in which children transcend the constraints of reality by acting ‘as if’;
daydreaming – a state of consciousness characterized by a shift of attention from external stimuli
to internal thoughts and images; and creative imagination, which is defined as the capacity to
generate many different novel or unusual ideas.28 This chapter will not deal with daydreaming,
being outside the scope of this discussion, but it will discuss below imaginative play, the creative
imagination, and the negative effects of media on the imagination as expressed in dreams.
Within this discussion, the experience of virtual worlds is pivotal as the harm discussed in this
chapter is the harm to imaginative development as a result of virtual worlds use.29 It is important
to note that some authorities30 see potential benefits in the use of virtual worlds in certain types
of educational projects.

26

Id., at 14-15.
Patti M. Valkenburg, and Tom H. A., van der Voort, Influence of TV on Daydreaming and Creative Imagination:
A Review of Research, 116(2) Psychological Bulletin 316-339 (1994).
28
J. L. Singer, The Inner World of Daydreaming, New York: Harper & Row (1975); J. L. Singer, Navigating the
stream of consciousness: Research in daydreaming and related inner experience. American Psychologist, 30, 727738 (1975).
29
The harm from virtual worlds is contested. Some authorities suggest that the harm-causing problem might be
screen time rather than virtual worlds (see the American Academy of Pediatrics, Media Use in School-Aged Children
and Adolescents, Policy Statement, October 2016,
http://pediatrics.aappublications.org/content/early/2016/10/19/peds.2016-2592 (last visited Nov 25, 2016) (“children
[should] have 2 hours or less of sedentary screen time daily”); Lipnowski, S., LeBlanc, CMA, Canadian Pediatric
Society , Healthy Active Living and Sports Medicine Committee, 17(4) Pediatric Child Health 209
(2012) (“Children (5-11 yrs) and youth (12-17 yrs) should minimize the time they spend being sedentary each day
by”)).
30
See, e.g., Eschenbrenner, Brenda, Fui-Hoon Nah, Fiona & Siau Keng, 3-D Virtual Worlds in Education:
Applications, Benefits, Issues, and Opportunities, 19(4) Journal of Database Management 20 (2008); Baker,
Suzanne C., Wentz, Ryan K. & Woods, Madison M., Using Virtual Worlds in Education: Second Life® as an
Educational Tool (14 Jan 2009), http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/00986280802529079 (last visited
Nov 25, 2016); Nussli, Natalie & Oh, Kevin, Teachers’ perceptions of the benefits and challenges of threedimensional virtual worlds for social skills practice, 53(3) Educational Media International 198 (2016).
27
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Virtual worlds differ in many ways from authentic imaginary experiences, and these
differences may actually impede the development of imagination in young children. According
to Cobb,31 the psychological distance between the self and the object of desire “is the locus in
which the ecology of imagination in childhood has its origin”.32 In virtual worlds, the distance
between ‘the self and the object of desire’ is vague since the self is portrayed as a virtual avatar;
the object of desire is always at hand in the virtual environment but cannot be reached in the real
one.
Scholars have defined four key characteristics of children’s imaginary worlds: first, the
child must be able to distinguish between what they have imagined and what is real; second, the
child’s interest in the fantasy world persists for months or years; third, the child will be proud of
the world and consistent about it; lastly, the child will feel that the world matters to him or her
(these worlds usually disappear by the age of ten).33 As with the tale of the child whose Webkinz
pet fell ill from his disuse of the game,34 virtual worlds can mimic the last three characteristics.
However, it is on the first characteristic that virtual worlds fall short: the child has not imagined
the world, and is not in control. The child may, therefore, have significant difficulties
distinguishing the virtual world from the real one.
Others contend that the development of the imagination is critical not only to our
individual development but also to our collective development. Jung,35 already cognizant of the
pressures of our modern life, warns us not to abandon our species’ hard-fought accomplishments
in developing our spiritual life. “The wheel of history,” he states, “must not be turned back, and
man’s advance toward a spiritual life, which began with the primitive rites of initiation, must not
31
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be denied”.36 The consequences of losing or not developing our imaginative capacities can have
serious and as yet unforeseen repercussions and, as Jung warns us, our collective
accomplishments can be turned back.
In summary, the imagination is unique to humans, and it is critical for our learning and
for children’s proper intellectual development. It is also a key part of what makes us human. In
addition, the imagination is a learned ability, one which is not yet present in young children. It is
originally derived from the basic senses, works on the material that is present in the brain and
bridges the gap between the self and the object of desire, as well as the time from the present to
the future. The development of the imagination also appears necessary in order to be able to
distinguish between the imagined and the real.
In children, the imagination develops and expresses in imaginative play and creative
imagination. The emphasis is on the novel reshaping of already-familiar images and experiences.
These skills are all essential for both understanding and creating stories. But the question that I
wish to raise in this chapter is whether the images and concepts that children receive from
playing in virtual worlds function as building blocks for the development of the child’s
imagination in the same way as images and concepts derived from less artificial media. To take a
simple example, the images a child gets from having a book read to them come from his or her
own mind’s eye, but the images they get from watching a show on TV come from the creator
and are imposed upon the child, crowding out the images in the mind’s eye the child would
otherwise create. Because a virtual world is an even more fully-immersive experience for the
child than a television show, even more of the images and concepts that child users receive are
imposed upon them, thus increasing the ill effects of the medium.

3. The Development of the Imagination
Imagination is critical to children’s learning and development. Vygotsky37 states that,
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[c]hild’s play is not simply a reproduction of what he has experienced, but a
creative reworking of the impressions he has acquired. He combines them and
uses them to construct a new reality, one that conforms to his own needs and
desires.38
When the child is rehearsing a situation from his life with toys, he/she is not only
duplicating the situation in reality but is creating a scenario that exceeds that reality and portrays
what will or may happen, according to the child’s fears, hopes and other internal drives.
Winnicott39 further states that, “[i]t is in playing and only in playing that the individual child or
adult is able to be creative and to use the whole personality, and it is only in being creative that
the individual discovers the self”.40 These two steps are essential. First, imaginative playing will
enable creativity, and in creativity will we discover ourselves.
While many animals engage in play, it lacks the generativity of children’s play. Cobb41
contends that, “while other animals do play, the human child’s play includes the effort to be
something other than what he actually is, to ‘act out’ and to dramatize speculation”.
Wittgenstein42 pondered, “Could one imagine a world in which there could be no pretend?”. Play
is essential for the imagination, but it is pretend play that most deeply express and develops our
creativity and imagination.
According to Piaget’s influential developmental theory,43 there are three main types of
children’s play that direct and foster a child’s mental development: practice games, symbolic
games and games with rules. When a child jumps over a stream for the fun of jumping, she is
engaging in a practice game. Games with rules are,
[g]ames with sensory-motor combinations (races, marbles, ball games, etc.) or
intellectual combinations (cards, chess, etc.), in which there is competition
between individuals (otherwise rules would be useless) and which are regulated
38
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either by a code handed down from earlier generations, or by temporary
agreement.44
Symbolic games imply representation of an absent object, since there is a comparison
between a given and an imagined element. For example, a child pushing a box and imagining it
is a car. It is the symbolic, or pretend, games that are most important in the context of the
development of imagination.
Piaget argues that,
[w]hile mere practice play begins with the first months of life and symbolic
play during the second year, games with rules rarely occur before stage II (age
4-7) and belong mainly to the third period (from 7-11).45
Piaget theorizes that from ages 4 to 7, symbolic games begin to lose their frequency, but
continue to appear in the same intensity. From the age of 7 to 11 or 12, symbolic play declines
and games with rules (social games) emerge. According to Piaget, symbolic play takes place
mainly from about age 2 to 7. Singer and Singer46 agree that,
[i]maginative play emerges toward the end of the child’s second post-partum
year, struggles fitfully toward a flowering well into the third year, and in the
fourth, fifth, and sixth years is a significant factor in the child’s behavioral
repertory.47
However, they claim that while,
Piaget seemed to suggest that imaginative play fades by the early school years
as ‘operational’ thought takes over, we shall suggest that it is merely
submerged in the interest of the changing demands of school decorum and
other social pressures.48
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In their view, it is not an internal psychological force that propels the shift, but external
ones. I posit that the use of virtual worlds may spur on this shift, making the symbolic play
period shorter and thus impairing the process of imagination development.
Recognizing the developmental importance of the imagination, Singer & Singer propose
that, “our human stream of consciousness emerges gradually in childhood from children’s play
and from their pretend games”.49 As explained by Grossman & Degaetano,50
The brain of the child is not a miniature version of the adult brain…the young
brain is an organ that will change considerably as it matures over the course of
childhood and adolescence. As it builds neural structures for optimal
development, the young brain is very vulnerable to stimulus from its
environment.51
Without pretend play, the imagination will not develop properly in young children, and
the literature suggests that some of the deficits created thereby may be life-long. I posit that
another mechanism whereby virtual worlds may be harming this development by misleading the
child’s brain to think he is engaged in pretend play, while he is actually engaged in a
combination of practice and rule games.
Cobb’s findings seem to support this proposition. She writes,52
The sense of wonder is spontaneous, a prerogative of childhood. When it is
maintained as an attitude, or a point of view, in later life, wonder permits a
response of the nervous system to the universe that incites the mind to organize
novelty of pattern and form out of incoming information. The ability of the adult
to look upon the world with wonder is thus a technique and an essential
instrument in the work of the poet, the artist or the creative thinker.
The artificial medium and the mediated stimulus it sends to the senses curtail this sense
of wonder. Instead of experiencing the world in wonder, the child is experiencing the virtual
49
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world where the alleged wonder is mediated and masks the ‘true’ imaginary universe with the
ready-made and mediated one.

4. The Role of Play
The chief value of play in child development lies in the child’s total control over his/her
imaginary universe, free from external constraints – an accomplishment that is simply not
possible in the mediated virtual world. Piaget argued that,
[u]nlike objective thought, which seeks to adapt itself to the requirements of
external reality, imaginative play is a symbolic transposition which subjects
things to the child’s activity, without rules or limitations.53
Although Piaget and Vygotsky experienced a theoretical controversy about the nature of
imagination,54 there was a mutual understanding between them that,
[t]he symbolic game as a whole is again a practice game, but a practice game
which exercises (and more particularly ‘pre-exercises’) the specific form of
thought which is imagination.55
Symbolic games develop the imagination free from any external constrains, a freedom
which is not possible in virtual worlds that are inherently bound to some rules.
Mitchell56explains that, “[p]retense or make-believe is a mantel activity involving
imagination that is intentionally projected onto something”. More elaborately, make-believe is
“the use of…props in imaginative activities,” where props are “objects of imagining”.57 Props
include the pretenders themselves and the objects. Pretence in play is called ‘symbolic play’, but
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pretending also occurs outside play, and need not be ‘playful’.58 Pretence is essential for the
imagination development either in play or outside it. But it is only possible when there are no
external constraints forced on the child.
Adults and other children might force external constrains, the same as do virtual worlds.
The difference is that external constrains in the real world are obvious and apparent, while
virtual worlds actually enforce external constraints, while pretending to provide props for
imaginative play. For example, a child can dress its penguin in Club Penguin, which is allegedly
imaginative play, but cannot use the penguin as a chair, i.e., the child cannot stand the penguin
as a symbol for some other object or idea, which constitutes true imaginative play.
Singer & Singer59 support the developmental value of symbolic games, stating that when,
children engage in symbolic games they are practicing mental skills that will
later stand them in good stead, just as practice in walking, balancing, or
swimming aids the development of motor skills.
In a follow-up study of children from age eight to twelve, twenty years later, Shiner,
Masten, and Roberts60 found that those children who scored high in social skills, academic
attainment, and work competence maintained these patterns as adults. These kinds of skills are
the same as those found to emerge from imaginative play in the earlier years.61 Therefore,
deficits in imagination in early years are correlated with long-term deficits in other pro-social
skills. Thus, the importance of the imagination for the development of the child and her
achievement, success and well being as an adult.
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Symbolic play enables children to have a clear sense of what is real and what is fantasy.62
Russ conducted a study with 121 first and second graders, and then a follow up study with 31 of
them in fifth and sixth grade. She found that,
[c]hildren who play imaginatively in their early years are more likely to think
creatively…good early play skills predicted the ability to be creative and
generate alternative solutions to everyday problems.63
Therefore, children who substitute their imaginative play with the rule-bound play in
virtual worlds may not fully develop these skills.
Make-believe play produces other important outcomes. Spiegel64 argues that it develops
the ability to self-regulate; Singer & Singer65 posit that imaginative play is associated with more
positive emotions in children. Other studies have shown how children engaging together in
make-believe play demonstrate advances in recognizing others’ thoughts, or in differentiating
fantasy representations from reality.66 Children engaged together in play in virtual worlds are not
involved in make-believe play; rather, they are playing games with rules, but these are the rules
set by the creators of the virtual world.
An illustration of the negative effects of the lack of pretend play was made by Wulff,67
who finds that autistic children have severe early deprivations in symbolic play. Harris states
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that, “the study of early pathology shows that it is the absence of early imagination, and not its
presence, that is pathological”.68 He continues, stating that,
[o]ne of the major characteristics of the syndrome of early childhood autism is
an absence or impoverishment of pretend play...The long term social and
cognitive restriction of people with autism suggest that the capacity for
pretence is an important foundation for lifelong normality.69
The imagination, the ability to think symbolically, and therefore the development of
normal cognition are all closely linked. This can clearly be seen in children who have serious
deficits in symbolic thinking and cannot engage in symbolic or pretend play, as occurs in
children who are on the severe end of the autism spectrum.
Children playing in virtual worlds might, therefore, interact with the virtual world as
though they are engaged in make-believe play, while they are really engaged in rule-bound play.
I argue that this interaction with the game removes the benefits children would otherwise receive
from their play. First, children are not receiving the benefits from symbolic play when they play
in virtual worlds, and second, because they may acquire a learned deficit in the ability to
distinguish the real world from the fantasy.

5. The Creative Imagination
It should be noted that this chapter deals with the creative imagination rather than
creativity itself. The commonalities and differences between the two are beyond the scope of this
chapter. Singer & Singer70 have noted some of the differences between the two concepts, stating
that,
[i]magination seems freer and broader, since our thoughts may remain as
private and as fanciful as we may want them to be, with no constraints.
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Imagination may take the form of visual imagery with no obvious outcome
other than the pleasure it affords us.71
It is the creative imagination in this sense that I discuss below.
Vygotsky72 saw creativity as a way of adapting to the challenges posed by our
environment. “A creature that is perfectly adapted to its environment,” he states, “would not
want anything, would not have anything to strive for, and, of course, would not be able to create
anything”.73 Rogers74 points out that, with the kaleidoscope of changes that are occurring at a
geometric rate, the development of genuine, creative adaptation may represent the only way
forward to build a constructive continuity. As Rogers states,
[u]nless man can make new and original adaptations to his environment as
rapidly as his science can change the environment, our culture will perish. Not
only individual maladjustment and group tensions but international annihilation
will be the price we pay for a lack of creativity.75
There may be a heavy price to pay, therefore, if genuine creative adaptation cannot be
fostered. At the same time as our real environment is changing rapidly, our virtual environment
is changing in the opposite direction, becoming more and more convenient for us and adapting to
our whims, rather than posing challenges to our creativity.
In this context, Winnicott argues that, “everything that happens is creative except in so
far as the individual is ill, or is hampered by ongoing environmental factors which stifle his
creative processes”.76 When the child is spending time in the pre-designed environment of the
virtual world, his creativity is stifled in this manner. Cobb77 states that,
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[a] major clue to mental and psychosocial health lies in the spontaneous and
innately creative imagination of childhood, both as form of learning and as a
function of the organizing powers of the perceiving nervous system.
As can be seen in children with severe autism, the lack of symbolic thinking and the
creative imagination presents itself as a severe cognitive pathology.
Winnicott78 further states that,
[m]any individuals have experienced just enough of creative living to
recognize that for most of their time they are living uncreatively, as if caught
up in the creativity of someone else, or of a machine.
However, children have not yet experienced enough creative imagining of their own to
realize they are, ‘caught up in the creativity of someone else, or of a machine’. Vygotsky79
concludes that,
[t]he entire future of humanity will be attained through the creative
imagination…The development of a creative individual, one who strives for
the future, is enabled by creative imagination embodied in the present.
But what if there is no ‘creative imagination embodied in the present’ because of the
influence of an all-encompassing virtual environment?

6. The Senses
The argument that technology alters our sensory perception is not new. McLuhan80
remarked on the changes in the senses as a result of the introduction of technology, stating that,
[i]f technology is introduced from within or from without a culture, and if it
gives new stress or ascendancy to one or another of our senses, the ratio among
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all our senses is altered. We no longer feel the same, nor do our eyes and ears
and other senses remain the same.81
Advanced technologies, such as virtual worlds, provide more powerful sensory input,
like time and interaction, all of which were not present at the time of McLuhan’s writing. We
ought, therefore, to think carefully about how our sensory perceptions are being altered by these
developing virtual cultures.
In an interview with Rudolf Arnheim,82 he discusses a generation that had lost touch with
its senses. Arnheim states,
If you look at television for hours every day, you must grow up with the
ghostly feeling that you live in a world of wraiths…the mind finds it hard to
grasp images that do not have significant form, and in grasping an object the
mind finds meaning in that object….The visual sense in most men and women
has been reduced to an economic minimum – the effort it takes to tell that the
piece of paper is not a piece of bread83…We have lost the human ability to
taste the feast of meaning that each event and object offers to our senses.84
The mind cannot fully develop its imagination based on sensory input coming from an
artificial medium, and this is more so for virtual worlds than it was in Arnheim’s time.
Pearce85 states that,
[a]bstract imagery is not present to the senses; it must be created from within.
We must then process that imagery, transfer it into images available to the
senses out there. If we cannot, we have no imagination, and if we have no
imagination we are automatically grounded in sensory-motor imagery.86
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When the mind is bombarded with sensory input from an artificial medium, there is no
place for acquiring and manipulating abstract imagery. There is no creation of images from
within, and therefore no imagination.
In his warning to us about the dangerous aspects of children’s exposure to artificial
media, Latham87 concludes that,
[y]oung children’s spontaneous imaginative capabilities may be neurologically
foreclosed and become increasingly impoverished as exposure to screen-based
electronic entertainment rises.88
The internal process of imagination is replaced by the outside exposure to the artificial
media. Kline89 summarizes this shift as one in which,
[m]arketing, rather than entertainment, considerations dominate the design of
children’s characters, the fictions in which they appear, and hence the way
children play.90
At the same time,
[p]lay, the most important modality of childhood learning is thus colonized by
marketing objectives making the imagination the organ of corporate desire. The
consumption ethos has become the vortex of children’s culture.91

7. Empirical Research on Children and the Media: The Visualization
Hypothesis
One would have expected to find extensive literature on media and the users’
imagination, but a diligent and thorough search yielded little results. From the outset of my
87
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research, I was searching for relevant literature including approaching leading scholars in this
field; my arguments were presented in the media ecology list serve, at international conferences
and were reviewed by experts in the field for publication, however, no literature to the contrary
(or in support) was provided. Possible explanation to the scarce literature could be that without a
theory that makes a claim (i.e., media harm imagination development), there will be little
relevant literature. It is usually when a theory is presented that relevant research is done. Many
influential theories have been accepted with skepticism, at best, and was later proven accurate
and groundbreaking.
Most of the empirical research regarding media and the imagination was conducted
during the 1980s and therefore focused on television. For several reasons – undoubtedly the
problem of quantifying imagination being one of them – this line of research has been rarely
pursued further to other, more advanced artificial mediums. Therefore, I will review the existing
research in this field, and the implications for the effects of more advanced artificial mediums
will be drawn based on the scarce current literature and by analogy.
Two competing theories have been introduced regarding the effects of TV use on
creative imagination: stimulation theory posits that TV stimulates creative imagination through
its content; reduction theory, on the other hand, posits that TV hinders the development of
creative imagination. 92 While five types of reduction hypotheses have been proposed in the
literature, 93 only the visualization hypothesis is relevant and will be discussed here. The
visualization hypothesis posits, in essence, that the visual nature of TV is responsible for the
reductive effect that TV has on creative imagination. Unlike verbal media, such as radio and
print, TV presents the viewer with ready-made visual images and thus leaves little room for
forming one’s own. When engaged in creative thinking, it is hard to dissociate oneself from the
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images supplied by TV, with the result that one has greater difficulty generating novel ideas and
images from TV.94
Valkenberg & Van der Voort have found some support for the visualization hypothesis.95
They reviewed a number of studies which indicated that children who watched a TV story more
often used visual content as a basis for drawing story related inferences, whereas children who
had heard the same story on a radio more often based their inferences on the verbal content, as
well as information from outside of the story, such as personal experience.96 Goldberg,97 too,
found that, “[TV] supplies the same image to millions of people at the same time. We process
those images rather than create them”.
Further support for the visualization hypothesis was provided by Lang et al.,98 as well as
Conway & Siegelman,99 who found that,
[h]eavy viewing destroys the natural ability of children to form mental images
from what they hear or read. With too much TV, the young child’s basic
capacity of imagination, like an unused muscle, never reaches a level adequate
for performing even the most elementary of creative acts.100
Mander,101 discussing the visualization hypothesis, wrote that,
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[m]ore than any other single effect, television places images in our brain. It is a
melancholy fact that most of us give little importance to this implantation,
perhaps because we have lost touch with our own image-creating abilities, how
we use them and the critical functions they serve in our lives.102
This can have a negative effect on the development of creative imagination in children.
Pearce argues,103
Television feeds both stimulus and response into that infant-child brain, as a
single paired-effect, and therein lays the danger. Television floods the brain
with a counterfeit of the response the brain is supposed to learn to make to the
stimuli of words or music. As a result, much structural coupling between mind
and environment is eliminated; few metaphoric images develop; few higher
cortical areas of the brain are called into play; few, if any, symbolic structures
develop.104
Pearce concludes that, “failing to develop imagery means having no imagination”.105
In their research on video game users and dreams, Gackenbach et al.106 found that highend users were associated with the lucid dream type, had more dead and imaginary characters in
their dreams,107 and were coded as containing more incongruent and vague elements than were
those of low-end gamers. Gackenbach et al.108 assume that dream bizarreness in high-end video
game users is a result of a more developed creative imagination.
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Similarly, a study conducted among users of the virtual world Everquest found that
80.6% of the female and 58.4% of the male players reported dreaming of the virtual world or
having a dream taking place in the virtual world environment.109 However, these findings may
rather indicate the deep influence of video games (and consequently, virtual worlds) on the user.
It might be said that the most ‘sacred’ space of the imagination – dreams – has been ‘invaded’ by
the artificial medium, and that this is a warning sign as to its deep and embracing influence.
I argue that virtual worlds and virtual realities call upon us to extend the visualization
hypothesis further – from the senses of vision and sound to higher psychological dimensions of
perception, including of time, interaction and associated aspects as a narrative construction, and
judgments concerning reality versus fantasy. I posit that these are weak and almost irrelevant in
TV, stronger in video games and predominant in virtual worlds, as the user becomes more and
more immersed in the medium, and more and more of the material is supplied for the user by the
medium. This is the key theoretical advance that I propose in this chapter. Accordingly, I
propose to rename this phenomenon the ‘displacement hypothesis’ in order to capture these new
cognitive and sensory dimensions that are being displaced by the immersive virtual environment,
and to emphasize that, when manufactured content is supplied ready-made to the individual, it
displaces the creative imaginative processes that the individual would otherwise supply for him
or herself. In children whose creative imagination is still developing, such continuous
displacement could have permanent effects on the creative imagination. It is no longer the visual
only that is displacing the images that could have been created by the imagination; time, space,
interaction and narrative, even presence and being, are now being projected onto us and
consumed from the artificial medium, where they are replacing the natural pace and creation of
these mental processes within the person. This has much more significant effects on the
individual than when only the visual sense is being displaced. The most internal object, the
mind, is becoming externalized, nourishing itself falsely from the artificial medium dimensions,
and leaving little space for the flourishing of the imagination.
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In a more recent research, Calvert and Valkenburg,110 support this argument by stating
that, “Overall the data support a reductive effect of media exposure.”111 According to
Edwards,112 the first way of understanding the connection between reality and imagination draws
on elements, “taken from reality, from a person’s previous experience.”113 This is where a child
might take an old sheet and use it to represent a cave or a pond, for playing a game about woolly
mammoths.
But what happens when that sheet is a toy manufactured by a large company with the
intention that it be “consumed” to create profit? Children can take a small, wooden Thomas the
Tank Engine train produced by HIT Entertainment, and they can locate it within their experience
of existing Thomas the Tank Engine movies, television shows, DVDs, online games, magazines,
books, toys, clothing, and accessories. Yet, the train’s potential to be anything other than a
“Thomas the Tank Engine” is greatly limited, when compared to an old sheet’s potential to
become a cave or pond.
According to Edwards,114
…‘reality’ experienced by children operating in digital–consumerist orientated
worlds is lacking in the richness necessary for fostering a productive
imagination as a means of supporting play as a leading activity. This
interpretation of the role of play as a leading activity in contemporary contexts
echoes those arguments regarding the ill effects of digital technologies and
consumerism on children’s development by positioning the social context
children inhabit as destructive to a particular view of ‘normal’ development.115
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Finally, Calvert and Valkenburg116 conclude that while only a few studies have been
conducted in the field of creative imagination and interactive media, “[T]here is reason to expect
that even exposure to newer media can disrupt creative behaviours.”117

8. Virtual worlds for children
According to industry report, there are over 400 virtual worlds designed and targeted
specifically to children.118 Some of the most popular virtual worlds claim tens of millions of
registered users, most of which consist of users under 13 years of age.119 There is no standard
definition or description of virtual worlds for children, but most of the major brands in the
market are based on a mix of social interaction and casual game-play. The classic example is
Club Penguin, launched by Canadian entrepreneur Lane Merrifield and acquired by Disney in
2007.120 In this case, children sign up as registered users and take on the form of penguin
avatars. They then go to a fantasy world called Penguin Island, where they can play games,
customize their characters, and talk to other children. Chat is moderated to ensure that there is no
antisocial behavior.
Registered users of Club Penguin, typically aged six to 12, with a slight skew towards
girls, can have a basic entertainment experience for free. But if they want the complete
experience, they have to pay a subscription fee of $6-8 per month. The difference is that
members can customize their world much more comprehensively: They can use virtual coins
they earn by playing games to change their penguin’s look or decorate their igloos more than
non-members can. There are also special events that only members can attend. An example is
the Halloween Party, when the look of the site changes completely.121
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In 2012 Club Penguin’s headline statistics suggested that the site had 175 million
registered users in 190 countries, up from around 12 million at the time of the purchase by
Disney. Analysts estimate that around 5 to 10% of the total are paying members. If these
estimates are correct, Disney generated approximately $122.5 million per month from Club
Penguin’s subscription fees.122 Nonetheless, according to other sources, in 2014 Club Penguin’s
daily revenue was estimated to be around $700 USD,123 but according to Disney, Club Penguin
has currently over 150 million registered users and a revenue of over $50 million.124
When users go to the Club Penguin website, the first thing they need to do is create a new
account. This usually takes a few minutes since all they have to do is enter their email address
and the password they wish to use. Then they activate their account via email. The email must
belong to the user’s parent.
In the game, there are four main things users can do. They can visit places, play games,
buy items at different shops, and play with their pet. Each different place they visit consists of
mini games and different items they can buy, depending on the style of the location. Users have
their own penguin, for which they can buy clothes and other items. Users can also buy clothes
for their pets. They have an igloo with a backyard, for which they can buy furniture. All the
things that users can buy cost coins, which they gain by playing games. Most of the items in the
shop cannot be bought unless the user has a membership. Users without a membership can only
buy simple and small items with the coins they earn from playing the games. Users can buy a
membership for one, six, or 12 months. Of course, the longer they buy the membership for, the
cheaper it is. The membership not only allows users to buy better things at the shop, but it also
allows them to buy more pets, play more mini games, and more.
The games are fairly simple to play and are clearly targeted to young children. They are
fun, and there are many different mini games125 even if you do not have a membership. Some of
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the games are for solo play, and some involve competing against others to win coins. In addition
to competing against other users in games, users can interact with them. Users can chat with
others who are in the same location, throw snowballs, and make other silly gestures towards
them. They can add people as friends, message them, and look at their igloo.
As stated before and well apparent in Club Penguin, the virtual environment and the
activities offered in it seems to foster the imaginative development of the children users.
However, and this is the locus of the harm described in this chapter, the combination of the game
environment coupled with the said activities merely pretend to foster the imagination, encourage
play and create interactions; in practice, all play offered at the website is both restricted heavily
with rules set by the code (ironically the virtual environment, inherently, does not even require
abiding to the rules of nature like gravity etc.) and geared towards consumption. The user’s
choices, activities and eventually status, is determined by the amount of coins purchased with
real money (or earned). There is no pretend play or even free play beyond the heavily moderated
environment set by the virtual world. Consumption, rather than imagination, is the vortex of this
world.
Another virtual world for children is Fantage,126 which was made available to the general
public in April 2008127 and has since expanded into a large online community. By January 2012,
Fantage had over 16 million registered users.128 On December 18, 2014, Fantage announced that
they had gained over 30 million registered users.129
In Fantage, the user can creates either a female or a male character. Users can interact
with other users by adding them as friends, talking to them in the main chat area, sending
messages, playing games, and exploring the virtual world. Users can customize their characters
with different hairstyles, clothing, and more. Fantage is mostly for small children to have fun
and develop new social skills. The game is very safe, and parents can determine how much
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interaction their children have with others (by mistake I cursed during chat and was banned for a
full hour from the game).
There are many different places in this virtual world. Users can play games to earn coins
and use those coins to buy things for their avatar: virtual pet, virtual house, and more. Users can
also join virtual parties and hold their own party where other users can join and play games.
Users can purchase a premium membership for one, six, or 12 months. The membership
provides double coins and gold in the game, which allows users to buy different items. Some
activities and purchases require payment in virtual gold, which can be obtained by buying either
a membership or an amount of gold from the virtual shop. Users can also buy coins at the shop.
The membership provides more benefits as well as the option to dye one’s avatar hair, acquire
more items, collect all the 65 types of virtual pets that are in the game, and more. One special
feature of Fantage is that members can get free items every month, and the longer the
subscription lasts, the more items members can choose.
While the imagination is ‘in the minds eye’, reflecting on internal representations and
dealing with transformation, the virtual world focuses (as part of the media inherent tendency)
on the external, the look and the appearance, rather on the internal nature of objects, interactions
and play. It is a superficial portrayal of a world driven by consumption in which the only things
that matter are the user’s achievements, using money, competition or both.
The last example is Animal Jam,130 launched in 2010 by WildWorks in partnership with
the National Geographic Society. The game, which has experienced 500% year-over-year
growth, has more than 30 million registered players,131 and it is one of the fastest-growing online
kids’ games worldwide.132
When creating a new account in Animal Jam, users need to choose an animal and a
name. Users are also required to provide personal information such as birth date, gender, and a
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parent’s email address. Animal Jam takes place in the world of Jamaa, where players can travel
through various ecological environments. Each environment has different facts, games, shops,
and more.
In the game, users can interact with other users in many different ways: correspond via
chat, send a message, and add friends. Users can join virtual parties, play games to gain gems,
and buy virtual items for their virtual den. There are also virtual places in this world where the
user is provided with fun facts about animals and can watch educational videos.
Users can purchase a membership for one, six, or 12 months, which provides more perks.
The perks allow users to buy everything in games using gems and provide extra gems when
users purchase a membership. They also allow users to have more virtual animals and houses
and to join premium virtual parties. Without a membership, users are limited in terms of what
they can do in the game.
Membership is also required if users wish to adopt virtual pets. The game has an online
shop where users can purchase virtual items, such as diamonds and gems, which can be used to
purchase virtual game items. Users can even purchase real clothing and merchandise based on
the game, such as binders, mouse pads, tote bags, and wrist bands.
By allowing the purchase of real items through the game, Animal Jam proceed even
further than the two other virtual worlds reviewed above by creating a direct connection between
in-game consumption and real world merchandise. While providing educational content which is
not present in the other games described above, Animal Jam is still a profit driven consumption
based game with rules, another example of seemingly pretend play which is in practice a game
with rules based on consumption.

9. The Harm
This chapter has reviewed some of the extant literature on virtual worlds, particularly those
aimed at children, as well as the imagination and its development. I have noted that there is a
great potential for the use of virtual worlds to harm the development of the creative imagination
in the child’s developing mind. Furthermore, I posit that the likely pathway of this harm is that
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virtual worlds, like television, displace the imagination with ready-made images and narratives.
Unlike television, however, virtual worlds further displace the child’s imaginary universe, their
sense of reality versus fantasy, and their creative and symbolic play. They do this while
mimicking the imaginary world that children need to create on their own terms, displacing this
experience as well. For this reason, children experience the virtual world not as a construct of
their imagination, over which they have control, but as an external reality like any other. This
can give rise to serious distortions of normal developing cognitive processes.
I am aware that there is little empirical research to date on the effects of virtual worlds on
children’s cognitive development, let alone the development of the creative imagination. With
this review of the extant literature, and the proposed mechanisms for how virtual worlds disrupt
children’s normal development, it is my hope to suggest a testable hypothesis, and generate
interest in further research. The displacement hypothesis that I herein propose has a long
provenance in the literature and is an extension to new media theories for which there is already
much empirical support. Healy133 reminds us that,
[t]echnology shapes the growing mind. The younger the mind, the more
malleable it is. The younger the technology, the more unproven it is.134
The rapid development of new and untested technologies operating on younger
and younger minds for longer and longer periods of time is in many ways itself a great
experiment, and there seem to be good reasons to believe that it is an ill-conceived one,
with potentially serious consequences.

10. Conclusion
The harm to children’s creative imagination from virtual-world play identified in this
chapter is alarming and relatively new. It represents several “digital-age” harms that are
inherently virtual and intangible and, thus, pose a challenge not only to traditional regulation but
even to modern regulations of virtual space. The following chapters attempt to answer the
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dissertation’s main question: How should we regulate a harm that is both virtual and intangible,
such as the harm to children’s creative imagination?
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Chapter 2 – Regulation: Foundations
Assuming one takes the harm described in chapter 1, supra, seriously, and that it affects
children, the first response might be to regulate one or more of the players and/or factors
involved in this realm, however difficult that might be. But even if the reader does not find this
harm convincing, there are other virtual and intangible harms (e.g., violent media) regarding
which there is a wide agreement that regulation is required. This chapter looks closely at the
literature on regulation to see if, how and where it speaks to the problem of virtual and intangible
harm in general and more specifically to the harm described in chapter 1. To the extent that it
does, how could one conceive of regulation in terms of a harm of this sort. I am not concerned
with practicalities, such as whether there would be any hope that regulation would be instituted
(the political question), or with how, technologically speaking, it could be done. Simply I want
to look for how the particular problem could or would be addressed by a better understanding of
regulation, and thus by regulation itself.
The first chapter established that there are reasons for concern regarding the harm that
virtual worlds use may cause to children’s imaginative development, harm that is both intangible
and virtual. This chapter addresses the foundations of regulation in the context of the said harm.
The first part of this chapter reviews the theoretical definitions of regulation with the goal to
identify a definition that will be broad enough to include virtual and intangible harm. The second
part reviews the goals of regulation to set the path in which the regulatory course of preventing
the said harm should take.

1. Definition of regulation
The term ‘Regulation’ has been defined in several ways.1 Baldwin et al. argue that
regulation refers to the enactment of an authoritative set of rules. These rules are accompanied
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by a mechanism that will monitor and promote compliance.2 The rules, according to Baldwin et
al, refer to any social control mechanisms, including unintentional and non-state processes.3 This
broad definition is suitable for regulating the harm to children’s imagination in virtual worlds as
it allows more flexible approach’s than just laws. When dealing with intangible and virtual harm,
flexibility and non-legal regulation (e.g., code, market, social norms) is important in light of the
unique nature of the harm.
Selznick narrows down the definition of Regulation offered by Baldwin et al. to, “a
sustained and focused control exercised by a public agency over activities that are valued by a
community.”4 In contradiction to Baldwin et al., Selznick argues that non-state and unintentional
‘control mechanisms’ are not considered regulation. Selznick’s narrow definition may bring to a
rigid perceptions of regulation and creates a situation in which one needs to search for a solution
to an intangible and virtual harm outside the realm of regulation. This is not a warranted
situation since remaining within the boundaries of the regulatory definition has its positive
theoretical and practical implications (e.g., compliance, reliability and more).
Examples from the OECD, Canada, Australia and the UK resonate with Selznick’s
narrow definition according to which only government actions are considered regulation. The
OECD defines regulation as,
The full range of legal instruments by which governing institutions, at all levels
of government, impose obligations or constraints on private sector (regulation
is often aimed at the public sector) behavior. Constitutions, parliamentary laws,
subordinate legislation, decrees, orders, norms, licenses, plans, codes and even
some forms of administrative guidance can all be considered as ‘regulation.’5
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The Canadian and Australian governments adopted a similar definition.6 According to
their approach, it is not regulation if it is not enacted through legislation or delegated legislation.
The UK government’s Better Regulation Task Force, in contrast, takes the broad approach
according to which regulation extends beyond government actions, defining regulation as,
[a]ny government measure or intervention that seeks to change the behavior of
individuals or groups, so including taxes, subsidies and other financial
measures.7
However, government is a very fragmented creature. While the Better Regulation Task
Force regards only government actions as regulation, the UK Office of Telecommunications
defines regulation as the operation of market forces.8 The definitions mentioned above, by
governments, indicate that there is an inherent and definitional obstacle in the way of dealing
with an intangible and virtual harm through flexible, non-state and varied regulatory instruments.
The reason for the state-centered, rigid and restricted definitions of regulation may be stemming
from the state desire to be the only regulator, its lack of flexibility or its tendency to act slow.
Nonetheless, as long as the definition of regulation is narrow, it would be challenging to promote
any meaningful, flexible and non state based regulation backed by the government. This in turn
implies that an effective regulation of intangible and virtual harm requires a high level change in
the regulatory thought.
Regulation’s definition was also discussed in the context of policy. Levi-Faur defines
regulation as a policy instrument,9 while Hartle10 sees it as, “[T]he most general policy
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instrument,” and Scott11 argues that in North America, “there is a long tradition of the deliberate
use of regulation as an instrument of public policy.”12 Scott further contends that,
[t]he image of independent regulatory agencies, capable of making technically
expert and correct decisions, isolated from politics and from the courts, is
illusory.13
Contemporary governance, according to Scott,14 “is characterized by fragmentation of
power, rather than its concentration in independent agencies.”15 This observation, Scott argues,
“substantially undermines many of the claimed virtues of regulation as a public policy
instrument.”16 This discussion is relevant to the choice of regulatory tool to deal with the harm to
children’s imaginative development in virtual worlds that is discussed in the next chapter. Once
the harm is assumed and identified, it is a question of great importance whether the regulatory
measures used to deal with the harm are based on empirical evidence, projected efficiency or, as
Scott suggests, political perceptions and influence. In general, the political aspect is beyond the
scope of this dissertation and assumed to be separate from the regulatory sphere.
Sarre and Johnstone17 recognize that regulation in its broader sense can be carried out by
non-state entities, including professional firms (auditors, accountants, and lawyers),
corporations, international interest holders, non-profit organizations,18 citizens, and community
groups. In these concepts of regulation, the state no longer dominates the regulatory processes,
regulation is thus “decentered,” and the state shares the regulatory control with other sub-
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centers.19 This flexible perception of regulation is more suitable for dealing with complex and
new harm which is both intangible and virtual (as the harm to children’s imaginative
development in virtual worlds).
Parker et al20 further contend that for scholars of regulation, the core area of study is
“regulation” in the sense of, “the intentional activity of attempting to control, order or influence
the behavior of others.”21 This definition of regulation is broad, as it is not limited to targeted
rules that are enforced and monitored. This definition is also not limited to the intervention of
the state in the economy and/or civil society. Regulation is usually considered an activity that
restricts behavior and prevents certain undesirable activities from happening (a “red light”
concept22). But the influence of regulation may also be enabling or facilitative (“green light”).
An example is the regulation of the airwaves that allows broadcasting operations to be conducted
in an ordered fashion and not left to the potential chaos of an uncontrolled market.23
Ellickson24 illustrates this distinction by stating that, “systems of social control typically
employ both rewards and punishments – both carrots and sticks – to influence behavior.”25 In
managing these negative and positive measures, enforcers usually apply rules dividing human
behavior into three categories: (1) good behavior deserving rewards, (2) bad behavior that needs
to be altered, and (3) ordinary behavior that requires no response.26 The case of harm to
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children’s imagination in virtual worlds and intangible and virtual harm in general is more
complex and does not fall within one of these definitions. Although the theory contends that any
use of virtual worlds (and media in general) could be harmful to children’s imaginative
development, it would be challenging to argue that using virtual worlds is a bad behaviour that
needs to be altered. The harm discussed in this dissertation falls into a fourth category of
behaviour which is neither good or bad but that requires intervention as it can cause harm.
To achieve the desired ends, according to Ogus,27 two kinds of tools are employed: (1)
legal regulation that details the implications of legal rules; individuals are either compelled or
receive incentives by an authority – the state – to behave in certain ways, with sanctions as a
threat if they do not comply or the incentive of rewards if they comply; (2) other kinds of
regulation that are not directly related to rules, such as, among others, code, information, and
education. In general, three basic requirements are incorporated into the regulatory regime:
standards setting, monitoring compliance with the standards, and mechanisms for enforcing the
standards. It is important to note that most standards have no mechanisms for compliance
enforcement.
In this context, Ogus28 recognizes two general types of regulation: social regulation and
economic regulation. Social regulation is the interest of the public to justify regulation, which
addresses such matters as environmental protection, health and safety, and consumer protection.
Social regulation focuses on two types of market failure. First, individuals contracting or about
to contract with firms that supply goods or services often lack adequate information regarding
the quality offered by suppliers; as a result, a market that is not regulated may fail to meet their
preferences. Second, even if the issue of inadequate information does not arise, market
transactions may have externalities (spill-over effects) that can drastically and negatively affect
individuals who are not part of the transactions.
A third type of market failure, not mentioned by Ogus, that lies at the heart of this
dissertation is the inability of individuals to avoid the harm embedded in the service they
consume. The market-failure approach assumes that the market is able to address every problem
but sometimes fails to do so. As markets evolve, we need to understand that this assumption
27
28
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does not apply to failures that are constructed in the market and can hardly be referred to as
market failures. This is especially true with regard to intangible and virtual harm relating to
children.
The more intangible the harm, the harder it is to prove it and identify its characteristics.
In addition, there is an inherent inclination to treat virtual harms as less dangerous than nonvirtual or tangible harms. This inclination is not only wrong but dangerous and could be proved
wrong for intangible and virtual harms and their consequences. The danger is in the nature of
these harms and their consequences since they tend to be hidden from view (as in the current
case study of the under-developed imagination); hence, it is harder to prevent and these damages
that may be detected only when the harm has already been done. Moreover, even the damage is
so embedded and fundamental, that it is very hard to detect, it reveals only over time and even
then in ways that are hard to refer to the original cause.
For example, if we assume that the use of virtual worlds by children cause harm to their
imagination development, how will we detect in the future that their imagination is
underdeveloped? And even if we will be able to detect that this is the case, how can we prove
that this is a result of virtual worlds use and not a consequence of other intervening factors?
These challenges place the regulation of intangible and virtual harm at the center of a chicken
and egg scenario thus requiring a different approach than the traditional approach to regulation.
In this respect, Bogart29 argues that modern market economies are predicated on
consumption. A multitude of interventions have attempted to control excessive consumption in
its many forms. According to Bogart, consumption is permitted, but harmful effects are
discouraged through various legal interventions. Society judges that, whatever benefits would
accrue from banning a particular form of consumption, such advantages are outweighed by the
costs that would be incurred.
Prohibition is an exception to this tendency and is used only sparingly, for example,
banning children from the use of alcohol, tobacco, marijuana,30 gambling and the criminalization
29
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of impaired driving (but how effective these prohibitions actually are is another question that is
entertained). Instead, regulatory efforts aim not to forbid consumption but to suppress excessive
use.
For example, in the case of tobacco, safe consumption means zero consumption since
there is no safe level of smoking. This does not mean that smoking is sanctioned, but it is
strongly discouraged through the use of deterring images on the package that graphically
illustrate the damages. The sale of cigarettes to children is obviously forbidden and strictly
sanctioned, as is the use of alcohol. With regard to alcohol, regulation means encouraging
consumption of moderate amounts for enjoyment and to bolster health but discouraging use
while driving. In the case of marijuana, regulation means limiting the purchase amount and
taxing the sales to support education,31 while keeping it away from children and schools.
In her work to find a conclusive definition of regulation, Black,32 summarizes three
definitions that are mentioned in the literature:
(1) regulation is the promulgation of rules by government accompanied by
mechanisms for monitoring and enforcement, usually assumed to be performed
through a specialist public agency;
(2) regulation is any form of direct state intervention in the economy, whatever
form that intervention might take;
(3) regulation is all mechanisms of social control or influence affecting all
aspects of behavior from whatever source, whether they are intentional or not.
According to Black, scholars adopt different definitions, implicitly or explicitly, in
different writings. For example, in the introduction to their Reader on Regulation, Baldwin,
Scott, and Hood adopt all three definitions;33 in their book Understanding Regulation, Baldwin
and Cave adopt the first two. They add “decentered,” thus potentially arguing that regulation is
Stuart Hunter, 5 Reasons Denver Is Now More Weed-Friendly Than Amsterdam, HuffingtonPost.com, (January 23,
2014), available at http://www.huffingtonpost.com/news/colorado-marijuana-laws (last visited April 26, 2016).
31
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also the making, monitoring, and enforcing of rules by non-governmental actors.34 In Regulation
Inside Government, Hood et al. adopt only the first definition, adding that the “regulator” has an
official mandate to moderate the behavior of the “regulate” and seek to change it.35 In their book
on telecommunications regulation, Hall, Hood, and Scott adopt the third definition when they
write of regulators being “regulated” by culture.36
Finally, Black37 defines regulation as,
[t]he sustained and focused attempt to alter the behavior of others according to
defined standards or purposes with the intention of producing a broadly
identified outcome or outcomes, which may involve mechanisms of standardsetting, information-gathering and behavior-modification.
I adopt Black’s definition of regulation as a starting point for the regulatory framework to
be developed in this dissertation. The main reason for doing so is the broad scope of Black’s
definition and its inclusion of non-governmental forms of regulation. Regulation in its broad
scope provides more and diverse instruments of regulation and enables a more creative approach
than does the formal definition of governmental formal instruments mentioned above.
Nonetheless, a problematic aspect of this definition in the stated context emerges in the
words, “… alter the behavior of others….” As will be explained at the end of the following
section, some of the problematic characteristics of virtual worlds are inherent in those worlds,
and therefore, dealing with them lies outside the relationship between the operators of virtual
worlds and the child users. Traditional regulation usually applies to a binary and simple world:
regulatees and protected subjects. The regulator regulates the regulatees’ behavior to protect the
subjects. However, it is challenging when the problematic characteristics are inherent in the
regulatees’ product and the harm cannot be prevented or reduced directly through the product.
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Aside from the challenging text mentioned above, Black’s definition as adopted situates
the harm to the development of children’s imaginations on solid ground as a situation that can be
regulated.

2. Goals of regulation
The theoretical framework of the goals of regulation is important in order to set the end
goal of regulating an intangible and virtual harm as the one discussed in chapter 1, supra, harm
to the imaginative development of children using virtual worlds. Identifying a theoretical end
goal is important in order to determine the actual practical goals of regulation to prevent the said
harm. While this dissertation attempts to determine the most efficient regulation to prevent the
said harm – identifying an end goal, both theoretical and practical, is a crucial step in the process
of outlining the solution.
According to Haines and Gurney,38 “good regulatory practice focuses on the outcomes of
regulatory aims, not with obsessive concern about compliance with prescriptive rules”.39 Parker
emphasizes the importance of flexibility in the regulatory process in order to achieve superior
results.40 The nature of a virtual and intangible harm calls for flexibility and focus on the
outcome of the prescribed regulation. Prescriptive rules may miss the prevention of the harm all
altogether by employing a rigid regulatory regime that is hard to implement and measures where
the factors relevant to the harm are hard to measure and quantify. The virtual and intangible
character of the harm to children’s imaginative development in virtual worlds requires an
holistic approach that focuses on the outcome rather than the means to achieve the goal.
Yet another aspect of regulatory goals and achieving these goals is compliance.
Gunningham and Johnstone talk about, ‘culture of compliance’ in which the regulatees are
committed to the regulatory goals.41 Hopkins argues that strong leadership is an important factor
38
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to bring to compliance with the regulatory goals,42 while Sitkin and Beis recommend avoiding
strategic use of regulations as it fails to achieve the regulatory goals.43 Even if the approach is
flexible and holistic in trying to address the harm to children’s imaginative development, lack of
compliance may yield poor results. Nonetheless, it is the ‘culture of compliance’ and not
compliance per se that is required in order to render the regulation efficient. An understanding
and acknowledgment that there is a harm and its consequences by all the actors in this regulatory
sphere is the first and most essential step in creating a ‘culture of compliance’. The second step
is the realization of the parties involved that the suggested regulation is appropriate,
proportional, efficient and warranted in light of the potential harmful consequences of the harm.
The challenge is to convince the involved parties that there is a harm, that this harm can be
severe and that the regulation can relax it if compliance is practiced by all the players involved.
Parker argues that linking regulatory aims with business goals enhances compliance.44 A
rational enforcement strategy underpins this ideal. According to Sitking and Beis, this means
adopting a stepwise progression of penalties for non-compliance.45 Such a framework not only
promotes the benefits of compliance but also reduces the costs of non-compliance. When dealing
with complex regulatory challenges such as the challenge with virtual and intangible harm,
sophisticated systems of compliance as the stepwise progression penalty mentioned by Sitking
and Beis may be helpful in maximizing the benefits of a chosen regulatory regime. Rather than
employing a ‘one size fit all’ solution that would be rigid, non-responsive and thus inefficient,
employing a gradual solution with business goals in mind would be helpful to decrease the harm
to children’s imaginative development in virtual worlds.
Nonetheless, even if these ideas seem attractive, approaches that assume a single
regulatory goal have limits. In regulation, multiple goals often exist, and some of these goals
may conflict. When conflict between regulatory goals arises, focusing on results, employing a
singular “compliance culture,” or following a specific enforcement strategy may miss the
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regulatory task altogether and over-emphasize its simplicity. For example, in the case at hand we
want to protect children’s imagination while maintaining the children’s good relationship with
their parents, and protect the virtual worlds’ companies freedom of speech. Only a ‘compliance
culture’ will enable a solution that on one hand protects the interests of the parties involved, and
on the other hand, leads to a solution to prevent the harm or at least, decrease it.
An example of other, more general conflicts within regulatory goals include conflicts
between worker safety and worker pregnancy,46 worker safety and disabled workers’ rights,47
laws on competition and the protection of the environment,48 health and anti-trust,49 indigenous
rights and environmental protection,50 as well as equity of access, environmental goals, and
utilities privatization.51 Haines and Gurney52 contend that these conflicts between regulatory
goals illustrate that regulation is a political activity, “Political exigencies that underlie regulation
shape both what is identified as a risk and the nature of any trade off”.53 Hood’s work54 supports
the notion that there is an ideological conflict between different regulatory regimes. Hood argues
that there are fundamental paradigm differences between the many justifications for regulation
and notions of an ideal regulatory framework. Further conflict related to the case of children’s
imaginative development in virtual worlds can be found in the tension between the government
desire to encourage business enterprises, especially technology oriented ones, to further their
capacity and success (i.e. virtual worlds companies), against the general social desire to protect
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children. This tension between technological advancement and children’s well being and the
question of how to reconcile this tension lies at the heart of this dissertation.
In this context, Sarre and Johnstone55 mention that regulatory theorists frequently talk of
seeking out the optimal “regulatory mix” and not relying on one form of regulatory technique.56
One concern is how various regulatory tools impact (or fail to impact) daily life in an attempt to
order it according to some set of norms.57 This concern also relates to the extent to which the
regulation values and techniques fit with pre-existing social ordering and norms in the target
population.58 There is strong evidence that apparently effective regulation that is not responsive
to non-legal norms will ultimately fail to accomplish its goals.59 In the case of the harm to
children’s imagination in virtual worlds, many non-legal norms are set in the background, such
as: children’s need to play, parents and children’s relationship and the virtual worlds companies
right to sell. Therefore, creating a regulatory mix that will be responsive to these norms is
challenging. The more the suggested regulation will rest in harmony with these factors, the more
it will be efficient and less disruptive.
Selznick argues that the common-law tradition embodies a distinctively communitarian
ideal: the integration of law and society. Therefore, Selznick argues that this integration is a key
to social justice.60 Justice requires a responsive legal order.61 Considerations such as these seem
to demand a different view of law and its appropriate relationship to government from that of
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simple legal instrumentalism. For example, Habermas62 insists that law be considered primarily
not as a policy instrument but as an institution, an expression, or framework, in some sense, of
existing structures of social life, while Lange63 argues that, “space is becoming an increasingly
important concept in the analysis of legal regulation.” We want to create a system of regulatory
instruments to approach the said harm. This is a close system where every aspect affects another
or many other aspects and unless there is harmony in the system, the outcome may not be
efficient. Only by considering all the factors and parties involved will we be able to present an
efficient solution that will decrease the harm without causing new challenges.
Another aspect that has been marked as fundamental for effective regulation is the mix of
regulatory entities. Ayres and Braithwaite64 argue that good policy analysis is not about
choosing between the free market and government regulation, or deciding what the law should
prescribe. They suggest that an understanding of private regulation, and its interdependence with
state regulation is required to achieve the mix of private and public regulation. We can conclude
that the principle of ‘one size fits all’ is a complete stranger to the efficient regulation of virtual
and intangible harm to children’s imagination in virtual worlds and therefore a regulatory mix –
both of the regulatory instruments and of the regulatory entities involved, is the right approach to
be taken to address the said harm. Only flexibility in the regulatory space will allow relevant and
efficient response to this challenging harm.
In this context, Gunningham and Sinclair65 propose two necessary components of a
successful regulatory design: regulatory design principles66 and instrument mixes.67 These
components will be used in the following chapters as a theoretical framework that drives the
search for an answer to this dissertation question: how should we regulate a harm which is both
intangible and virtual. The first component, regulatory design principles, will be discussed below
while the second component, instrument mixes, will be discussed at the end of the next chapter.
62
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Regulatory design principles are classified into four types:68
(1) identification of the desired policy goal(s) and trade-offs necessary to achieve it – in
the case of the harm to imagination in children’s virtual worlds, as much as in the case of
advertising to children (see chapter 6, infra) the policy goal is to reduce the said harm
while maintaining both the children and the virtual worlds companies’ freedom of speech
(see chapter 5, infra). Another aspect of the trade offs is balancing the interests of the
players in the regulatory sphere, i.e. the children, the parents, and the virtual worlds
companies (see chapter 7, infra).
(2) identification of the unique characteristics of the problem being addressed – the harm
is hard to prove and measure (see chapter 1, supra); the harm is new and stems from new
technologies (see chapter 4, infra); while it is a public interest to encourage use of new
technologies, it should be done in moderation to prevent deleterious effects; complex
social interactions are involved as children-parents relationships (see chapter 7, infra).
(3) identification of the range of potential regulatory participants and policy instruments –
as said above, there are multiple and diverse participants in the regulatory realm of the
harm discussed, mainly: the user children, their parents, virtual worlds companies, the
state, school, children’s friends, and society in general. The policy or regulatory
instruments will be discussed in details in the next chapter.
(4) identification of opportunities for consultation and public participation – there are
many opportunities for consultation and public participation in this regulatory realm. Issues
to be discussed include the fragile and complex relationship between parents and children,
including the school environment; the regulation of the internet from a public point of view
(see chapter 4, infra); and aspects of freedom of speech in the view of the participants and
the public (see chapter 5, infra).
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3. Conclusion
Given Black’s broad definition of regulation, the harm described in chapter 1 comes
within this definition and is considered a regulatory realm to be considered within regulation’s
theoretical framework. With the goals of regulation in mind, Gunningham and Sinclair’s
regulatory design principles sets the framework to move to the second step of the regulatory
discussion brought in the next chapter – regulatory instruments. The next chapter will detail the
regulatory instruments and their suitability for the harm discussed in chapter 1.
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Chapter 3 - Regulatory Instruments
In the previous chapter the working definition of regulation was established and the goals
of regulation were determined in order to set the theoretical framework for a discussion of the
regulation of a virtual and intangible harm as the harm described in chapter 1, supra. This
chapter will discuss the regulatory instruments available and their suitability to deal with the said
harm in an efficient way.
According to Ogus,1 policymakers can choose from a range of regulatory instruments
classifiable according to the degree of state intervention required. Bronwen et al2 classify
regulatory instruments by the underlying “modality” through which the control of behavior is
sought. They identify five classes:
1.

Command and Control – the government commands and the regulatee needs to obey

otherwise he/she will be sanctioned;
2.

Competition - regulation instruments that facilitate competition among regulated

entities using incentives (‘green light’ regulation). It should be mentioned that often
industry players are interested in enforced regulation in order to prevent competition and
maintain other competitors from entering the market.
3.

Consensus - can come in different forms (i.e. enforced self-regulation, performance

based regulation, etc.) and relates to the process of the regulatee’s regulating itself.
4.

Communication - less intrusive forms of regulation like forcing industry to provide

information to consumer or education measures taken by the state or industry in order to
enhance knowledge and prevent harm.
5.

Code (or architecture) - the use of technology (or other practical means) to prevent

unwanted behavior. This last modality will be discussed in detail in the context of the
internet in the next chapter.
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These four modalities (Code will be discussed in detail in the next chapter) and the
regulatory instruments they entail will be discussed below in the context of their suitability to
regulate a virtual and intangible harm as the one discussed in chapter 1, supra. Further, a short
discussion of paternalism and compliance will follow as these two components are crucial
aspects of any kind of regulation. The underlying assumption of this chapter is that the most
efficient regulatory regime would be a mix of regulatory instruments with an emphasis on the
fourth modality of information. This assumption will be subject to the consequences of dealing
with a virtual harm as discussed in chapter 4 infra, the constraints of the freedom of speech as
discussed in chapter 5 infra, the lessons drawn from the regulation of advertising online detailed
in chapter 6 infra and finally, the aspects of regulation at home as discussed in chapter 7 infra.
The goal of this chapter is to set the theoretical framework, based on the grounds set in
chapter 2, supra, for a mix of regulatory instruments that would be efficient in dealing with a
virtual and intangible harm as the harm described in chapter 1, supra. While the discussion is
theoretical and doctrinal, the implication to the case at hand are specific and illustrative.

1. Command and control
The literature discusses the pros and cons of command and control as a regulatory regime
and instrument, and the principles of command-and-control design. The studies conclude that it
is an inherently unsuitable regulatory instrument for successfully and efficiently regulating a
virtual and intangible harm such as the one discussed in this dissertation, mainly because the
rigid nature of command and control regulation and the need to have a well defined and tangible
factor or factors to be controlled.
The typical starting point for understanding regulatory instruments is an examination of
command-based mechanisms for regulating behavior. This is also the instrument with which
lawyers are most familiar. Command and control involves legal rules promulgated by the state in
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order to prohibit specified conduct. These rules are underpinned by coercive sanctions (either
civil or criminal in nature). Ojo3 argues that,
The ability to define the expected behavior of regulatees with immense clarity
constitutes the major strength of command and control regulation.4 Not only
does this enable breaches of the legal standard and legal enforcement to be
identified in a relatively simple manner, it defines limits of regulators’
operations which enables individuals and firms to have a clearer understanding
of their regulatory obligations.5
Latin6 suggests that command-and-control regulation has advantages that extend beyond
the advantages identified with more tailored and flexible instruments. Nonetheless, commandand-control is criticized for its rigidity, which contributes to economic inefficiency.
Black7 argues that many people’s core understanding of “regulation” as a form of
“command and control” is based on the notion of regulation administered by the state using legal
rules enforced by (often criminal) sanctions. In many cases, “command and control” has also
become shorthand to denote all that can be bad about regulation, including rigidity, poorly
targeted rules, under- or over-enforcement, ossification, and unintended consequences.
Sinclair8 contends that command-and-control regulation is accused of stifling innovation,
being costly and inefficient, inviting enforcement difficulties,9 and focusing on “end-of-pipe”10
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solutions.11 Whether command and control lives up to this criteria is an empirical question.12 It is
more relevant for this discussion to assert that command-and-control regulation posits a
particular role for the state against which the “decentering” analysis is counterpoised. Command
and control is “centered” in that it assumes the state’s capacity to command and control, to be
autonomous of the regulatees, to be the only regulator, and to be potentially effective in this role.
Command and control is assumed to be based on relations of simple cause-effect, to be
unilateral in its approach (state telling, regulatees doing), and to envisage a linear progression
from policy formation to implementation.
Within the so-called command-and-control approach to agency regulation, major tasks
are perceived to be rule-making, enforcement, and application of sanctions. The design of
appropriate regulatory rules has been the subject of a substantial and growing literature.13 A wide
variety of parameters to describe legal rules have been identified: generality and clarity,14
comprehensibility,15 accuracy of prediction,16 determinacy,17 weight,18 value,19 and consistency
with social purpose.20 Rules have been treated by some analysts as having four dimensions: (1)
substance (what the rule says), (2) character (whether it is permissive or mandatory: may or

11

A. Moran, Tools of Environmental policy: Market Instruments Versus Command-and-Control, In R.
Eckersley (ed.), Markets, the State and the Environment: Towards Integration, South Melbourne:
Macmillan Education Australia (1995); Janis D. Bernstein, Alternative Approaches to Pollution Control
and Waste Management: Regulatory and Economic Instruments, Washington, D.C.: The World Bank for
Urban management programme (1993); Richard B. Stewart, Models for Environmental Regulation: Central
Planning Versus Market-Based Approaches 19 Boston College Environmental Affairs Law Review 547-62
(1992); Robert W. Hahn & Robert N. Stavins, Incentive-Based Environmental Regulation: A New Era from
an Old Idea? 18(1) Ecology Law Quarterly 1-42 (1991); Arnold W. Reitze, Jr., A Century of Pollution
Control Law: What’s Worked; What’s Failed; What Might Work 21 Environmental Law 1549-1646 (1991);
Cass R. Sunstein, The Paradoxes of the Regulatory State, University of Chicago Law Review 407-41
(1990); Robert A. Leone, Who Profits?: Winners, Losers, and Government Regulation, New York: Basic
Books (1986).
12
See R. Baldwin, C. Scott & C. Hood, A Reader on Regulation, New York: Oxford University Press,
(1998); N. Gunningham & P. Grabosky, Smart Regulation: Designing Environmental Policy, Oxford:
Clarendon Press 38-50 (1998).
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Baldwin, supra note 12.
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Lon L. Fuller, The Morality of Law, New Haven: Yale University Press 46-49, 63-65 (Revised ed. 1969).
15
H. L. A. Hart, The Concept of Law, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 121 (1961).
16
J. Frank, Law and the modern Mind, New York: Brentano’s 118-19 (1930).
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R. Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press 24-26 (1977).
18
Id., at 26-28; J. Raz, Legal Principles and the Limits of Law 81 Yale L. J. 832-33 (1972).
19
See, e.g., R. Posner, Economic Analysis of Law, Aspen 419-21 (2nd ed. 1977); M. Landes & R. A. Posner,
Legal Precedent: A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis 19 J. L. & Econ. 263-64 (1976).
20
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shall), (3) status (its legal force and the sanction attached to it), and (4) structure. Rule type is a
function of only three of the dimensions: character, status/sanction, and structure.21
For regulators and regulatees, one of the key issues is a particular rule’s ideal degree of
precision. Diver22 defines the concept of rule precision and distinguishes three qualities of
regulatory rules: transparency, accessibility, and congruence. Transparency is defined by Diver
as the rule-maker’s will to use, “words with well-defined and universally accepted meanings
within the relevant community.”23 Accessibility is the rule-maker’s will to make the rule
“accessible” to its intended audience, “[t]hat is, applicable to concrete situations without
excessive difficulty or effort.”24 Finally, a policymaker will care about whether the content of his
communicated message will produce the desired behavior.25
Although criticized as mentioned above, command-and-control regulation is still the
major regulatory instrument in use. Nonetheless, as virtual worlds redefine compliance,
enforcement, and efficiency, command and control becomes unsuitable for addressing harm to
children’s imaginations.
In a geographically borderless virtual world, enforcement becomes contested as an issue
of jurisdiction. Moreover, the application of command-and-control standards to intangible harmprevention faces compatibility challenges because the nature of the harm is hard to prove
empirically and to quantify. While an element of command-and-control may be part of a mix of
regulatory instruments as will be discussed in the end of this chapter, employing a strict regime
21

Baldwin et al., supra note 12.
Colin S. Diver, The Optimal Precision of Administrative Rules 93 Yale L. J. 66. (1983-1984)
23
Id., at 67. Jerry Mashaw uses the term “transparency” to describe a similar idea (J. Mashaw,
Administrative Due Process: The Quest for a Dignitary Theory 61 B. U. L. Rev. 901(1981). It is
presumably this same notion that Hart has in mind when speaking of rules “which multitudes of individuals
could understand,” (Hart, supra note 15, at 121), that Fuller has in mind when speaking of a rule’s
“clarity,” (Fuller, supra note 14, at 63-65), and that Kennedy describes as “formal realizability,” (D.
Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication 89 Harv. L Rev. 1687-88 (1976).
24
Diver, supra note 22, at 67; See G. Tullock, Trials on Trial: A Pure Theory of Legal Procedure, New
York: Columbia University Press 180 (1980); J. F. Brodley, In Defence of Presumptive Rules: An
Approach to Legal Rulemaking for Conglomerate Mergers, In R. Blair & R. Lanzilloti (eds.), The
Conglomerate Corporation: An Antitrust Law and Economics Symposium, Greenwood Press, 255-60
(1981).
25
For a graphic representation of this point, see J. Tussman & J. tenBroek, The Equal Protection of the
Laws 37 Calif. L. Rev. 346-49 (1949) (discussing passage of a hypothetical law for sterilization of
suspected hereditary criminals); see also Cabell v. Chavez-Salido, 454 U.S. 432, 440 (1982) (defining
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of command-and–control to deal with an intangible and virtual harm would be unsuitable, rigid
and inefficient. The new and innovative regulatory sphere of virtual and intangible harm requires
an innovative approach which usually runs contrary to command-and-control regime.

2. Competition
There are many disadvantages associated with using command-and-control regulation.
The extent of these disadvantages seem to convince regulators to refrain from using such
regulation. These disadvantages are part of the reason for the shift toward regulatory instruments
that take advantage of the competitive forces that exist among competing actors. There are
various such instruments available, often referred to as economic instruments, including taxes,
charges, subsidies, changes in liability rules, and tradable emissions.
The OECD26 defines economic instruments as,
Instruments that affect costs and benefits of alternative actions open to
economic agents, with the effect of influencing behavior in a way favourable to
the environment.
In this regard, it is important to note that sometimes the target industry wants to be
regulated in order to prevent competition with other actors that the regulation will prevent from
entering the market. Ogus27 argues that,
The general disenchantment with traditional regulatory forms which has
emerged in the last two decades has led to pressure not only to deregulate but
also to experiment with other regulatory forms which encourage the desired
behavior by financial incentives rather than by legal compulsion. Such
incentives can be either negative (conduct is legally unconstrained but if a firm
chooses to act in an undesired way it must pay a charge) or positive (if a firm
chooses to act in a desired way it is awarded a subsidy).

26
27

OECD, Environemntal Policy: How to Apply Economic Instruments 10 OECD (1991).
A. Ogus, Costs and Cautionary Tales – Economic Insights for the Law, Portland: Hart (2006).
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Supporters of economic instruments claim that these instruments are able to deal
successfully with command-and-control regulation many challenges. Command-and-control
often requires centrally formulated complex and detailed set of standards; whereas broad target
goals can be the basis for the functionality of economic instruments, while reducing the costs of
administrative handling and information providing, for both the firms and the regulators.28
Further, the freedom level enabled by economic instruments creates development incentives for
firms. For example, tax credit awarded for reduced toxic waste production may encourage more
efficient production process. Third, while there is considerable uncertainty in the enforcement of
command-and-control with respect to prosecution, apprehension, and the level of sanctions,
economic instruments ensure payment of specific sums. Fourth, the funds generated by negative
economic instruments (i.e., charges) can be used to compensate the victims of externalities; this
compensation is rarely possible in command-and-control regimes.
Typically, arguments for the use of economic instruments, have been presented in terms
of their advantages over command-and-control regulation.29 Command instruments of
environmental regulation have been criticized for being administratively complex and costly,
rigid, and failing to produce sufficient incentives for business to reach beyond the regulatory
floor.30 Although some command-and-control regimes have incentive effects, such as
administrative pricing, they are not market-based, as governments effectively control resource
allocation. Nonetheless, the strongest argument in favor of economic instruments is their cost
effectiveness.31
Markets are a powerful player on the regulatory board. Competition aligns with market
perceptions, it is easy to enforce, provides certainty and can generate income to the government.
Yet, when the harm is embedded at the heart of the product, as in the case at hand, the markets
28

Cf. Benjamin J. Richardson, Economic instruments in UK Environmental Law Reform: Is the UK
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171 (2000).
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See N. O. Keohane, R. L. Revesz & R. N. Stavins, The Choice of Regulatory Instruments in
Environmental Policy 22(2) Harvard Environmental L. Rev 313 (1998); J. van Dunne (ed.), New
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may fail to prevent the harm. On the contrary, it can fiercen the competition and create
potentially more harm. Nonetheless, incentives can be associated with encouraging the virtual
worlds companies to engage in communication based regulation. As will be discussed below,
this communication may increase the knowledge and awareness of the harm’s existence, its
potential danger, the long term implications and the potential protection measures.

3. Consensus
The notion of regulatee’s regulating themselves is appealing at first impression.
Regulatees should have the knowledge, expertise and ability to identify the harm, regulate
themselves to prevent it and make sure they comply with the regulation. Nonetheless, beside its
flexibility and alleged cost effectiveness, self regulation has encountered criticism for creating a
flexible regulatory regime that seek first and foremost to satisfy the regulatee’s interests and only
then look at the harm and the ways to decrease or prevent it.
According to Ojo,32 the term “decentering regulation” is intended to emphasize the idea
that there is no monopoly on regulation by governments and that such a monopoly should not
exist. Regulation is conducted by other actors as well: collective associations, large
organizations, professions, technical committees, and so forth. This occurs without the
government's involvement or even formal approval.33 Decentered regulation also refers to
changes taking place within government and administration. These changes manifest in the
internal fragmentation of policy formation and implementation.34 Black35 contends that,
Since we are familiar with the notion of the "regulatory state',36 and even with
that of a 'new regulatory state',37 we should also begin to take seriously the
notion of a 'regulatory society' in which we recognize that regulation is not
'centered' on the state, but instead is 'decentered', diffused throughout society.
32

Marianne Ojo, Responsive Regulation: Achieving the Right Balance Between Persuasion and
Penalisation, 14170 MPRA 2 (March 19, 2009).
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36
G. Majone, The Rise of the Regulatory State in Western Europe 17 West European Politics 77 (1994).
37
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Streeck and Schmitter38 argue that associations, the “private interest governments,”
should be added to the governing alternatives of bureaucracies (hierarchies) and markets.
Regulation is often perceived as the outcome of the interactions of networks or,
alternatively, “webs of influence” that operate in the absence of formal governmental or legal
sanctions.39 Therefore, in an understanding of decentered regulation, the role of formal authority
is ambiguous, and regulation is a product of activity. Teubner40 argues that,
Any regulatory intervention that attempts to change social institutions will face
the possibility that it is either:
(1) 'irrelevant'; that is, it is ineffective because people fail to comply;

(2) 'produces disintegrating effects on the social area or social life'; that is, it is
non-responsive to existing norms, values, and social orderings;
(3) produces 'disintegrating effects on regulatory law itself'; that is it is
incoherent.
These regulatory flow’s: being ineffective, non-responsive and incoherent, will be further
discussed in chapter 4, infra, regarding the regulation of the internet and in chapter 7, infra,
regarding regulation at home as both of these institutions, the virtual space and the family, are
social institutions with defined rules, players and interactions.

3.1 Self-regulation
According to Baldwin and Cave,41 self-regulation is,
The exercise of control by a group of firms or individuals, over its membership
and their behavior. Variables of self-regulation consist of the governmental
38

P. Streeck & P. Schmitter, Community, Market, State and Associations? The Prospective Contribution of
Interest Governance to Social Order, In P. Streeck & P. Schmitter (eds.), Private Interest Government:
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nature of self-regulation, the level of involvement of self-regulators and the
extent of the binding legal force which is connected to self-regulatory rules.42
Claims in favor of self-regulation or the incorporation of components of selfregulation into governmental regulation are based on arguments related to
expertise and efficiency.43
The case of Coase Theorem, theorizing that legal measures will not force compliance and
Ellickson’s field experiment with cattle growers, illustrates the advantages of self-regulation.
In the most cited law article “The Problem of Social Cost,” Coase suggested as a
fundamental example a conflict between a farmer raising crops and a neighboring rancher
running cattle.44 Coase used this parable to illustrate what has come to be known as the Coase
Theorem.45 In its strongest form, this counterintuitive proposition states that when transaction
costs46 are zero, a change in the rule of liability will have no effect on the allocation of resources.
For example, assuming these assumptions are met, Caose’s theorem predicts that holding a
rancher liable for damage done by his trespassing cattle would not cause the rancher to take
precautionary measures such as reducing his herd’s size, erecting more fencing, or keeping a
closer watch on his livestock. In theory, a rancher who is liable for trespass damage has a legal
incentive to implement all cost-justified measures to control his cattle. But Coase argues that
42

Id., at 125-126.
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even if the law were to decline to make the rancher liable, the potential trespass-control victims
would pay the rancher to implement identical trespass-control measures to the ones that the corn
grower has implemented. In short, the parties involved internalize market forces and, thus, all
costs in the transaction, regardless of the rule of liability. This theorem has undoubtedly been the
most fruitful and the most controversial proposition to arise out of the law-and-economics
movement.47
Coase was fully aware that negotiating agreements, obtaining information, and litigating
disputes are all potentially costly. Therefore, his Farmer-Rancher Parable might not portray
accurately how landowners in rural areas would respond to a change in trespass law.48
Nonetheless, law-and-economics scholars believe that when only two parties are in conflict,
transaction costs are indeed often trivial.49 These scholars therefore might assume, as Coase
likely would not, that the parable accurately predicts how rural landowners would resolve cattletrespass disputes.
In an account of how residents of rural Shasta County, California resolve various disputes
that arise from wayward cattle, Ellickson’s50 principle finding is that Shasta County neighbors
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apply informal norms, rather than legal rules, to resolve most of the issues. According to
Ellickson,51
Shasta County neighbors, it turns out, do not behave as Coase portrays them as
behaving in the Farmer-Rancher Parable.52 Neighbors in fact are strongly inclined
to cooperate, but they achieve cooperative outcomes not by bargaining from
legally established entitlements, as the parable supposes, but rather by developing
and enforcing adaptive norms of neighborliness that trump formal legal
entitlements. Although the route chosen is not the one that the parable anticipates,
the end reached is exactly the one that Coase predicted: coordination to mutual
advantage without supervision by the state.
Ellickson further contends that order often arises out of mutual understanding. Although
many other writers have recognized this point,53 it remains counterintuitive and cannot be
repeated too often. It is not surprising that those who favor expanding the role of government in
regulation do not appreciate non-hierarchical systems of social control such as those pointed out
by Ellickson.
Although Coase’s writing tends to support decentered regulation, in “The Problem of
Social Cost” he adopts the “legal centralist” view, arguing that the state functions as the sole
creator of operative rules of entitlement among individuals. In so doing, Coase repeats an
approach dating back to Thomas Hobbes.54 According to Hobbes, all would be endless civil
strife without a Leviathan (government) to issue and enforce commands. The Shasta County
evidence shows that Hobbes was much too quick to equate anarchy with chaos.
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Id., at 3-4.
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Ellickson55 argues that many entitlements, especially workday entitlements, can arise out
of mutual understanding. People may supplement, and indeed pre-empt, rules of their own with
the state’s rules.56 Ellickson concludes that,
A centerpiece of the theory is the hypothesis that, to govern their workaday
interactions, members of a close-knit group tend to develop informal norms
whose content serves to maximize the objective welfare of group members.
This hypothesis suggests that the choice of informal custom over law is done
not only because custom tends to be administratively cheaper but also because
the substantive content of customary rules is more likely to be welfare
maximizing.57
Because the potential harm caused by virtual worlds to the development of children’s
imaginations is a consequence of an interaction between unequal forces, the operators of virtual
worlds and child users, Ellickson’s norms-based regulation might be irrelevant. Moreover,
placing liability on the virtual worlds companies for damages caused to children as the Coase
Theorem suggests, may not encourage the virtual worlds companies to ‘erect virtual fences’ in
order to prevent the damages to the children.
Both in Coase Theorem and in Ellickson’s experience, the advantage to the party causing
the harm is marginal as the cattle grower is not relying on the corn field to feed his cattle. In
contradiction, in the case of children’s virtual worlds, the profits of these entities is based on
children users, thus any measure to prevent or monitor entrance to these worlds will be directly
negative to the virtual worlds companies.
When the self-regulation objective is in direct contradiction to the business model of the
entities maintaining this regime, as in the case of children users and virtual worlds, this
regulatory instrument is bound to fail. A different aspect of self-regulation to be discussed in
details in chapter 7, infra, is the regulation of children usage employed by parents at home.
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3.2 Co-regulation
Co-regulation refers to industry-association self-regulation with some oversight and/or
ratification by government.58 Enforced self-regulation is different from co-regulation since in
enforced self-regulation, negotiations take place between the state and individual firms to
establish regulations that are tailor-made to each firm.59 In co-regulation, these negotiations are
conducted between the government and the industry association combined with the individual
firms. This “centralization” of self-regulation enhances standardization and can make it more
efficient for the government to enforce compliance. Nonetheless, this kind of generic approach
might be a less distinctive approach than the individual approach that can be employed in
enforced self-regulation.
As we assume that the harm is similar in all virtual worlds, since the harm causes, as
discussed in chapter 1, supra, are inherent and embedded in the media itself, enforced selfregulation is not relevant. In addition, similar to self-regulation discussed above, co-regulation
may not be effective in preventing the harm as it is a result of the virtual worlds use which lies at
the heart of the virtual world product and its operator source of income. Nonetheless, as will be
discussed at the end of this chapter and in chapter 7, infra, co-regulation could be part of a mix
of regulatory instruments. For example, the government overseeing a regulatory measure to be
implemented by the virtual worlds to educate children and their parents about the potential harm
and ways to avoid or decrease it. Moreover, the government can force the virtual worlds
companies to create regulation in which these worlds dedicate part of their revenue to
rehabilitate those who are suffering from the harm.
Though the notion of causing the harm on one hand and curing its effects on the other by
the same entity may seem absurd, it could be a valid and efficient partial solution that reconciles
some of the interests and factors involved in this regulatory realm, namely, the complexity of
virtual regulation (see chapter 4, infra), virtual worlds companies and children’s freedom of
speech (see chapter 5, infra), the challenge of regulating an intangible harm (see chapter 6,
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infra), children autonomy and a solution for the resources needed for education based approach
(see chapter 7, infra).

3.3 Responsive regulation
Ayres and Braithwaite60 proposed a responsive approach to regulation. This approach
involves a process in which regulators use compliance-based strategies, and when the desired
level of compliance is not achieved, they resort to more punitive “deterrents.” According to
Ayres and Braithwaite, this option is preferable to the positions supported by those who believe
that, “gentle persuasion works in securing business compliance with the law.”61 It is also
preferable to those who believe that corporations will comply with the law only when tough
sanctions are applied. They contend that greater regulatory challenges are found at the
intermediate levels of the pyramid of regulatory strategies.62 Nonetheless, such intermediate
levels are in greatest need of regulatory innovation.
According to Ojo,63 the responsive approach assumes that the commencement of
regulation would always be at the base of the pyramid. A form of responsive regulation can be
found in the enforced self-regulation model. Under this model, negotiations are held between the
state and individual firms to establish regulations that are particular to each firm.64 In this model,
each firm is required to propose its own regulatory standards in order to avoid harder (and less
tailored) standards imposed by the state.65
According to Ayres and Braithwaite,
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This individual firm is “enforced” in two senses:66 first, the firm is required by
the state to do the self-regulation; second, the privately written rules can be
publicly enforced.
According to Baldwin and Black,67
Ayres and Braithwaite acknowledge the possible difficulties of moving down
the regulatory pyramid since relationships between regulators and regulatees,
which are foundations for less punitive strategies, could be influenced through
the application of punitive sanctions.
Facing an intangible harm such as the harm to children’s imaginative development in
virtual worlds, responsive regulation might be impossible to use. In the absence of a defined and
measurable parameter to be measured, there is no meaning to the sanctions pyramid as there is
no way to bring it into action.

3.4 Risk-based regulation
Regulation may be regarded as a response to risk,68 and the main concern of regulation
can be considered as controlling these risks.69 According to Power, “The regulatory state is
becoming a risk management state.”70 Beck argues that,
Whilst the standard way of risk regulation in modern societies was well suited
for such societies, it is not responsive enough to our “postmodern” societies.71
Risk is, as a result, inefficiently controlled at too high a cost.72
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Power further states that there is growing acceptance in recent years of the fact that
regulation efficiency will be enhanced where collaboration with private control systems exists,73
By utilizing activities which relate to private internal control systems for
purposes which are of public regulatory nature, regulators are not only able to
relieve themselves of the cumbersome work which derives from rule making,
but are also able to concentrate on the oversight of the functioning and design
of local systems.74
In comparison to responsive regulation,75 risk-based regulation is relatively new.76 In
March, 2005, The Hampton Review77 recommended a risk-based approach to regulation,
particularly enforcement. According to Baldwin and Black,78
In the aftermath of the Hampton Review, ‘risk based’ regulation has been
implemented primarily through inspection and enforcement procedures which are
derived through an examination of risks posed by a regulated person or firm to a
regulatory agency’s objectives.79

sociologists’ considerations of the “risk society”, nature does not play a role in generating risks in the sense
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Furthermore, according to Power, in contrast to the concept of zero tolerance, risk-based
regulation is an expression of the notion that regulatory failures are possible,80
Whilst some events can be classified as being of “zero-tolerance” nature, such an
event as that of the fall of Equitable Life, which could be considered as ‘tolerable’
from the perspective of a systemic financial risk, in fact, generated life changing
catastrophic consequences for many.81
According to Baldwin and Black, other problems associated with risk-based regulation
derive from the fact that “drivers of action” are short-term, random, and irrational considerations.
In addition, the most important risks are not necessarily receiving attention, and lower levels of
risk will likely be neglected. These lower-level risks, in turn, may aggregate to risks of immense
and dangerous proportions.82
According to Baldwin and Cave,
The first regulatory challenge faced by regulators consists in the identification
of risks that need to be reduced – not only on the basis of priority, but also in a
way which would be approved by the public.83
In the current case study of harm caused by virtual worlds to the development of
children’s imaginations, it seems, perhaps unsurprisingly, that the public is the one to
acknowledge the risk, while the regulator still needs solid proof that this harm actually exists and
poses harm to a degree requiring regulation.
Second, managing and regulating risks effectively and in an acceptable way is the
challenge for regulators.84 Furthermore, additional challenges arise from aspects such as the
design of institutions and techniques for managing risk, choosing the appropriate regulatory
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technique, whether risk management or regulation should be “blame oriented,” and the reliance
on qualitative risk evaluations in contrast to more quantitative assessment methods.85
Anthony Giddens86 argues that,
A risk society, is a society that increasingly lives on a high tech frontier, with
consequences which no one completely understands, and which generates a
diversity of possible futures and outcomes. At a certain point, sometime in the
past 50 years or so we stopped worrying so much about what nature can do to
us and started worrying much more about what we have done to nature.87
In light of Giddens’s warning and in the context of the case study at hand, we should be
concerned about what technology is doing to our human nature and, more important, how it
shapes our children’s natures.
Baldwin identifies risk as, “the probability that a particular adverse event will occur
during a stated period of time, or result from a particular challenge.”88 Hence, risk regulation
seeks to reduce the risk for personal and environmental injuries.89 According to Beck, risk
regulation represents a, “systematic way of dealing with hazards and insecurities induced and
introduced by modernization itself.”90
According to Ogus,
[r]isk assessment should be followed by risk management and risk
communication. There are three types of risks allowing for three main
assessment categories:91 1) risks that society will not be willing to tolerate, 2)
risks that society will tolerate due to the small-scale danger they pose, and 3)
risks between these two extremes that need to be controlled and managed.
85
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The risk presented in this case study falls within the third category, if not the first. It is
argued that an adverse event will occur with high probability – the development of children’s
imaginations will be harmed by the use of virtual worlds, during a stated period of time – within
one generation that was born to this reality of the use of virtual worlds (i.e., the Millennials).
Therefore, according to risk-regulation perception, there is a need to create a “systematic way” to
address the said harm.
This is especially important in our case given that the harm is new, virtual and intangible
and, thus, hard to prove and measure. Relaxing or even making the need for solid evidence
regarding the potential harm unnecessary, will be an important step in making regulatory
measures acceptable. Since in risk-based regulation it is the potential of the harm that matters,
and not the actual harm (being impossible to assess and measure at present). Therefore, within
the regulatory mix to approach the said harm, risk regulation is one of the instruments to be
employed along with co-regulation identified above.

3.5 Meta-regulation
Parker defines meta-regulation as the regulation of self-regulation.92 Parker et al93 argue
that,
It is useful to think about the relationship of law and society or law and
economy in terms of various layers of regulation each doing their own
regulating. At the same time, each layer regulates the regulation of each other
in various combinations of horizontal and vertical influence.94
The label “meta-regulation” has been applied to this concept.95 An example of metaregulation can be found in the trend toward the greater regulation of business-management
92
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processes and strategies of firms, through regulatory tools that address the role of senior
management in firms and directly regulate individuals within firms.96 According to Haines,97
meta-regulation is capable of managing “self-regulatory capacity” while exercising
governmental discretion regarding the goals and levels of risk reduction to be achieved in
regulation.98 Not only key stakeholders but also personnel within these organizations are
developing processes and procedures for risk management.99 This development can occur while
ensuring that “pro-compliance motivational postures” are maintained within the regulated site in
a way that the regulator’s goal, that is, risk reduction, is achieved.100 Common understanding of
risk priorities by the regulator and regulated organizations will determine the success of the
implementation of meta-regulation.101 Haines concludes that,
[m]eta-regulation is advantageous particularly where there are complex causes
of harm, which also require constant monitoring.102
Braithwaite103 illustrates successful meta-risk management by describing the Transfer
Pricing Record Review and Improvement Project of the Australian Taxation Office, setting out
the “arm's length” principle to prevent multinational corporations from using fake transaction
prices between subsidiaries in different countries in a way that will shift the taxation jurisdiction
preference to the one that charges less tax,
The arm's length principle uses the behaviour of independent parties as a guide
or benchmark to determine the allocation of income and expenses in
international dealings between associated enterprises.104
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As stated above, in the absence of a scientific way to measure associated harm or other
factors that are measurable and/or standardized, meta-regulation would be difficult to employ in
this case study and with respect to any harm that is intangible. Nonetheless, as said regarding coregulation, meta regulation can be employed in association with other regulatory instruments as
part of a regulatory instrument mix. In this respect there is not much difference between coregulation and meta regulation, since both of these regulatory instruments involve some degree
of government oversee and self-regulation by the virtual worlds companies.
Identifying the virtual and intangible harm as a challenge by the virtual worlds
companies’ management would be the first step towards a desirable shift. Forcing these
managements to think of creative, innovative and educational ways to try and decrease this harm
through resource allocation and modifications to the product (the virtual world) would be a
second desirable step. Finally, asking these companies to reconsider their business model, could
lead to a desirable shift with respect to the said harm. There are good reasons to suspect that
these changes will not happen without governmental intervention. Nonetheless, virtual worlds
companies should be given credit for having an advantage over the regulator in knowing their
product and being able to meet some standards that may make it less harmful.
While the Artificial Medium Laws Theory discussed in chapter 1, supra, assumes that
any use of virtual worlds (and the media in general) may harm children’s imaginative
development, steps taken by these companies in order to try and encourage children’s
imaginative development may be a step in the right direction. This approach will require
research, awareness, acknowledgment that there might by a harm and ethical reconciliation
within the virtual worlds companies between their inherent desire to increase their revenue – and
their responsibility to the generation to come.

4. Communication
Communication-based regulation attempt to educate and convince the regulatees to
behave in a way that will help achieve the regulatory goals. Communication-based instruments
regulate behaviour by providing more information to the regulatees, thereby helping them to
reach more informed decisions and choices, hence foster and achieve regulatory goals.
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The aim of communication-based regulatory instruments, according to Bronwen et al.105
is to, “bring some kind of indirect social pressure to bear on individual decision-making in the
hope that it will lead to behavioural change”.106 The most familiar form of communication-based
instrument is government-backed public education campaigns.
According to Yeung,107 the state may compel manufacturers, for example, to disclose
information regarding the ingredients of a product, any potential side-effects and/or the way it
was produced. The goal is to foster more informed choices and decision-making by the
consumers in their consumption and purchasing decisions. In addition, the obligation to disclose
information can deter manufacturers against fraud or misrepresentation, reflecting the wellknown claim by Louis Brandeis that, “sunlight is the best disinfectant”.
Mandatory disclosure regimes combine both command and control (the government
makes disclosure mandatory, with the enforcement of some form of criminal or civil sanction for
non-compliance) with market-based mechanisms (relying on consumers to make the decision
whether to purchase the product in question).
Challenges that are associated with communicated-based regulatory instruments include:
issues of privacy and confidentiality, the costs associated with generating, collecting and
reporting the information, and the costs to the authority responsible for administering and
enforcing a disclosure regime. Finally, disclosure-based schemes see consumers not only as
rational decision-makers, but also as capable of accurately understanding and evaluating the
information provided.
According to Bronwen et al.108 there is empirical evidence that the effect of information
on individual behaviour is highly context sensitive. For example, in the regulation of financial
and investment products, there is evidence to suggest that the information disclosed may have
very little effect on consumer investment decisions.
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Disclosure regimes may also be initiated voluntarily by the regulated companies. In a
competitive economy, there are powerful incentives to provide consumers with information
regarding the product, the way it was produced and other relevant facts.
Information can be disclosed by the regulated entities, as a requirement of the regulator or
voluntarily, and can rely on the communication of specific messages or information, by the
regulatory authority. This latter communication will be done where it is considered impractical,
inefficient or ineffective to compel the regulatees to disclose the presence or magnitude of the
hazard associated with their activity.
There are different ways in which communication can be conveyed by the government to
implement government policy. The most common way is campaigns (‘exhortation’) in which the
state communicates for the purposes of influencing social behavior, trying to encourage the
public to behave in a way that is pro-social and consistent with the regulator policy goals.
Communication regulatory instruments assumes that individuals will be willing to accept,
learn, and behave upon the information provided. Nonetheless, it is demonstrated by the
literature on ‘risk communication’, that in response to risk information, individuals behave in
contingent, complex, and sometime unpredictable ways.
Viscusi and Margat109 draw a distinction between information that is provided in order to
cause the public to behave in desired ways, from information that seek to help the public in
making informed decisions.
Finally, in her study on music education and the law, Heimonen110 refers to Aristotle’s
thought on the law as a means in moral education. In Aristotle’s view,
[t]he state has to educate its individual citizens in the exercise of virtue, since
living according to virtue means living in harmony with one’s own nature, this
being the proper end of the individual. Aristotle referred to virtue as a
disposition that demands long and careful exercise. Thus, for him and his
109
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followers, the law is an instrument in moral education.111

5. Conclusion
While the Artificial Medium Laws Theory assumes that any use of virtual worlds may
harm children’s imaginative development, the recognition that the harm cannot be completely
prevented but only reduced is an important notion that should be adopted as part of the stepping
away from the ‘black and white’ rigidity of command-and-control regime. A constant and
carefully design movement on the regulatory instrument’s scale away from intrusive and rigid
command-and-control towards soft and innovative communication regulation aligns with the
general scheme of dealing with intangible and virtual harm and fit swell with the theoretical
framework identified in chapter 2, supra, while resonating with the requirements of the freedom
of speech as will be discussed in chapter 5, infra.
As mentioned in the previous chapter, Gunningham and Sinclair112 propose two
necessary components of a successful regulatory design: regulatory design principles113 and
instrument mixes.114 The regulatory design principles were discussed in chapter 2, supra, and the
instrument mixes will be discussed below in light of the discussion regarding regulatory
instruments and in the context of the harm in question.
(1) preferring policy mixes incorporating a broader range of instruments and institutions
The discussion above identifies regulatory instruments that can be employed as a mix in
order to deal with the intangible and virtual harm discussed in this dissertation. The scheme to be
considered in the following chapters is a combination of command-and-control measures
incorporated into a communication-based co-regulation regime. This regulatory mix will enable
the government to oversee a self-regulatory regime by the virtual worlds companies that will act
to reduce the harm, inform the users and their parents about the potential harm and educate the
users and their parents in order to prevent more harm and face future harm. To the said mix we
should add risk regulation that should be efficient in cases where the harm is hard to measure. It
111
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should be emphasized that this is only a general layout to be considered in light of the factors
and constrains discussed in the following chapters.
(2) preferring less interventionist measures which include the principle of low
interventionism
Co-regulation and communication-based instruments as discussed above are measures of
low intervention and align well with the recommended regulatory mix. Moreover, as will be
discussed in the coming chapters, when dealing with a multi-factorial, sensitive and complex
regulatory sphere, soft and less interventionist measures are preferable. In addition, flexible and
non-interventionist instruments align with the freedom of speech constraints discussed in detail
in chapter 5, infra.
(3) ascending a dynamic instrument pyramid to the level required to achieve policy goals
– including building in regulatory responsiveness
The structure of communication-based co-regulation instrument, can create a dynamic
instrument pyramid and regulatory responsiveness. The notion of decreasing the harm, rather
than eliminating it altogether, enables a pyramid approach to regulation. For example, a coregulation regime that will cause the virtual worlds companies to create educational programs for
users and their parents about the harm to the imagination and how to prevent it. In cases where
the virtual world company fails to comply with this requirement, the government can force more
stringent measures as forcing the virtual world company to incorporate mandatory online course
in order to start using its services.
(4) empowering participants which are best placed to act as quasi regulators – including
the application of the principle of empowerment and maximizing opportunities for
win-win outcomes
As said above, requiring the virtual worlds companies to educate children users and their
parents will empower participants as quasi regulators. This trend can be further extended to
consulting with the children and their parents on the desired educational measures, ways to foster
imagination in virtual worlds and programs for education at home and in school.
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(5) including the consideration of whether firms will voluntarily go beyond compliance
The option of firms going beyond compliance is remote. However, if the harm is
acknowledged and widely accepted in the users and their parent’s awareness, the virtual worlds
companies can go beyond compliance. This can be done by employing exceptional educational
measures as well as features that suppose to enhance the user’s imagination, hence, creating for
these companies’ a competitive advantage in the market.
The next chapter will deal with the virtual aspect of the harm to children’s imagination in
virtual worlds through the discussion of the regulation of the internet and the regulatory
instruments of ‘Code’.
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Chapter 4 - Can the Internet be Regulated?
The previous chapter discussed the use of regulatory instruments to attempt to regulate
virtual and intangible harm as the harm identified in chapter 1. This chapter continues this
discussion by focusing on code regulation in the context of the Internet. The goal of this chapter
is to address the virtual aspect of the harm, in this case caused by virtual worlds, to the
development of children’s imagination and the unique aspect of virtual and intangible harm in
general. The first part will address the debate over the regulation of the Internet. The second part
will address code regulation in the context of the Internet.

1. The Regulation of the Internet
From the inception of the Internet, whether and how it should be regulated have become
contested issues. Arguments reflect a wide continuum, from those who argue that there is
nothing unique about the Internet and therefore it should be treated as anything else that is
regulated by law, to those on the other extreme who argue that the Internet is so unique that it
should not be regulated at all. This debate is ongoing and rests on the tension between the
claimed benefits of the Internet (e.g., free market of ideas, information source, and more) and its
alarming consequences (e.g., pornography, surveillance, spam etc.). I argue that the answer lies
somewhere in the middle of these opposing arguments: There is a real need for regulation of the
Internet in the context of virtual and intangible harm, but this regulation should be within the
limits of freedom of speech discussed in chapter 5, infra, and taking into account the lessons and
inferences drawn from chapter 6 and 7, infra.
In an article published in 1980, Chalfant et al.1 wrote,
The time when developments in science and technology were automatically
welcomed as progressive and beneficial has passed. Public confidence in the
scientific community has given way to skepticism, if not distrust. This attitude
is due in part to the recent development of highly complex and sophisticated
1
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technologies which, from their inception, have been recognized as entailing
substantial risks as well as benefits. The public now expects the government to
evaluate independently the risks of new technologies before they are
introduced and, moreover, demands input into the decision making processes
that sanction their use.
Although the timing of this comment matches the commercial birth of the Internet, the
general attitude of the public towards the internet was different from the described attitude
towards DNA-related scientific developments. Livingstone and Bober2 argued, regarding the
Internet, that,
In terms of media regulation, therefore, it may be that the stakes have never
been higher, as society seeks to strike a balance between the failure to
minimize the dangers and the failure to maximize the opportunities.
In this context of striking the balance between dangers and opportunities as well as the
tension between technology and regulation, Kirby3 notes that Napoleon never responded to
letters for at least a year. The logic of this principle was that if the problem still existed after a
year, there would be enough time for the Emperor to give it his attention. Either intentionally or
not, Kirby argues, many of the issues currently presented to law by the advance of technology
appear to receive the same treatment. Nonetheless, in contradiction to Napoleon’s approach, it
seems that the cause of the delay is not intentional but rather a result of the complexity and
sensitivity of the issues.
Dickerson4 argues that, given the Internet’s potential to enhance democracy and promote
the exchange of ideas, it is not clear why anyone is permitted to regulate it at all. Nonetheless,
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there is great potential for abuse via the Internet. Therefore, in some areas, regulation is very
much needed.5 In this context, four main reasons have been identified as requiring regulation.6
First, the protection of moral values:7 The protection of children from harmful
information is the most prominent example.8 Second, the security of the state and additional
political interests enforce regulation.9 Third, the Internet is often regulated in the name of
protecting the intellectual property of copyright holders from those wishing to copy, modify, or
redistribute copyrighted materials.10 Finally, computer security and commercial concerns about
unwanted messages (in various forms of spam) or viruses comprise a fourth category of Internet
activity necessitating regulation.11 Although the first category requiring regulation – moral
values – seems to be the most relevant to harm to the development of children’s imagination in
virtual worlds and virtual and intangible harm in general, this harm goes beyond moral values.
Failure to prevent children from watching pornography (online explicit websites), for
example, may result in distorted perceptions of sex, wrong perceptions of intimate interpersonal
relationships, and other negative consequences. Nonetheless, harm to the development of
children’s imaginations as a case of virtual and intangible harm seems to go further in its
implications by causing damage that is permanent and incurable. Therefore, we should redefine
the first category of Internet regulation from, “moral value protection” to, “the prevention of
virtual and intangible harm.”
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Berman12 reports that from the outset of the Internet, judges and academics have
considered whether it creates a new area of law. Justice Easterbrook13 argued that treating
Internet law as a new field of law would be no different from studying the “Law of the Horse” in
the nineteenth century. Easterbrook's position and the responses to it divided the field into two
camps. One camp, the “unexceptionalists,” argued that Internet law can and should be dealt with
by using the existing legal system;14 the other camp, the “exceptionalists,” argued that there is a
need for a new legal system to deal with the Internet.15
According to Berman,16
While the unexceptionalists have relied too much on the application of
'mythical well-settled principles', the exceptionalists have, at times, tended to
the opposite extreme, assuming that the rise of cyberspace changed nearly all
extant ideas about law and the role of the state. Indeed, many of these
exceptionalists rejected the idea that Internet 'communities' could or should be
governed by territorially based sovereigns at all. John Perry Barlow muchquoted Declaration of Independence of Cyberspace,17 Issued in 1996, illustrate
this approach.
Echoing Barlow’s declaration, Johnson and Post argue that there is no way to regulate the
Internet in a legitimate and effective way by using a jurisdiction based on geographical
boundaries. They further argue that the Internet should create its own legal jurisdiction (or
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multiple jurisdictions).18 In response, others pointed to online harms and states’ and non-state
entities’ need and desire to control those harms.19
In this background, the second generation of Internet-regulation scholars emerged. This
generation was less optimistic regarding online regulation and more aware of individual
empowerment.20 The most important aspect of this generation’s attitude is the way in which code
can regulate behavior on the Internet. If one would like to prevent trucks from entering a parking
lot, he can place a sign stating that it is forbidden and then hire guards to make sure that drivers
comply. Another option would be to build a barrier at the parking entrance that prevents trucks
from driving inside, based on their height. In both cases, the guards and the barrier are used as
regulatory tools.
On the Internet, argued the second generation of Internet-regulation scholars,
architectural (or code) regulation would be much more effective than guards because the Internet
is made of code and is thus inherent to the technology itself. Koops21 argues that, “‘Code as law’
is viewed sometimes from an optimistic and sometimes from a pessimistic point of view.”
Now, we have reached a third generation of regulatory thought about the Internet, which
combines some of the perspectives of the previous two.22 Much like the exceptionalists, thirdgeneration scholars believe that there is a fundamental difference between the Internet and other
regulatory spheres and that this difference creates new opportunities and alters existing
conventions. Nonetheless, much like the second generation, the third generation is concerned
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about code regulation and its implications. This perception focuses on maintaining the balance
between the advantages and disadvantages of the Internet.
Before we discuss code regulation as a regulatory instrument to prevent or decrease the
harm to the development of children’s imaginations in virtual worlds as well as the suitability
and efficiency of this regulation regarding virtual and intangible harm in general, it is important
to review the infrastructure and control of the Internet.

1.1 Infrastructure
Understanding the Internet’s technical aspects is necessary in order to conduct adequate
legal analysis of many online legal issues. According to Smith,23 a technical definition of the
Internet would focus not on physical devices but on the Internet’s networks transmission and on
addressing protocols that glue the networks together. These protocols allow the networks and the
attached computers to communicate and, using a common address system, to find other
computers attached to the Internet. The collection of protocols is known as TCP/IP, after the two
most important protocols: TCP (Transmission Control Protocol) and IP (Internet Protocol).
While an underlying collection of networks makes up the Internet, various applications
designed to work with Internet protocols provide facilities to Internet users. The most significant
applications are the World Wide Web, electronic mail, file downloading (using file transfer
protocol (ftp)), Usenet newsgroups, instant messaging, streaming audio and video, and voice
telephony (Voice Over IP, or VoIP).24
The core infrastructure of the Internet consists largely of routers or switches (computers
designed to receive and forward packets of data), hosts (which store programs and data), and
pipes (telecommunications connections that link the hosts and routers). Network providers have
both physical links to and contractual relations with other networks and their providers. The
physical connection (which may be a bilateral link to the other networks or at a special-purpose
multilateral traffic-exchange center, such as MAE-East in Washington DC or LINX in London)

23
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enables traffic to flow directly from one network to the next. The contractual arrangement (often
known as a “peering agreement”) governs the exchange of traffic among the networks.25
The Internet is based on two main providers. Content providers provide the Internet’s
content, which comes in many forms but divides generally into real-time and downloadable
content. Real-time content can be viewed or heard as the user accesses it, either delivered in
batches or by maintaining a continuous stream of data. Downloadable content takes the form of a
file that can be copied from the Internet site to the user's own computer.26 In contrast to most
media forms, Internet users play a central role as content providers. The second type of providers
is access providers. The typical access provider is now a commercial organization selling
Internet access to home and commercial users. Commercial-access providers are commonly
known as Internet service providers, or ISPs.27
In the case at hand, virtual-world companies are content providers, and access providers
enable users’ access to websites. In the context of code regulation, ISPs are relevant for
employing filtering and blocking, whereas content providers, virtual-world companies in this
case, can mainly employ age verification and other similar screening techniques. As will be
discussed below, these measures are problematic from a freedom-of-speech point of view and are
not relevant to this particular harm. Nonetheless, to complete the picture I will review the control
structure of the Internet.

1.2 Control
According to Cukier,28 every network’s functionality depends on a centralized control.
The International Telecommunication Union (now part of the United Nations), for example,
controls the global phone system. The Internet is coordinated by the Internet Corporation for
Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN), a private-sector non-profit organization set up in 1998
by the United States.
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One of the myths of the Internet is that it is uncontrollable. Like all myths, part of this is
true, and part is wishful thinking. Compared with the telephone system, the Internet is free of
regulation. Nonetheless, there are four areas that require control and coordination to operate
smoothly. The “domain name system” of addresses is the general name of these areas of control.
First, there is a need to determine who will operate the database of generic names ending
with suffixes such as .com, .net, .info, and others. This includes the two-letter country-code
suffixes (such as .ca, for Canada). Second, up-to-12-digit codes, referred to as Internet Protocol
numbers, are required for the computers in the network to identify other computers. Third, there
are “root servers.” When Internet users surf the Web or send email, these servers match domain
names with corresponding Internet Protocol numbers in a matter of milliseconds. The root
servers are located in NASA, a Dutch non-profit organization, universities, the US military, and
private companies. Today, ten root servers are operated from the United States and one each
from Amsterdam, Stockholm, and Tokyo. Fourth, there is a need to establish technical standards
to allow the Internet's interoperability.
Many countries argue that the Internet should be operating under a multilateral treaty.
They consider ICANN an instrument of American hegemony over the Internet. The latest session
of this ongoing debate took place in Dubai, when the United Nations summit broke down after
the US, Canada, and other democracies refused to sign a treaty that would grant a UN agency
more authority over how the Internet is managed.29
This debate ties in well to the difference in regulatory approach between the US (and
Canada) and the European Union and other countries. While the North American approach
prefers more flexible forms of regulation (i.e., self-regulation among others) due to pressure from
Internet giants and constitutional constraints of freedom of speech, the European approach is
more concerned with the potential deleterious implications of the harm (mainly for children) and
takes a stricter approach to regulation. The different approaches parallel the general debate over
the question of whether the Internet should be regulated (discussed above) and are illustrated by
the regulation of data transfer from the EU, in which the European Union’s commissioner
29
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surrendered to US demands for self-regulation30 but eventually, 15 years later, faced a refusal by
the European Union high court.31

2. Code of conduct
Reidenberg32 was one of the first scholars to point out that in the digital age, software and
hardware tend to regulate themselves, or, rather, Internet users and developers tend to regulate
themselves through technology. He coined the term “Lex Informatica” to refer to this
development, thus comparing the newly emerging technology-embedded “law” with the largely
bottom-up-developed “Lex Mercatoria” of the Middle Ages.33 Initially he viewed this as
positive, since traditional legislatures are not fit, for many reasons, to regulate the Internet by law
and hence invite public authorities to embrace the emerging “Lex Informatica” to fill the gap of
Internet regulation.34 Reidenberg later turned more pessimistic, noticing the downside of selfregulatory norms built into technology that bypass democratic control.35
Lessig36 has made a major contribution to the discussion of regulatory instruments in the
context of code regulation for the Internet, arguing that the Internet is a unique regulatory sphere
that should be treated differently from other, non-virtual regulatory spheres. In many aspects,
code is used in Internet applications to create restrictions on unacceptable conduct through
technology. Such control creates a risk to our moral judgment in other, less restricted domains;
or, as Spinello argues, “code should not be a surrogate for conscience.”37
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While techniques based on communication seek to bring behavioral change by turning to
the human rationale, techniques based on code operate by eliminating the possibility of undesired
behavior. Lessig38 argues that regulating the Internet may be achieved through code, since, “Law
as code is the start to the perfect technology of justice.”
According to Koops,39 the main systematic attempt to offer a set of criteria for judging
normative technology has been made by Asscher,40 in the Institute for Information Law’s “code
as law” project. Asscher puts forward a fairly rough and tentative set of criteria, presented in the
form of questions, using “code” to indicate “normative technology.”41
1) Can code rules be understood? If so, are they transparent and accessible to the general
public?
2) Can the rules be trusted? Are they reliable in the sense of predictability?
3) Is there an authority that makes the code rules?
4) Is there a choice?
This set reflects transparency, reliability, accountability, and choice. All of these are
procedural criteria.
Brownsword,42 in his discussion of “techno-regulation” (his term for normative
technology that secures compliance, i.e., norm-enforcing technology), presents two criteria for
regulatory intervention: effectiveness and legitimacy; legitimacy comes down to respect for
human rights and human dignity. Brownsword’s key criterion for assessing compliance-proof
normative technology is the existence of choice.43
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In subsequent work, Brownsword44 has outlined as additional criteria the principles of
good governance: transparency and accountability. Particularly interesting is the remark that,
even if techno-regulation is implemented in a fully transparent and accountable way, in due time
transparency is lost because the rule built into the techno-object simply becomes, for later
generations, part of the object’s features and is no longer recognized for what it once was: a
normative rule that purposefully influences people’s behavior. Then, “it is only outsiders and
historians who can trace the invisible hand of regulation.”45 Whether there are disadvantages to
this suggested process is not clear.
Zittrain46 argues that,
Generative networks like the Internet can be partially controlled, and there is
important work to be done to enumerate the ways in which governments try to
censor the Net.47 But the key move to watch is a sea change in control over the
endpoint: lock down the device, and network censorship and control can be
extraordinarily reinforced.48
Kesan and Shah49 have highlighted three characteristics of code that regulators should
pay attention to: transparency of rules, open standards (which can be seen as transparency of the
rule-making process), and default settings. The latter are important, because users tend not to
change default settings, partly because they have a legitimating effect: Apparently, the default is
“normal.” This means that default settings ought to be made optimal for users, in light of the
values that are at stake.50
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Zittrain51 argues that in cases of pornography and intellectual property, for example, even
a click of a mouse can force extreme sanctions on the user. Users of offline media are usually
aware of illegal content by the fact that it is not offered for sale. If it is for sale, the user assumes
the content is legal. The situation is different online. Although the user is accustomed, based on
offline media, to assume that if it is accessible then it is legal, this is not always the case. This
situation places the user in a vulnerable position. One solution would be for Internet service
providers to implement filtering and, in turn, to offer users’ immunity for most categories. A
negative consequence of filtering and blocking could be that both users and the law might judge
content as acceptable that is not blocked or filtered. An example of this approach exists in laws
that criminalize unauthorized access to computer systems only if the user has broken the
technical security protecting that system.52
Advocating technology regulation via code to the case of harm to the development of
imagination caused by virtual worlds is problematic. The intangible nature of the harm leaves
only one identifiable indicator to regulate: usage time. This indicator is problematic for practical
reasons and for issues of freedom of speech, as discussed in chapter 5.
In a technology-created creature that operates automatically, code regulation is not a
precise instrument. As will be discussed below, filtering, blocking, and age verification are the
more common variations within code regulation. These tools are employed in cases similar to the
harm at hand but are not suitable for intangible harm. Code regulation is based on identifiable
characteristics, factors, and variables that the machine (the computer) can understand and comply
with. Nonetheless, when the harm is intangible, these factors and variables are hard to define, let
alone transform into language that the machine can understand and implement.
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2.1 Filtering and blocking
According to Mcintyre and Scott,53 Internet filtering and blocking are technologies that
prevent access to or restrict the distribution of information. Jurisdictions such as Saudi Arabia
and China widely use filtering to prevent access to political or pornographic material, thus
creating, “borders in cyberspace.”54 One example is the censorship of the phrase “Tiananmen
Square” in Google Chinese, following the demands of the Chinese government.55
British Telecom, a UK telecommunications operator (in consultation with the Home
Office), has employed the Cleanfeed system, which blocks requests for Internet websites
suspected of displaying child pornography.56 The British government has asserted that all
Internet service providers should adopt a similar system.57 A court in Belgium ordered the
implementation of measures by an Internet service provider to prevent users from accessing filesharing websites and from distributing certain music files.58 In Canada, the Internet service
provider Telus blocked users from visiting a website that supported the strike of Telus’
employees, while also blocking many unrelated sites.59
Blocking and filtering share common features: They are automatic, self-enforcing, and
often opaque. These features are common to code regulation in general. Lessig argued that code
regulation is automatic and often opaque.60 Boyle61 and Swire62 asserted that the nature of the
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Internet will cause regulators to focus on indirect enforcement, targeting providers rather than
users, “elephants” rather than “mice.”
A user may not be aware of filtering63 or that access to a particular site has been blocked.
The website owner might also not be aware of it. Moreover, sometimes when websites are
considered unacceptable by governments,64 they are routinely blocked and deliver a message to
users suggesting that the website is not available (“file not found”), or users encounter technical
problems (e.g., “connection timeout”).65 Villeneuve described the use of error pages as “an
attempt to deflect criticism, allowing the authorities to claim that they are not censoring Internet
content.”66
In other cases, governments can employ practices that mislead end users. For example, in
Uzbekistan there is a practice of informing users that pornographic content is the reason for
blocking websites that are actually blocked for political reasons.67 Villeneuve observed that
governments, “[u]nable to justify the reason for blocking political content…choose to obscure or
deny the fact that such content is in fact targeted.”68 Lessig argued that, “even if the users are
aware of the filtering, they may not know who is responsible for it: it may be any entity upstream
of the user.”69
Commercial forces are also involved. Filtering-software companies protect their lists of
blocking sites, considering these lists as trade secrets. As these lists are generally encrypted,
filtering-software companies have filed claims or threatened to do so against those who would
make the lists public.70 According to McIntyre and Scott,71 in some cases, such as the Australian
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Interactive Gambling Act of 2001, specific legal authority exists for a public body to investigate
particular content, make determinations, and issue notices requiring ISPs to block access to that
content.72
From a regulatory perspective, a more troubling situation occurs when governments use
their capacity, without legislation, to encourage Internet service providers to engage in content
filtering. This is what the UK government has done as part of self-regulation. According to
Bright, consultation and cooperation were used to push Internet service providers such as British
Telecom to automatically block customer access to URLs alleged to host child pornography,
while the Internet Watch Foundation maintained the list of blocked URLs.73 Now, Grossman
argues, UK authorities have indicated their intention to ensure that all UK Internet service
providers adopt either Cleanfeed or a similar system, with the threat of legislation should ISPs
fail to do so “voluntarily.”74
Furthermore, McIntyre and Scott raise the concern that requiring Internet service
providers to filter content might allow them to externalize the costs associated with monitoring
and blocking, thus causing high levels of censorship.75 Even more troubling are the incentives
that filtering creates for Internet service providers. Kreimer argues that regulators can recruit
“proxy censors” by targeting Internet service providers whose “dominant incentive is to protect
themselves from sanctions, rather than to protect the target from censorship.”76
As the harm in virtual worlds is inherent to their use, filtering techniques have little to do
with preventing such harm. Monitoring can allow better supervision by parents, although
regulation at home presents other challenges (see chapter 7, infra). Furthermore, as stated above,
blocking and filtering may violate virtual-world companies’ freedom of speech rights and the
rights of children as users (see chapter 5, infra).
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2.2 Age verification and identity authentication
The purpose of age-verification technologies is to prevent minors from engaging harmful
material (e.g., pornography, gambling), and to ensure that adults do not use websites for children.
Methods to determine a user’s age include trusted third parties for verification (e.g., schools,
banks, or government agencies), user self-identification, and credit-card requirements, for
example. Technologies designed to authenticate a user’s identity work in the same manner. The
Internet Safety Technical Task Force77 reported that available technologies make it challenging
for children to pretend to be adults or for adults to pretend to be children, but that usually more
than one technology is used to perform both functions. Willard78 questioned the utility of such
technologies.
Problems with age-verification and identity-authentication technologies were identified
by the ISTTF Technology Advisory Board.79 For example, duress can cause victims to provide
their verification credentials received as part of the process, thus enabling unauthorized persons
pretending to be someone else to enter restricted sites; children can use fake birth date and make
use of their parents credit card for false identification. The ISTTF concluded that “age
verification and identity authentication technologies are appealing in concept but challenged in
terms of effectiveness.”80
An underlying assumption of the harm described in chapter 1, supra, is a correlation
between the length of virtual worlds use and the harm to the imaginative development.
Therefore, one way that these technologies can be used to address the harm discussed here is to
prevent children from lengthy use of virtual worlds. This is a “mechanical” solution that might
miss the subtle issues involved with intangible and virtual harm. First, users may find ways to
overcome this regulatory instrument by logging in with different user names. Second, although
usage time is correlated with Internet addiction (see chapter 1, supra), it does not necessarily
77
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correlate with harm to the development of imagination. Third, this solution may raise freedomof-speech concerns (see chapter 5, infra) by forcing virtual-world companies to limit their
customers’ usage time, which is the central element of their business model. Finally, this solution
faces all the concerns related to code regulation (transparency, moral values, and accountability),
in which users are not informed of the challenges they face but, rather, are forced to cease usage
after a specific amount of time.

3. Conclusion
Internet regulation may account for the virtual aspect of the potential harm discussed in
this case study, but the intangible nature of this harm does not allow code regulation to prevent
such harm. In the absence of identifiable and measurable factors associated with the harm, code
regulation is not a suitable solution for prevention. The only factor directly associated with the
harm is usage time, and this factor is problematic for several reasons discussed in chapters 5 and
7, infra.
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Chapter 5 – Freedom of Speech and Online Harm to Children
Any discussion of regulation or control of virtual and intangible harms resulting from
media exposure, in this case, virtual worlds harm to imagination development, must take into
account issues concerning legal aspects of freedom of speech. Such comprehensive discussion is
beyond the scope of this dissertation. Instead, this chapter will focus on the general approach
taken in two countries, Canada and USA.
The Canadian approach will be illustrated and analyzed using the Canadian Supreme
Court decision in Irwin Toy v. Quebec,1 ruling that prohibition of marketing to children in
Quebec does not infringe the right set in section 2(b) of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms. The
US approach will be illustrated and analyzed using the US Supreme Court decision in Brown v.
Entertainment,2 quashing a California law intending to protect children from violent video games
on the basis that it abridges the Freedom of Speech.
For each jurisdiction, the approach taken in the Supreme Court decision (i.e., Irwin Tory
and Brown) will be used to draw an analogy towards the harm at hand. More specifically, an
attempt will be made to predict what would be the decision of each Supreme Court, in case of a
freedom of speech challenge, with respect to the regulation of children’s use of virtual worlds in
light of the potential harm to children’s imaginative development.

1. Canada – Irwin Toy v. Quebec
The text of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms leaves much open to
interpretation.3 Section 2(b) protects the, "freedom of thought, belief, opinion and expression,
including freedom of the press and other media of communication."4 The language, on its face, is
broad and without apparent definitional limitations. As a result, picketing outside a business,5
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advertising to children,6 publishing details of a divorce proceeding,7 describing Jews to school
children as “sadistic,” “power hungry,” “child killers,”8 soliciting one's services as a prostitute,9
denying the Holocaust in a pamphlet,10 financing election advertisements,11 creating child
pornography,12 comparing a public personality to Hitler, the Ku Klux Klan and skinheads,13 and
advertising on the side of a transit bus,14 among other things, have all been held to be protected
means of expression under section 2(b).
The state can, however, seek to limit expression. Section 1 of the Charter permits "such
reasonable limits prescribed by law as can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic
society."15 Similar to the language used in section 2(b), the constitutional dictate in section 1 is
broad, leaving much to be filled by the court. The result, for example, is that certain limits on
advertising to children are constitutionally acceptable,16 but others on the sides of transit buses
are not;17 denying the Holocaust is permissible,18 but calling all Jewish people "child killers" is
not.19
These examples demonstrate that the Court has opted for a structure that defines
expression very broadly, with almost every conceivable form of human expression prima facie
protected under section 2(b).20 The result is that section 2(b) is "little more than a formal step,"21
6
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leaving effectively all analysis to section 1. But at the same time, the Court has imposed a single,
high bar for justification under section 1. As a result, illegally parking a car in order to make a
point22 and distributing pornography depicting real children22 are each considered forms of
expression that -- in theory -- require a, "pressing and substantial purpose" if they are to be
constitutionally limited.23 Unsurprisingly, the Court has thus struggled mightily in the two
decades since its early section 2(b) cases to find meaningful ways to assess limits under section
1. Its solutions to this dilemma include the adoption of a "contextual approach" and "deference"
to the legislative branch. However, these solutions have often served to further muddy the
jurisprudential waters of section 2(b).
The overall result is a jurisprudence that, according to Cameron, is replete with
"contradictions and double standards,"24 and is "capricious, and [is] a captive of instincts which
shift from judge to judge, case to case, and issue to issue."25 In this view, the myth of a
monolithic Oakes test under section 1 is belied by, "case-by-case manipulation"26 where the
Court has, "transformed section 1 review into an ad hoc exercise that exalts flexibility at the
expense of principle."27
Others express frustration with a highly deferential section 1 analysis that is according to
Hogg, "unprincipled and unpredictable,"28 according to Macklem and John, "inherently
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indeterminate and, consequently, open to manipulation,"29 and according to Bredt and Dodek, "a
highly subjective exercise with little predictability."30 Dodek further argued that the Court's
struggle in crafting its jurisprudence, "has resulted in a lack of transparency and a general state of
confusion among lawyers, scholars and Charter litigants."31
Most troublingly, however, the purported stringency of a single Oakes test is contradicted
by precedents that confirm the "dominant narrative" of recent scholarship that the Court's section
1 analysis has been weakened over the last two decades.32 In the expression context, the adoption
of the contextual approach and a more deferential posture in applying section 1 has eroded the
foundations of expressive freedom, especially in core areas such as political speech.
The Supreme Court decision in Irwin Toy is relevant to the harm discussed in this
dissertation and is illustrative of the manner in which the Supreme Court of Canada approachs
freedom of expression issues. Sections 248 and 249 of Quebec's Consumer Protection Act33
prohibits commercial advertising directed at persons under thirteen years of age. Irwin Toy
challenged this legislation, arguing that it was ultra vires of the province and that it infringed the
Canadian and the Quebec Charters. As in Ford,34 the Supreme Court of Canada treated the
Canadian and Quebec Charters as being largely synonymous in their guarantees of freedom of
expression.
The starting point for the majority (Dickson C.J., Lamer and Wilson J.J.) was to elaborate
on the scope of the protection found in s. 2 (b) of the Charter. This scope is very broad indeed.
"Activity," the majority stated, "is expressive if it attempts to convey meaning."35 Any human
activity that conveys or attempts to convey a meaning falls within the scope of the guarantee.36
29
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Even the mundane physical activity of parking a car, the majority stated, can fall within the s. 2
(b) guarantee if it is performed to convey a meaning. For example, in a case of parking space
reserved to spouses of government employees, an unmarried person might protest against this
method of allocating a limited resource, by parking in these spots.37
Once the Supreme Court had determined that commercial advertising aimed at children
was prima facie expression, the majority turned to the issue of the purpose and effect of the
impugned legislation. Following the position taken in R. v. Big M Drug Mart Ltd.38, the majority
concluded that legislation will infringe s. 2 (b) of the Charter if its purpose, "is to restrict the
content of expression by singling out particular meanings that are not to be conveyed...".39
This is to be contrasted with time, place and manner restrictions that simply aim at
controlling the, "physical consequences of certain human activity, regardless of the meaning
being conveyed...”.40 This latter category of governmental regulation may still infringe s. 2 (b) if
it can be established that the effect of the regulation is to restrict the plaintiff's free expression. If
the plaintiff is to fall within this latter category, the onus is on the plaintiff to establish that his or
her activity is consonant with one or more of the functions of the freedom of expression
guarantee.
Applying this test, the majority had no difficulty in finding that the legislation under
attack violated s. 2 (b). The whole purpose of the Quebec legislation was to ban certain types of
advertising. This was not simply a manner or form restriction; it was a total prohibition, in
certain media, against advertising aimed at children under the age of thirteen. As such, the
purpose of the legislation was to limit the free expression of advertisers.
The majority then turned to the Oakes criteria to determine that the impugned sections of
the Consumer Protection Act were justified under s. 1 of the Charter. The evidence before the
Court indicated a high degree of consensus among the experts that children are particularly
vulnerable to, "the techniques of seduction and manipulation abundant in advertising".41 The
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scientific evidence differed on precisely what group was vulnerable. The impugned legislation
protected a group that was somewhat broader than the group that some studies found particularly
at risk (children six or younger). The Court, however, was not willing to pick and choose among
the social scientists' reports. The government is, the majority stated, "afforded a margin of
appreciation to form legitimate objectives based on somewhat inconclusive social science
evidence".42
Turning to the proportionality requirement of the Oakes test, the majority concluded that
unlike the legislation in Ford, the impugned legislation in Irwin Toy was rationally connected to
its goal. The government's goal was to prevent advertisers from exploiting the vulnerability of
children; while a complete ban on advertising of children's products would not have been
rationally connected to this end, the majority concluded that a prohibition of advertisements
directed at young children was.
Did Quebec's advertising ban restrict the freedom of expression as little as possible? In
answering this question the majority once again emphasized the purposive approach to Charter
interpretation. When legislation is directed towards the, "protection of vulnerable groups, [the
courts] ... must be mindful of the legislature's representative function”.43 Thus, the majority
stated, the courts will be more vigilant in enforcing the minimal impairment requirement when
the government is, "the singular antagonist"44 of the individual whose right has been infringed
(for example, in the context of criminal prosecution) than they will when the government is
balancing competing claims between groups in society.
This is especially so, the majority stated, when the Charter is being used as, "an
instrument of better situated individuals to roll back legislation which has as its object the
improvement of the condition of less advantaged persons".45 Given this somewhat relaxed
standard, the Court was willing to conclude that the route chosen by Quebec impaired freedom of
expression as little as possible.
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Finally the majority noted that there was no suggestion that, "the…effects of the ban are
so severe as to outweigh the government's pressing and substantial objective."46 Significantly,
the majority concluded that the challenge to the legislation was based simply on a concern that
corporate revenue would be affected.47 This concern over corporate profits was not seen as a
factor that weighed heavily in the s. 1 scales. This is especially so when it was contrasted with
the legislative objective of protecting a vulnerable group in society. Of some interest is the short
dissenting judgment by McIntyre J. (Beetz J. concurring), emphasizing the fundamental
importance of freedom of expression, and concluding that the legislation could not be justified in
a free and democratic society.48
McIntyre J. further suggests that this freedom should only be suppressed for the most,
"urgent and compelling reasons and then only to the extent and for the time necessary to protect
the community".49
As to the particular legislation, the dissenting judges declined to accept the government's
view that any real harm existed. While children may be unduly influenced by advertising and
while this may be, "a source of irritation to parents…no evidence had been led that suggested
that children would be permanently harmed by being subjected to advertising”.50 Given this
conclusion, McIntyre J. rejected the notion that the legislation was in fact directed towards an
objective of pressing and substantial importance. McIntyre J. went on to note that, "a total
prohibition of advertising aimed at children below an arbitrarily fixed age makes no attempt at
the achievement of proportionality."51
In Irwin Toy, the Supreme Court constructed a special analytical framework for the
resolution of freedom-of-expression cases under s 2(b) of the Charter.52 That analytical
framework both identified the questions that courts are required to answer when called upon to
determine whether governmental action challenged on the basis of s 2(b) violates the right to
46
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freedom of expression, and prescribed the principles that are to be applied when each of these
questions is being answered.
In setting out that framework, the Supreme Court provided us with its understanding of
two of the building blocks of any coherent theory of freedom of expression as a constitutional
right: (1) the meaning to be given to freedom of expression, and (2) the manner in which one
determines whether governmental action infringes upon freedom of expression as defined in (1).
Of these two building blocks, the first is clearly the more important, since it determines the range
of interests that s 2(b) protects. However, the second is a necessary and far from unimportant
component of any such theory, for without it one has no legal basis upon which to decide in a
given case whether or not the impugned governmental action adversely affects one of the
protected interests in a manner, or to a degree, that should engage the concern of the courts.
The Irwin Toy framework was harshly criticized by a number of scholars and counsel in
the years immediately following its adoption, and for a broad range of reasons.53 To this point,
however, that criticism has fallen on deaf ears; in fact, the Court appears to have ignored it
entirely.54 The Court has used the framework consistently in resolving s. 2(b) cases since it was
first articulated and, as the judgment in Ontario (Public Safety and Security) v Criminal Lawyers'
Association55 makes clear, continues to invoke it today.
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Cameron56 submits that from the outset the Charter purpose was, “that the substantive
rights be given a broad and literal interpretation”. These rights should be limited, according to
Cameron, exclusively under section one. Therefore, the distinction between breach and
justification under the charter, “must be maintained to preserve the Charter's integrity”.
Cameron further suggests that the Supreme Court of Canada's decision in Irwin Toy will
only perpetuate the confusion surrounding Charter interpretation.
Drawing an analogy from the Supreme Court decision in Irwin Toy to the harm discussed
in this dissertation may yield similar results. If the evidence brought before the court will be
convincing as to the damage to imagination development caused to children from the use of
virtual worlds, the court may reach a similar conclusion and uphold a theoretical law that will
limit the use to children over the age of 14, for example. Nonetheless, there is a fundamental
difference between the restriction imposed in Irwin Toy – advertising to children, and the one
discussed here. In the case of virtual worlds use the restriction is on the product itself and not its
promotion.
Therefore, if a law banning the use of virtual worlds by children under the age of 14
would be challenged on the grounds of breaching the freedom of expression, it is assumed that
the Supreme Court would not be protecting this law as it was done in Irwin Toy, as this would
not be the least restrictive measure the government could take in this respect. This is not an
advertising of a toy to use Irwin Toy analogy, but rather a ban on the use of the toy itself which
means going a long way from the justifications brought forward in the Irwin Toy decision.
Having said that, if the government will enact a regulatory regime in which a self
regulatory or a co-regulatory scheme is employed to prevent a virtual and intangible harm, the
Supreme Court of Canada, based on its approach as was articulated in Irwin Toy, will tend to
approve such a scheme as it will protect children from an intangible harm on one hand and will
comply with the tests set out in Oaks on the other hand.
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2. USA - Brown v. Entertainment
In this case, The United States Supreme Court struck down a California law prohibiting
the sale of violent video-games to minors57 as it offended the First Amendment.58 Brown v.
Entertainment is the first video game case to be heard by the United States Supreme Court.59
The California statute at issue “Prohibits the sale or rental of “violent video games” to
minors, and requires their packaging to be labeled “18.” The Act covers games, where the
options available to the player includes, “[k]illing, maiming, dismembering, or sexually
assaulting an image of a human being,” as long as these acts are presented in a way that a
reasonable person would find, “appeals to a deviant or morbid interest of minors”. Violation of
the Act is punishable by a civil fine of up to $1,000.60
Since the opinions of the Court were strongly divided, I will discuss the decision
according to the Judge who wrote it, from the majority to the dissent.
(a) Justice Scalia
Justice Scalia delivering the majority opinion, relied heavily on an earlier case – United
States v. Stevens.61 In Stevens, the majority held that new categories of speech which is not
protected by the first amendment, may not be added, by a legislature that concludes certain
speech is too harmful to be tolerated. In Stevens it was the depiction of animal cruelty that the
Supreme Court decided not to add to the list of speech which is not protected by the first
amendment.62
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According to Justice Scalia the decision in Ginsberg v. New York63 cannot be used as a
protection from First Amendment scrutiny every time a legislature decides that speech is harmful
to minors. The decision in Ginsberg applies only to speech that is obscene and therefore harmful
to minors.
Justice Scalia further concludes that an exception for the protection of speech when it
comes to violent video game aimed at minors can only be created, “if there were a long-standing
tradition in this country of specially restricting children’s access to depictions of violence.”64
Nonetheless, since there is no such tradition, the statute is, “a restriction on the content of
protected speech,” and therefore offends the first amendment.65 It is not enough to show that
declaring violent video games harmful to minors is rational the legislator must show that the
statute, “is justified by a compelling government interest and is narrowly drawn to serve that
interest.”66
According to Justice Scalia neither prong of the strict scrutiny doctrine is met: (i) there is
no evidence of “compelling interest,” because California, “cannot show a direct causal link
between violent video games and harm to minors,”67 at the, “degree of certitude that strict
scrutiny requires”;68 and (ii) if this causal link between violent speech and harm to minors was
established, the statute is not narrowly tailored to achieve its asserted goal. It is “wildly
underinclusive” because it covers only violent video games, and does not cover the wide range of
other violent speech (e.g., fairy tales, movies and cartoons) to which children are exposed, and
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because the statute is content to “leave this dangerous, mind-altering material in the hands of
children so long as one parent (or even an aunt or uncle) says it’s OK.”69
Moreover, the statutory coverage is also “vastly over inclusive”:70 though the state
asserted that the statute was designed to “aid parental authority,” the Court is reluctant to accept
this notion asserting that parents don’t always care if their children will purchase a violent video
game. Therefore, the state limits on the purchase of violent video game may effect these children
which their parents do not object to the purchase of violent video games and hence, this
legislation is broadly tailored and therefore breach the first amendment.71
Justice Scalia’s most notable evaluation is that future technologies will be subject to the
same protections of the First Amendment.72 Specifically, the Court stated that the First
Amendment, “do not vary when a new and different medium for communication appears”.73
Justice Scalia addressed California’s argument that video games are distinguishable from
other forms of media because they are interactive in that the player participates in the violence
and determines its outcome.74 The Court, however, found this distinction uncompelling for two
reasons.75 First, with respect to controlling the outcome of the game, this is a common feature
akin to, “choose-your-own-adventure stories,” which have been around since 1969.76 Second, as
for the player’s participation, the Court viewed this as, “more a matter of degree than kind.”77
This increased interactivity, however, is not a strike against video games, and is in fact, a
testament to their success at drawing the player into the experience.78
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The opinion expressed the Court’s doubts that punishing the video games vendors for
selling violent video games to children, in case their parents do not agree with the sale of these
video games, is a, “proper governmental means of aiding parental authority”.79
However, this type of government regulation of children’s access to speech is exactly
what the Court upheld in Ginsberg and many other cases.80 In fact, the Court has upheld
numerous broadcasting restrictions, which affect adults and children alike, all in the name of
protecting children from speech of which their parents may disapprove.81
Scalia’s opinion pointed out that California regulation does not take into account the fact
that some children who will be prohibited from purchasing video games under the law have
parents who do not care whether their child is buying violent video games.82 As a result, the
law’s purported aim to assist parental authority actually supports only what, “the State thinks
parents ought to want.”83
(b) Justice Alito
Justice Alito, joining the majority opinion conclusion, would have held the statute
unconstitutional on the, “narrower ground that the law’s definition of ‘violent video games’ is
impermissibly vague.”84 The California statute does not meet the vital threshold requirement; it
does not define “violent video games” with the “’narrow specificity’ that the Constitution
demands.”85
Justice Alito rejects the majority assumption that video games are the same as books and
movies,86 saying that the experience of playing video games, “may be very different from
anything that we have seen before”. According to Justice Alito, testifying in his decision that he
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had played violent video games to learn about this topic, the experience is very different from
reading books or watching movies.87
Justice Alito’s concurrence expressed the concern that the majority decision will be
interpreted as indicating that no regulation of a minor’s access to violent video games (and new
technologies in general) is ever allowed.88 Justice Alito argues that the law should progress with
technology and proceed with caution when considering the principles of the constitution and the
rapidly evolving technology. Especially relevant to the harm discussed in this dissertation is
Justice Alito statement that, “We should take into account the possibility that developing
technology may have important societal implications that will become apparent only with time”.
Justice Alito further states that the legislator may be in a better position than the court to assess
the implications of new technologies. The majority, according to Justice Alito, exhibit none of
this caution.89
Clearly, Justice Alito is taking the side that the internet is a unique regulatory sphere. In
addition, I argue that he is the only voice within the majority that recognizes, ‘the simulacra
bias’,90 “the signs of the real when there is no real,” according to Baudrillard.91
(e) Justice Breyer
Justice Breyer argues that the majority decision creates a, “serious anomaly in First
Amendment law.”92 While the state can prohibit the sale of magazines with nude pictures to
minors, according to Justice Breyer, the decision in Brown prohibit the state from preventing the
sale of violent interactive games to minors. This could lead to an absurd situation in which nude
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pictures are prohibited but interactive video game allowing the minor to torture, rape and kill a
virtual naked women is allowed.93
Justice Breyer stated that the applicable standards of review in determining the
constitutionality of California’s video game regulation are the vagueness precedents and the
strict scrutiny test. The relevant category of speech for this type of review is not depictions of
violence, but rather is the category of, “protection of children.”94 Under the vagueness analysis,
Breyer found the California statute provided sufficient notice of what is prohibited under the law,
and therefore was not impermissibly vague.95 Additionally, California’s law was no more vague
than New York’s statute in Ginsberg.96 Accordingly, any issues of remaining confusion could be
cured through the state courts’ interpretation.97
By applying the same standard of strict scrutiny to California’s video game regulation,
Breyer reach the opposite result of the majority.98 Breyer determined that both California’s
interest in addressing a social problem and in aiding parental authority are legitimate, and indeed,
are furthered by the California legislation.99 According to Breyer, the California law achieved
these aims since it only prevents a minor from buying a violent video game without a parent’s
permission.100 Furthermore, video games are accepted teaching tools, and therefore, properly
regulating the distribution of video games deemed exceedingly violent will further California’s
aim of protecting the physical and psychological well-being of minors.101
Justice Breyer imparted that the present case is more about education than censorship.102
As such, the First Amendment does not prevent the government from assisting parents with their
children’s education about matters of violence.103 As Breyer pointed out, the Court has
previously stated that an immature and developing child may be less able than an adult to
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determine for him or herself what material is appropriate or not, and as such is vulnerable to
“negative influences.”104

(f) Justice Thomas
Justice Thomas’s dissent took the view that the majority improperly extended the
protections of the First Amendment.105 Instead, Justice Thomas believed the present case
encompasses a new category of speech, “speech to minor children bypassing their parents.”106
Justice Thomas reasoned that the law does not prevent a minor from buying a violent video game
if his parent’s agrees to it. But if the parents disagree to this purchase, than the freedom of speech
provides a bypass to parents consent, and this was not the original purpose of the first
amendment.107
The Brown decision was hailed by many commentators as a big victory for free speech
and the First Amendment.108 Post argues that the Brown decision, read along with the Stevens
decision, prevents the government from suppressing speech by defining it as ‘obscene’ (Stevens)
or ‘obscene to minors’ (Brown).109
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Post110 further indicates that on the legal question at the heart of the case, as he sees it,
“will a legislature’s decision to prohibit and distribution of purportedly harmful but non-obscene
speech receive the highest level of First Amendment scrutiny?”, the Court appears to be split into
a somewhat more fragile 5-4 alignment.
According to Black, if the California law would have been affirmed, it would have a
created a ‘chilling effect’ on the video game industry.111 Black further argues that the “wolf” has
taken the form of violent video games; however, “the Supreme Court has held that California’s
cry is nothing more than a false alarm”. 112
Nonetheless, Goltz113 argues that the Court’s decision was a result of lack of
understanding of new technology and the ‘Simulacra Bias’ influencing the majority.
Using the analogy of the Brown decision to analyse a potential court decision regarding
the harm presented in this dissertation and the validity of regulation to take measure against it
leads to a different conclusion than the case with the Canadian jurisprudence. Even when it
comes to a law that engages the parents in the regulation of their children engagement with new
media, as the California law in the Brown case, the US Supreme Court was reluctant to approve
the law and strike it down on the basis that it is offending to the freedom of speech.
Therefore, in order to pass master and satisfy first amendment requirements, a much
more lenient approach should be taken. According to the US Supreme Court, any governmental
supervision may offend the freedom of speech of both the virtual worlds operators and the
children users. Therefore, even a ‘weak’ instrument as co-regulation may be considered
offensive in this respect. Self-regulation nonetheless may be treated differently as it is not set by
law and the government is not enforcing it in legal means but merely suggesting that the industry
will self regulate itself.
Both in the Brown and Stevens decisions the US Supreme Court made it clear that it
would not allow any regulation of content which does not fall into the few categories already
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identified in the past as exceptions to the freedom of speech protection. Whether the Court
analysis was right is a different matter that exceeds the scope of the discussion here.

3. Conclusions
Two aspects of freedom of speech and harm to children are important and illustrated in
the two cases presented: Irwin Toy v. Quebec and Brown v. Entertainment. The first aspect
demanding consideration in the context of this case study is the notion that freedom of speech
restrictions are a crucial and imperative element of any regulatory attempt to regulate content.
The second aspect is what seems to be a different approach to the freedom of speech
interpretation between the Canadian and the American Supreme Court. In light of the decisions
in Irwin Toy and Brown it is suggested that in similar cases the Canadian Supreme Court will
tend towards a more flexible approach when considering content regulation, especially as it
relates to the interpretation of section one of the Charter.114 The US Supreme Court is bound to
continue the line set in Brown. Unless a surprise occurs and future American courts adopt Justice
Alito’s side of the majority opinion in Brown – Justice Scalia’s rigid framework will reign and
with it the tendency not to allow regulatory interference with any content.
It should be mentioned that the US Supreme Court conclusion runs to the heart of ‘The
Law of the Horse’ debate of whether the internet requires special regulation as discussed in
chapter 4, supra.115 One may argue, depending on those who favor the Internet’s special
regulation, that the ‘special’ attitude towards internet new regulation should be also applied to
constitutional aspects.
Finally, and most important to the case study at hand, the cases analyzed in this chapter
and the legal tradition demonstrate the correlation between softer regulatory instrument and the
ability to pass the constitutional master of freedom of speech. Moreover, there may be a need to
114
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take different approach when it comes to Canada and the USA. While the Canadian Supreme
Court may approve co-regulation as not offending freedom of expression in order to protect
children’s imaginative development in virtual worlds and virtual and intangible harm in general,
the US Supreme Court may reject such a solution regardless of the evidence to support the
existence of the harm.
It is also important to distinguish the two cases on the basis that while Irwin Toy deals
with the advertisement of the product, Brown deals with the actual access to the product. To
draw an analogy to the harm to children’s imaginative development in virtual worlds, it would be
permissible from a freedom of speech perspective to educate the children users and their parents
about the potential deleterious effects of virtual worlds but it would be extremely challenging to
restrict the access to these worlds. Nonetheless, while in Irwin Toy the potential harm is in the
advertisement itself and children’s poor ability to deal with it, in Brown it is the actual product
that poses the harm.
The most important aspect of this comparison in the context of the regulation of virtual
and intangible harm in general and more specifically with respect to the harm identified in
chapter 1, supra, is the constitutional concept of harm and how it is doctrinalized differently
under Canadian and US free speech protections. The bottom line is that Canada is prepared to
assume the causal link and presume the presence of harm on little or no evidence, while the US
is not. Canada is more likely as well to allow generous regulation where a vulnerable group
(children) is the target of expression.
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Chapter 6 – Lessons Learned from Comparable Regulation
[w]hat we are experiencing is the absorption of all virtual modes of expression
into that of advertising...The lowest form of energy of the sign.1

Many characteristics of the potential harm in advertising to children, especially online,
resemble the characters of the harm to children’s imaginative development as detailed in chapter
1, supra. The virtual and intangible nature of the harm, the importance of the development stage
in children’s understanding as well as the evolving technologies and frequently changing terrain
– all make the regulation of advertising to children online a suitable case for comparison and
lesson drawing when it comes to understanding the challenge in regulating a virtual and
intangible harm in general and the harm to children’s imaginative development in virtual worlds
in specific.
This chapter provides a background on advertising to children, especially online,
followed by an analysis of the legislative and regulatory framework concerning advertising to
children in two countries, Canada and United States. The chapter concludes that the pressure to
move to soft forms of regulation, codes and voluntary standards in dealing with harms to
children is great. The situation is hardly reassuring that the harms resulting from new forms of
participation in media can or will be dealt with. I will argue that the existing regulation can
perhaps deal with ‘old’ non-virtual advertisement, but it is not equipped to deal with ‘new’
virtual advertisement. The case of virtual advertisement regulation as reviewed in this chapter
and its suitability to address virtual and intangible harm to children will be used to draw an
analogy to virtual and intangible harm regulation in general, and specifically to the harm to
children’s imaginative development in virtual worlds as described in chapter 1, supra.
It is important to note that a major part of the discussion on advertising directed to
children has focused on the effects of unhealthy food and drink choices and obesity among
children. This discussion, although central and highly important, is not part of this chapter. In
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addition, although privacy and advertisement are two sides of the same coin, apart from
behavioural advertisement, privacy regulation exceeds this chapter’s scope.

1. Online Advertising to Children
Advertising to children is a big and growing business. In 2007, companies paid $17
billion on advertising to children,2 while in 2011, it was estimated that American teens hold
almost $200 billion of the American market buying power.3 Moreover, it is estimated that
children under the age of twelve influence (e.g., asking, nudging etc.) family purchases of $130–
670 billion annually.4
Screen media is a big part of this campaign with the average American child above age 8
spending more than seven hours a day watching TV, using the computer, playing video games,
and using hand-held devices.5 Children younger than 8 are spending two hours a day with screen
media.6 On average, American children between the ages of 8 and 18 are spending an hour and a
half per day on the computer,7 while 30% of their Canadian peers are (grades 6 to 12) are
spending more than two hours per day using their computers.8
According to Cai & Zhao, most of the popular websites for children (87%) include some
type of advertising.9 This online advertising represents a radical shift from the traditional
advertising to children in TV and print,10 for several reasons: its interactivity allows children to
2
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engage in an active manner with the brand; its immersive nature brings and keeps the child in a
fully branded virtual environment, thus blurring the lines between advertising and other content
(as well as blurring the lines between reality and the virtual world11); and the advertisers can
build the advertisement based on the data they have on the specific child (e.g., location,
preferences, web history etc.).12
These factors have implications not only on the children and the influence of
advertisement on them, but also on the research of these effects. As Montgomery noted,
“[D]igital entertainment and advertising are now thoroughly intertwined,” and this makes it
“difficult to isolate advertising as a separate form of communication.” This is true for the child as
well as for the researcher.13
According to Calvert,14 new techniques of advertisement are being used due to the
advances in technology. One example is stealth advertising15 (or embedded advertising16), where
the intent of the advertisement is being concealed.17 The reason for this strategy is the notion that
the effectiveness of advertising increases if it is not being recognized by the consumers as an
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advertisement.18 This technique tries to capture the consumers when their “guards” are down, so
that they will be more open to persuasive arguments about the product. This way the border
between the advertisment and the content is blurred. See in this context Goltz’s19 first law: “The
Truth in the Medium is Context Dependent” as explained in chapter 1 supra.
Examples of stealth advertising include ‘planting’ products in movie scenes, the use of
word-of-mouth (viral) advertising, creating interactions between children and online characters
promoting specific brands, creating advertisements that appear to be video news releases, and
employ behavioral advertisement in which information is being collected from children online
and is being used to advance targeted advertisement to them.20 These examples of stealth
advertising are designed to create or enhance a branded environment that fosters loyalty.21 One
example of stealth advertising is adver-games, “online video games with a subtle or overt
commercial message where the use of product placement is common”.22 This technique provides
information about the user’s engagement with the brand and ensures that the user is in constant
interaction with it.23 Since 64% of American children between the ages of 5 to 14 are using the
internet in order to play games, adver-games are a very popular and powerful tool.24
In many cases adver-games keep the user immersed with the brand for a growing period
of time,25 hence blurring the line between advertising and entertainment with little understanding
of the user children about the advertisement being presented to them while playing these
games.26 Therefore, it is not surprising that only 25% of four and five grade students succeeded
18
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in recognizing that advertising was, in fact, the purpose of the adver-game.27
Other online advertisement techniques includes spokes-characters that promote the
brand;28 social-media marketing;29 the traditional Banner ads;30 and mobile advertisement.31

1.1 Children’s Vulnerability
According to Kunkel, children’s ability to understand the intention of advertising is
developing based on their age.32 Robertson and Rossiter argue that children younger than eight
understand advertising as a tool used to help them in their purchasing decisions; at this age, they
are not aware of advertisers’ intention to convince them to purchase the product.33 Piaget’s
theory of cognitive development is often used in order to explain children’s development in
understanding advertisements.34
Valkenburg and Cantor argue that at a younger age (2-7), children focus their attention on
properties such as how a product looks. The children believe that, just like in the advertisement,
Santa will bring them the presents portrayed during the Christmas season,
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Preoperational modes of thought put young children at a distinct disadvantage
in understanding commercial intent and, thus, in being able to make informed
decisions about requests and purchases of products.35
A more realistic understanding of the world begins at ages seven to eleven. At this stage,
children go beyond the information provided by the advertisement and realize that the intent of
the advertisement is to sell them products. Finally, at age twelve, “adolescents can reason
abstractly and understand the motives of advertisers even to the point of growing cynical about
advertising”.36
In a research conducted in the 70s, Robertson and Rossiter questioned 1st, 3rd and 5th
grade students about their understanding of advertisements. While only 50% of the 1st grade
students understood the commercials’ persuasive intent, 87% of 3rd graders and 99% of 5th
graders understood the persuasive intent of the advertisement.37 While children understanding of
advertisement has developed in the last 40 years, so does the sophistication and manipulative
nature of advertisers and advertisements.
Education can improve children’s ability to understand the intent of advertisement.
Roberts et al presented to children in grades four, six and eight a movie teaching advertisement
techniques or a control film. Children who viewed the advertisement techniques film
demonstrated a more sceptical approach to advertisements after viewing the film. One week
later, these children showed a sophisticated understanding and applied advertising techniques.
Second, third, and fifth graders demonstrated weaker but similar effects.38
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The research on children’s learning from interactive media made use of Piaget39 and
Vygotsky’s40 notion that, “knowledge is constructed through interactions between the knower
and the known”. According to Wartella et al.,
Interactive technologies are based on dialogue and turn-taking – a child takes a
turn, then a computer responds and takes a turn, then the child takes a turn
again. In essence, a conversation is taking place in which each response made
by a child leads to potentially different content being shared.41
Nonetheless, the nature of the virtual interaction is based on the development level of the
child. For example, children younger than eight believe they are really interacting with branded
characters. Older children have a better understanding of the differences between what is real
and what is imaginary. Advertisers can target the children’s level of understanding therefore
achieving a much more effective tool of advertisement than what could be done in traditional TV
advertisement, for example. Reber argues that repeated presentation of commercial messages
online, “can also tap into children’s implicit memory, which involves learning without conscious
awareness”.42 Auty and Lweis argue that embedded products into entertaining content creates a
positive attitude towards that product while the user is not aware of it.43 In order to help children
coup with embedded advertisement, Reid44 suggests to create online games in which the goal is
to identify embedded products.
Another aspect that makes children more vulnerable to online marketing is the
immediacy and ease of the purchase. While in television advertisement there is the actual need to
go to the store and purchase the product or call the ‘hot line’, on the Internet the purchase can be
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done with the click of the mouse. There is no delay between the moment where the product is
presented in the advertisement and the next moment when the child can purchase it online.45
1.2 Criticism
An example of the cynical way used by advertisers to convince children to buy products
without any moral constrain can be found in Schor’s book, 'Born to Buy'.46 Shor observe that
while in the 1920’s the purpose of marketers was to convince mothers (the “gatekeepers”) that
the product being advertised is beneficial for the child,47 in the 1980s, marketing strategies aim
to undermine parental authority in the name of “kid power”,
Parents are now presented as neglectful, incompetent, abusive, invisible, or
embarrassing. These ads represent authority figures as laughable, and convey
the message that the only one capable of understanding children is the
corporate sponsor.48
According to the case of Thomas Cook and advertising standard Canada,49 the ‘kid
power’ approach remains intact today.
Fleras50 emphasise the shift from advertisements that provide information about the
product to “creating an emotional connection between the product or brand and the consumer”.51
This emotional connection is achieved by using images, sound and narrative that are either not
connected or remotely connected to the product. Fleras further argue that,
By not making verifiable (and therefore, falsifiable) claims that are clearly
subject to regulatory scrutiny, this shift in approach could allow advertisers to
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partially or completely remove advertising from the oversight of traditional
statutory controls on misleading advertising if those controls are narrowly
interpreted.
In the virtual worlds, interactivity and the appeal to emotions reveal new dimensions. An
example can be found in The Media Awareness Network report in which a fourteen-year old girl
took the “Ultimate Personality Test” on Tickle’s predecessor, emode.com.52 After taking the test,
the girl was told that “she values her image”, so the website recommended that she visit e-diets,
one of their advertisers, to “prep her body for success”.53
Another example of the deep ‘relationship’ artificially created by advertisers between the
children and the online content is provided by Steeves,54
[t]he site [Barbie.com] incorporates more than a sales pitch – it reinforces the
‘friendship’ between the child and the brand itself. After taking a car trip into
the city to help Cali (a doll) get ready for a party, the screen tells her, ‘We’re
totally glad your’e chillin’ with our Cali girl crew!’ For US$1.99, Barbie can
also step out of the website and call the child directly on the phone. The site
tells girls, ‘Wow! You could get a call from your best friend – Barbie!’.
In this context Lawford55 and others56 found that the online world is perceived by
children as an extension of the offline world, rather than as a separate space with different rules.
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This led to the development of the “immersive advertising” model mentioned above in which
advertisers use adver-games and stealth advertisement. In her book ‘Consuming Kids: The
Hostile Takeover of Childhood’ Lin, argues, that,
[s]uch immersive advertising environments are detrimental to the child’s own
development by invading the child’s sense of how to play – potentially
emotionally and mentally impoverishing the child.57
The criticism of advertising to children is so severe that it is now coming from the heart
of the advertising industry. Bogusky, widely credited with having invented viral marketing,58
called the practice of marketing to children a “destructive” practice that has no “redeeming
value”. Children are, “incapable of protecting and defending themselves from a message that
probably doesn't have their very best interest at heart,” Bogusky stated, and because it is,
[t]he duty of adults in society…to protect…children, they should demand that
corporations and marketers stop spending billions to influence our innocent and
defenseless offspring.59
Lindstrom, a leading kids marketer, is similarly concerned,
Kids are being led to expect everything to be customized around them,
including parents and schools, and if it's not, they lose patience and move on to
something else…One of the biggest scares in the future is going to be lack of
creative people…We're forcing the brain in the wrong direction, killing all
creativity and fantasy.60
In light of the said above, advertising to children online poses a real risk to many aspects
of the children’s well being. Nonetheless, as stated in earlier chapters, the regulation tends to
503-526 (2006); Sonia Livingstone & Magdalena Bober, UK Children Go Online: Listening to Young People’s
Experiences, London: Economic and Social Research Council (2003).
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react slowly and late to new technological and market developments. One of the indications that
this is the case with the regulation of advertising to children’s online is the fact that there is no
real distinction between traditional advertising regulation and the new advertising online.

2. The Regulation of Advertising to Children Online
This section details and analyses the regulation of advertising in Canada and the US,
especially regarding advertising to children online. Each part of the section will include the
legislation, code of practice, industry codes, recent legal developments and finally the research
evaluating the regulation in each of the two jurisdictions. With the exception of Quebec, the
focus of the discussion is federal.

2.1 Canada
The general regulatory framework regarding advertising to children in the media is set by
the Canadian Radio-television and Telecommunication Commission (CRTC),61 according to
which, children's advertising includes:
(1) any paid commercial message carried during children’s program, and (2)
any commercial message that is directed to children (defined as those under 12
years of age), whether it’s during children’s programming or not.62
Broadcasters must adhere to the Broadcast Code for Advertising to Children.63 This Code
was created to complement the Canadian Code of Advertising Standards,64 containing general
principles for ethical advertising. The Canadian Code of Advertising Standards is published by
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the Canadian Association of Broadcasters65 and Advertising Standards Canada.66 In Quebec, as
will be detailed below, commercial advertising aimed at persons younger than 13 is generally
prohibited.67

(a) Legislation
Online advertisement directed at children is not directly regulated by legislation in
Canada.68 The federal legislation that is relevant to this field consists of the Competition Act,69
and recently the Canada Anti Spam Legislation (CASL). In Quebec, The Quebec Consumer
Protection Act70 and related regulations oversee this field. Other provincial legislation is beyond
the scope of this discussion and deals mainly with misleading advertisement of specific
professionals and products.71
(i) Federal Competition Act
Engaging in false or misleading advertising is a criminal and/or civil offence according to
The Competition Act. When advertising to children, fair disclosure will be measured from the
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standard of the target audience.72 To determine liability in online advertisement, a case by case
analysis is conducted.73 Nonetheless, when targeting children, a special standard will be applied.
Section 52 of the Act Makes a criminal offence to make false or misleading
representation to the public in any material respect, if done knowingly or recklessly.74 Noncompliance may result in a fine of up to $200,000 and/or imprisonment of up to one year on
summary conviction. Upon indictment the court has discretion regarding the fine amount and/or
imprisonment of up to 14 years.75
The civil provision set in Section 74.01(1)(a) of the Act prohibits a person to make or
permit the making of a representation to the public, if this representation is false or misleading in
a material respect. Intention is not required. In the first instance, for such an offence
administrative monetary penalties (“AMPs”) of up to $750,000 for individuals and up to
$10,000,000 for corporations may be imposed. The AMP can be increased in subsequent
offences up to $1,000,000 in the case of individuals and $15,000,000 in the case of
corporations.76 Under both provisions, the literal meaning and “general impression” are
considered in the determination of whether a representation has been false or misleading.
The case of Popsicle Industries Inc. (Canada) shows that it is the duty of the advertiser to
meet the demand of its target audience, especially in the case of children. In the case of Popsicle,
the charge was that Popsicle violated the Competition Act in a promotion targeted at minors.77
Participants in Popsicle promotion were allowed to exchange “points” for prizes. These prizes
included games by Nintendo. Nonetheless, due to unexpected demand for the Nintendo prize,
Popsicle awarded substitute rewards. These substitute prizes were at a lower quality and less
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desirable. Eventually, Popsicle gave Nintendo prizes to all of the participants and paid a fine of
$200,000 for the delay in awarding these prizes.78
In 2012 the Supreme Court in Richard v. Time79 held that misleading advertising claims
ought to be determined from the point of view of the, “credulous and inexperienced consumer”.
The first general impression that the advertisement made on the viewer substitute the misleading
element. The “credulous and inexperienced consumer” does not have experience in detecting the
falsehoods in advertisements, his intelligence is less than average, and he is not particularly wellinformed, prudent, nor diligent.
The Commissioner of Competition expressed the view that the decision in Richard v.
Time is directly relevant to the application of the Competition Act. This approach aligns with the
Competition Bureau’s aggressive enforcement of the Competition Act. For example, in the
Yellow Pages Marketing case, the Competition Bureau was successful in obtaining $9 million.
This is the highest AMP that was awarded to date in a proceeding dealing with misleading
advertising.80
A relatively new addition to the Competition Act is the Canada’s anti-spam legislation
(CASL). This legislation requires that in the case of sending “commercial electronic messages”,
there will be strict consent by the receiver, and unsubscribe option available. Under this new
legislation express consent is required in the case of installing a computer program on any other
person’s computer system. Cookies are considered computer programs and therefore there is a
need for consent to install cookies where, “the person’s conduct is such that it is reasonable to
believe that they consent to the program’s installation”.
The regulator under CASL can impose AMP’s of up to $1,000,000 for an individual per
violation and $10,000,000 for businesses. Coming into force in July 1, 2017, CASL allows a
78
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private right of civil action with the award of damages of up to $200 per violation (i.e. for every
email sent), but not more than $1 million per day.
The purpose of CASL is to prevent unsolicited or misleading commercial electronic
messages (“CEMs”) and deter individuals and companies from engaging in other forms of online
fraud. CASL comes into force when commercial electronic messages are sent by a computer
system in Canada to a recipient. The location of the sender or recipient are not important. The
provisions of CASL relating to CEMs came into force on July 1, 2014.
(ii)

Quebec Consumer Protection Act
The Quebec Act banning advertising to children was the first such law in the twentieth

century.81 At its inception, the concerns related to consumption of heavily-promoted sugary
foods and the accompanying risks of tooth decay were part of the justification for the ban.82 But,
the primary rationale was related to the unique vulnerability of children to deception.83 The
Quebec Act and its Regulations84 are the only legislation in Canada prohibiting advertising
directed at children. The Act does not consider specifically the issue of online advertising to
children.85 However, it has been applied by the government and provincial courts to marketing
directed at children on the Internet.86
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Commercial advertising directed at persons under 13 years of age is prohibited by the
Act.87 Whether the advertisement is directed at children is determined by the following
contextual factors, “a) the nature and intended purpose of the goods advertised, b) the manner
that the advertisement is presented and c) the time and place that it is shown”.88 According to the
Regulations, advertisers may not portray goods, persons or services in such way that may be
potentially harmful or misleading. The use of professionals or animated cartoons for
endorsements is prohibited.
In general, the Act and Regulations are enforced. In 2009, Saputo Inc. manufacturer of
Vachon snack cakes was ordered to pay a fine of $44,000 as a result of a 2007 campaign in
which the company distributed Igor cakes and merchandise in daycare centers.89 Charges under
the Act were also made against Burger King, McDonald’s, and General Mills, for sponsoring
Tele-Quebec children’s movies as well as distributing toys with meals intended to children.
Nonetheless, eventually although charged and pled guilty, General Mills was subject to an
insignificant fine of $2,000.90 The problem with enforcing the Quebec Act relates to the
complaint process according to Kent et al.,91
[s]ome food and beverage companies are not respecting Quebec’s Consumer
Protection Act on the Internet. The key to strengthening this Act is systematic
surveillance, as currently the Quebec government relies on consumer
complaints.
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(b) The Federal Commission
Section 5(1) of the of the Broadcasting Act92 sets the Objects and Powers of the Canadian
Radio-television and Communication Commission in Relation to Broadcasting, “the Commission
shall regulate and supervise all aspects of the Canadian broadcasting system”. The Canadian
Radio-television and Telecommunications Commission Act93 oversee the establishment of the
commission.
In 1974, both the Federal Communication Commission (FCC - US) and Canadian RadioTelevision and Communication Commission (CRTC - Canada) became more engaged in the
realm of children’s media, with the establishment of new policy guidelines regarding children's
programmers and advertisers.94 Both the US and the Canadian government began applying
pressure on the industry to, "adopt codes regulating some of the worst excesses of children's
advertising" and "violence," and include more programming with educational content.95
Nonetheless, by the 1980s, the tendency towards self-regulation led to relaxing the requirements
and leaving the regulation at the hands of the industry.96
Advertising limitations encountered compliance and enforcement challenges in both
countries. According to Shanahan & Hyman, in the US,
Despite clear prohibitions on host selling (since 1974) and program-length
commercials (since 1992) targeted at children97 television stations continue to
violate children's television rules with very little repercussion.98
In Canada, Jeffery argues,
92
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[t]here is no evidence on record that the CRTC has ever considered violations
of the Children's Code to determine whether a license should be renewed,
revoked, or subjected to additional terms.99
In June 2015, the Standing Senate Committee on Social Affairs, Science and Technology
chaired by Senator Kelvin Kenneth Ogilvie met to continue its study on the increasing incidence
of obesity in Canada: causes, consequences and the way forward.100 The committee met with the
CRTC Executive Director, Broadcasting, Scott Hutton, and the Director, Social and Consumer
Policy, Nanao Kachi to discuss the regulation of advertising to children in Canada. The CRTC
representative’s presentation to the committee is telling and encapsulate most of what is wrong in
the regulation of advertising to children in Canada.
At the outset of his presentation, Mr. Hutton states that,
[a]lthough the CRTC does not directly regulate advertising content, we do
intervene when it comes to basic standards for advertising aimed at Canadians
aged 12 years and younger.
This intervention includes, according to Mr. Hutton, requirement from broadcasters to
adhere to the Broadcast Code for Advertising to Children, the Canadian Children’s Food and
Beverage Advertising Initiative administered by ASC, and advertising pre-clearance, a service
performed by Advertising Standards Canada. According to Mr. Hutton,
Such measures are working. the CRTC collects and addresses complaints made
by Canadians about the appropriateness of content aired by broadcasters. In
2014–15, we received over 2,800 complaints related to television
programming. Of those, only 30—or less than 1% of the complaints—
concerned advertising directed at children.
Following Mr. Hutton statement that there are no complaints to the CRTC about
99
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advertising to children, Senator Stewart Olsen was skeptical saying that, “with the industry
setting its own standards, they are after advertising money” and asked how often does the CRTC
review and redo the advertising to children standards, “Apparently the code was put in place in
1978, so I would be interested in hearing about your reviews of it”. Nanao Kachi, Director,
Social and Consumer Policy, at the CRTC answers with no hesitation, “We base our
determination as to whether or not the code needs to be reviewed on input from Canadians…we
basically have no complaints.”.
A brief look at the CRTC website solves the mystery and provides a different reason as to
why the CRTC is not receiving any complaints about advertising to children – the option to make
a complaint to the CRTC about advertising to children does not exist. When choosing the ‘Make
a complaint -> TV/Radio (for the Internet the option of ‘Advertising’ does not exist) ->
Advertising’ option in the CRTC website, there are three options: inappropriate content/false or
misleading content/sound levels.101 When choosing ‘inappropriate content’, the following
message appears,
For concerns related to inappropriate content in advertising, you should try
to resolve the issue with the broadcaster. Many questions or complaints are
resolved at this stage.
If your issue remains unresolved, please contact Advertising Standards Canada
(ASC). As Canada’s advertising self-regulatory body, they administer the
Canadian Code of Advertising Standards, the principal instrument of
advertising self-regulation in Canada. The Code sets the criteria for acceptable
advertising and forms the basis for the review and adjudication of consumer
and advertising disputes.
In the case of ‘false or misleading content’, the CRTC website refers the complainant to
the Competition Bureau. It is only with regard to complaints about ‘sound level’ that the CRTC
will deal with the complaint, after the complainant will contact the broadcaster and the complaint
will not be settled.
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Given this structure, it is not surprising that the CRTC top area of complaints, according
to Mr. Hutton, is, “the loudness of advertising [which] comes front and centre”.
The same pattern of reply by the CRTC representatives demonstrated above with regard
to complaints, arise with respect to the regulatory mechanism that oversees advertising to
children. The regulatory regime is described by Mr. Hutton as a, “co-regulation form”,
We trust the industry to co-regulate itself and to work out best situations. If
there are issues that arise, they always come back to the commission. The
commission has final say and can impose further conditions or restrictions, or
require improvements to those conditions through its own motions.
However, in a further explanation about ASC pre-clearance system cast doubt as to the
trustworthiness of the industry in overseeing itself,
When an advertiser comes to Advertising Standards Canada to have their
advertisements reviewed, there is a fee associated with that.
It is unlikely that ASC will reject an advertisement when its source of revenue relies on
the fee paid by the advertisers for the preclearance process. Therefore, it seems that in theory the
CRTC is maintaining a co-regulation regime where the government is overseeing the self
regulatory body (i.e., ASC), however, when this oversight is focused mainly on enforcing
compliance and given that the self regulatory body is biased towards approving the
advertisements and rejecting code based complaints, the government involvement is theoretical
and the alleged co-regulatory regime is actually plain self regulation.
As to the regulation of the Internet, the CRTC position is clear, “We don't regulate other
forms of digital social media”. When asked if there is any regulation, the CRTC representatives
answer that there is not and this is the reason for their approach of empowering the users,
[t]hat's why we're making the point that we need to work collectively on
engaging citizens, teaching them about advertising, teaching them about being
digital savvy and that is our message, even as we are looking at other forms of
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our interventions. Restrictions don't seem to work as well as in the past. We
need to educate and get the proper messages out.
Nonetheless, intentions and performance do not walk together when it comes to the
CRTC as they refer the committee to the work of MediaSmarts, a not for profit independent
organization which is supported by the CRTC. A review of the relevant parts of MediaSmarts
website,102 reveals material which is dated, is not intended for children, not interactive and raises
questions as to whether anyone is using it. In addition, the CRTC latest imitative, ‘Let’s Talk
TV’,103 is silent about media literacy, advertising to children or any topic relevant to this
discussion.
In 2009, the CRTC decided to maintain the exemption status of new media broadcasting
undertakings.104 The Broadcasting Act would not apply to Internet content, as the new
technology was still changing in a way that continued to justify various exemptions. Then, in
February 2011, the Supreme Court of Canada stated that Internet providers do not fall under the
laws that apply to broadcasters since they have no control over the content they distribute. This
decision settled the ongoing debate to determine whether or not Internet service providers were
broadcasters.105
A related field in which the CRTC was much more active, is the regulation of violence in
children television programs. The following discussion purpose is to demonstrate the CRTC
dealing, across time, with a harm which is both virtual and intangible, thus similar to the harm
caused by advertising to children and the harm identified in chapter 1 supra. A discussion on the
affects of violent television on children or the fine differences between the nature of the harm
from violent television and the nature of the harm from advertising and the potential harm to
imaginative development from virtual worlds use as well as the rich literature on the regulation
of violent video game, is beyond the scope of this discussion.
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MediaSmarts website, http://mediasmarts.ca/digital-media-literacy/media-issues/marketing-consumerism provide resources for parents and teachers; http://mediasmarts.ca/digital-media-literacy/digital-issues/onlinemarketing - for online.
103
CRTC website, Let's Talk TV: A Conversation with Canadians http://www.crtc.gc.ca/eng/talktv-parlonstele.htm
104
CRTC Broadcasting Regulatory Policy 2009-329, Review of Broadcasting in New Media, 4June 2009.
105
Reference re Broadcasting Act, [2012] 1S.C.R. 142.
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According to the CRTC website,106
Canadian policies prevent children from being exposed to inappropriate
violence on TV. Work on these policies began in the early 1990s, and
continues.
According to the CRTC public notice,
The CRTC policy focuses on three areas: broadcasters’ responsibilities, which
include the industry codes of conduct’, parents’ responsibilities, including tools
parents can use to make informed viewing choices, and media literacy.107
In February 1993, the National Action Group, later renamed Action Group on Violence on
Television (“AGVOT”), was formed to further examine the issue of violence in Canadian
children programming. AGVOT was comprised of representatives of the broadcasting industry.
In September 1993 a General Statement of Principles was adopted by AGVOT concerning the
depiction of violence in children television programming. These principles prohibited depiction
of gratuitous violence; pose responsibility on broadcasters to be sensitive to the concerns for
children; and a commitment by licensees to provide viewers with adequate information about the
subject matter of programs offered. The principles expressed the commitment of the Canadian
broadcasting industry to adopt a code dealing with violence in television programming, based on
the General Statement of Principles.108
In October 1993, the revised Voluntary Code Regarding Violence in Television
Programming was submitted by the Canadian Association of Broadcasters109 (CAB). This
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http://www.crtc.gc.ca/eng/info_sht/b317.htm (last visited April 30, 2016).
Public Notice CRTC 1996-36; Industry Code Regarding Violence in Television Programming (Public Notice
CRTC 1993-149); Pay Television and Pay-per-View Programming Code Regarding Violence (Public Notice CRTC
1994-155).
108
See Report to the Canadian Radio-television and Telecommunications Commission from the Action Group on
Violence on Television, Report on a Classification System for Violence in Television Programming to be used in
conjunction
with
V-chip
Technology
(April
30,
1997),
Available
at
http://www.cab
acr.ca/french/societal/antiviolence/agvot_vchip.shtm (last visited April 30, 2016).
109
http://www.cab-acr.ca/english/about/default.shtm (last visited April 30, 2016) (“The Canadian Association of
Broadcasters (CAB) is the national voice of Canada’s private broadcasters, representing the vast majority of
Canadian programming services, including private radio and television stations, networks, specialty, pay and payper-view services. We are the voice and choice of Canadians. Private radio and television services enjoy by far the
107
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revised Code embraced the principles set out by AGVOT. The CRTC accepted the code in its
Public Notice announcement.110
The Violence Code, administered by the Canadian Broadcasting Standards Council,111 was
used for the first time on 24 October 1994, as a response to complaints about violence in what
was then the most commercially successful children’s television program of all time: Mighty
Morphin Power Rangers.112 The adjudicators found that all of the episodes violated several of the
standards of the Violence Code. Following this decision, the broadcaster stopped airing the series
a few months later. Nonetheless, despite the decision, the show was still available via
broadcasters not subject to the authority of the CBSC. This issue pressured the CRTC to
establish a regulatory system to apply to all channels available in Canada.
In the fall of 1995 the CRTC held regional consultations on television violence, followed by
a national public hearing in October. In the resulting Policy, the CRTC stated its intention to
develop program rating classification systems and announced an acceptable blocking technology
that would function in tandem with that system.113 In March 1996, the CRTC outlined its policy
in a report entitled ‘Respecting Children: A Canadian Approach to Helping Families Deal with
Television Violence’. The report stated that the solution to the problem of violence on television
will be a combination of adoption of industry codes and a rating system – accounting for 10%,
Vchip technology accounting for another 10% and finally, public awareness and media literacy
programs that would account for 80% of the solution.

largest share of the market, and Canadian programming broadcast by those services attracts the predominant share of
the total audience for Canadian content”).
110
Public Notice CRTC 1993-149 (28 October 1993), Available at http://www.crtc.gc.ca/eng/archive/1993/PB93149.htm (last visited April 30, 2016).
111
CBSC website, http://www.cbsc.ca/about-us/ (”The CBSC is a national voluntary self-regulatory organization
created by Canada’s private broadcasters to deal with complaints made by viewers or listeners about programs they
have seen or heard broadcast on a participating station. The CBSC administers seven industry codes covering
various issues relating to ethics, violence on television, equitable portrayal, journalistic ethics, cross-media
ownership, and pay television which set out the guidelines for television and radio programming. Our Associates
include almost all private sector radio and television stations, specialty services and pay television services from
across Canada, programming in English, French and third languages. The CBSC was first incorporated on
August 15, 1990 and was recognized by the Canadian Radio-Television and Telecommunications Commission
(CRTC) on August 30, 1991 in its Public Notice 1991-90”).
112
Andreh Caron & Ronaldi Cohen, Regulating Screens Issues in Broadcasting and Internet Governance for
Children, McGill-Queen’s University Press, London, 2013
113
CRTC, Broadcasting Public Notice CRTC 1996-36, Policy on Violence in Television Programming, 14 March
1996.
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Following this statement, AGVOT presented its planned rating classification system on 30
April 1997, and the CRTC approved it on 18 June. The classification system came into effect in
September 1997, when Canadian broadcasters began to air the ratings icons. By 2001, most
analog television sets larger than thirteen inches on the Canadian market had V-chips. By March
2001, all Canadian broadcasters coded rating information in accordance with the V-chip, and by
2005 the chip and the ratings classification system were well established. Full responsibilities for
the administrative duties concerning these two mechanisms were transferred to the CBSC on 1
March 2007. The CBSC became the self-regulatory organization that administers the codes
concerning violence and equitable portrayal in broadcasting. It is now responsible for everything
related to the rating classification system and V-chip, and it has reported that between 2000 and
February 2008 the number of complaints concerning television violence dropped by around 22
per cent.114
In 2002, a complaint similar to those from 1994 was made concerning a new Power Rangers
series, Power Rangers Wild Force, broadcast by CTV. The CBSC disagreed. No program
targeting children has been the subject of complaints to the CBSC since that time.115
A review of children channels licensing decisions illustrates the CRTC’s vague
implementation of the violence in children’s programs discussion. For example, Broadcasting
Decision CRTC 2006-381,116 dated 18 August 2006, dealing with the renewal of the license for
YTV states:
In accordance with its usual practice for specialty television services, the
Commission is imposing conditions of licence requiring the licensee to adhere
to industry codes related to sex-role portrayal, advertising to children and the
depiction of violence in television programming.
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Submission of the Canadian Broadcast Standards Council to the Standing144 Notes to pages 61–5 Committee on
Canadian Heritage regarding Bill C-327, 6 March 2008, 3.
115
Caron & Cohen, supra note 112.
116
CRTC Website, http://www.crtc.gc.ca/eng/archive/2006/db2006-381.htm; see also Broadcasting Decision CRTC
2004-12, 21 January 2004, http://www.crtc.gc.ca/eng/archive/2004/db2004-12.htm (in the matter of Teletoon).
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The decision further states that YTV, “shall adhere to the guidelines on the depiction of
violence in television programming set out in the CAB's Voluntary code regarding violence in
television programming”.117

(c) Code of Practice
(i) The Canadian Code of Practice for Consumer Protection in Electronic Commerce
In January 16, 2004 the federal, provincial and territorial ministers of consumer affairs
first endorsed the Canadian Code of Practice for Consumer Protection in Electronic
Commerce118 created by The Consumer Measures Committee.119 The Code establishes
benchmarks for good business practices for merchants who are engaged in e-commerce, and is
now open to private-sector and consumer organizations to endorse. Communications with
children is set in Principle 8 of the Code.120 Section 8.1 states that,
[v]endors have a social responsibility to determine whether the person with
whom they are communicating or transacting is a child. When communicating
with children, or when the content is likely to be of interest to children, the
language must be age-appropriate, must not exploit the credulity, lack of
experience or sense of loyalty of children, and must not exert any pressure on
children to urge their parents or guardians to purchase goods or services.
Vendors are required to take all reasonable steps to prevent monetary transactions with
children,121 and are forbidden from collecting, using or disclosing personal information of
children without the express, verifiable consent of their parents or guardians.122 When seeking
117

Id.
http://cmcweb.ca/eic/site/cmc-cmc.nsf/eng/fe00064.html (last visited May 1, 2016).
119
See Consumer Measures Committee Website, Available at http://cmcweb.ca/eic/site/cmccmc.nsf/eng/h_fe00013.html (last visited May 1, 2016) (“[T]he Consumer Measures Committee (CMC) was created
under Chapter Eight of the Agreement on Internal Trade (AIT). The Consumer Measures Committee has a
representative from the federal government as well as every province and territory. The CMC provides a federalprovincial-territorial (FPT) forum for national cooperation to improve the marketplace for Canadian consumers,
through harmonization of laws, regulations and practices and through actions to raise public awareness.”).
120
http://cmcweb.ca/eic/site/cmc-cmc.nsf/eng/fe00073.html (last visited May 1, 2016).
121
Id., section 8.2
122
Id., section 8.3 (except as provided for in sections 8.5 and 8.6 - 8.5 When contests or clubs are directed at
children, vendors may collect children's personal information without parental consent and communicate directly
with those children, when vendors: a) collect the minimum amount of information required to provide the club
118
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parental consent, vendors shall clearly specify the nature of the proposed communications, the
personal information being collected and all potential uses of the information. Vendors are not
allowed to send marketing e-mail to children. 123 These principles are voluntary.124

(d)Industry Codes
The compliance with industry codes of advertising is voluntary. Nonetheless,
organizations as the Canadian Marketing Association (CMA)125 and Advertising Standards
Canada (ASC), employ enforcement and disciplinary measures against their members in cases
where the members does not follow the standards set out in their respective codes. Although the
legal consequences of breaching these codes are minor, the negative publicity resulting from
such breaches can be a major deterrent to make sure that members comply with the code.
(i)

CMA Code of Ethics and Standards of Practice

membership or to determine the winner of a contest; b) limit communications only to those required to provide the
club membership; c) in the case of contests, only deal with the parents or guardians of the winner(s) and do not
contact the winner(s); d) retain the information only as long as the children remain members of the club or until the
conclusion of the contest; and e) make no use of the information other than to provide the club membership or to
determine a contest winner. 8.6 When vendors contract with third parties to provide a club membership or to
determine the winner of a contest, vendors shall disclose only the personal information necessary for this, and shall
ensure that the third parties agree to comply with principles 4 and 8.).
123
Id., section 8.4.
124
CIPPIC, Submission to the House of Commons Standing Committee on Access to Information, Privacy and Ethics
on the Personal Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act (“PIPEDA”) 15 (November 28, 2006),
Available at https://www.yumpu.com/en/document/view/22500202/written-submission-on-the-identity-trail (last
visited May 1, 2016).
125
CMA, “About CMA”, http://www.the-cma.org/about (last visited May 1, 2016) (“The Canadian Marketing
Association (CMA) is the only marketing association in Canada that embraces Canada’s major business sectors and
all marketing disciplines, channels and technologies. Its programs help shape the future of marketing in Canada by
building talented marketers and exceptional business leaders and by demonstrating marketing’s strategic role as a
key driver of business success.”).
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The CMA Code is a measure of self-regulation by the marketing community.126 The
CMA’s Code is compulsory for members.127 Section K of the code deals with, “Special
Considerations in Marketing to Children”. The Code considers children to be under the age of
13.128 According to the Code, it should be recognized by marketers that children are not adults
and that not all marketing techniques are appropriate for children.129 Opt-in consent of the child's
parent or guardian is required for any marketing interactions directed to children that include the
collection, transfer and requests for personal information.130 Children’s information should be
immediately deleted if the child, parent or guardian withdraws or declines permission to collect,
use or disclose a child's information.131
According to the Code, it is not allowed to exploit children's credulity, lack of experience
or sense of loyalty,132 and marketing communications must be age appropriate and presented in
simple language, easily understood by children.133 Finally, a parent or guardian's opt-in consent
must be obtained in order to accept an order from a child and the marketers are not allowed to
pressure a child to urge their parents or guardians to purchase a product or service.134
Section N4.11 of the Code deals with Online Interest-based Advertising,135 and
determines three principles when using internet and app interest-based advertising,
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CMA, Code of Ethics and Standards of Practice, http://www.the-cma.org/regulatory/code-of-ethics (last visited
May 1, 2016).
127
Id.
128
Id., section k1.
129
Id., section k2.
130
section k3.1 with the exception of K4 Contests Directed to Children, Subject to applicable laws, marketers may
collect personal information from children for the purposes of contests without obtaining the parent or guardian's
opt-in consent, only if the marketer: (a) collects a minimal amount of personal information, sufficient only to
determine the winner(s); (b) deals only with the winner(s)' parent or guardian and does not contact the winner(s); (c)
does not retain the personal information following the conclusion of the contest or sweepstakes; (d) makes no use of
the personal information other than to determine the contest or sweepstakes winner(s); and (e) does not transfer or
make available the personal information to any other individual or organization.
131
Id., section K3.2.
132
Id., section K5.
133
Id., section K6.
134
Id., section K7.
135
Id, section N4.11 (“Online interest-based advertising, sometimes referred to as online behavioral advertising,
refers to tracking consumers' online activities over time in order to deliver advertisements that are relevant to
individuals' inferred interests. In advertising their goods or services through online interest-based advertising,
marketers may directly or indirectly make use of service providers that include communications agencies, ad
networks and website publishers.”).
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a.

Transparency: Marketers should be transparent when collecting, using, disclosing

and retaining information regarding their consumers.
b.

Consent: Marketers must take the appropriate steps to allow consumers to opt-out

from tracking and behavioral advertisment.
c.

Children: Unless an opt-in consent was obtained from a parent or a guardian,

marketers must not advertise to children under the age of 13.
Following a complaint made by a consumer, a member that does not comply with the
CMA Code, will be summoned to an inquiry by the CMA. Failing to respond to the CMA or to
satisfy the CMA that best efforts to comply with the CMA Code was done by the member
organization, will bring to the referral of the complaint to mediation. If the mediation does not
succeed, a hearing by an independent panel is conducted. CMA’s board of directors will hold a
meeting with the member organization upon receipt of the panel’s report. The meeting will
determine, a) whether the member organization is willing to follow the panels’
recommendations, b) make an order for corrective action or c) make a public announcement that
the member is expelled.136
(ii)

Canadian Code of Advertising Standards
Being a national advertising self-regulatory organization, Advertising Standards Canada

(“ASC”) administers the Canadian Code of Advertising Standards and the Broadcast Code for
Advertising to Children. Clauses 12 and 13 of the Canadian Code of Advertising Standards are
directed at children and determine that,
Advertising that is directed to children must not exploit their credulity, lack of
experience or their sense of loyalty, and must not present information or
illustrations that might result in their physical, emotional or moral harm137
In addition, the code defines that,

136
137

Id,, at Section Q.
Id., section 12.
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Products prohibited from sale to minors must not be advertised in such a way
as to appeal particularly to persons under legal age, and people featured in
advertisements for such products must be, and clearly seen to be, adults under
the law.138
Under the Broadcast Code ASC regulates advertisements in the broadcast media that is
specifically directed to children.139 Several of ASC’s policies provide the framework for
advertisement to children’s online.140 To comply with the Children’s Code, advertisers must
obtain preclearance from ASC prior to airing any paid commercial messages.141
Children (persons under 12 years of age)142 advertising is defined as,
[a]ny paid commercial message that is carried in or immediately adjacent to a
children's program. Children's advertising also includes any commercial
message that is determined by the broadcaster as being directed to children
and is carried in or immediately adjacent to any other program.143
The Code provides interesting directions regarding factual presentation,
(a) No children's advertising may employ any device or technique that attempts
to transmit messages below the threshold of normal awareness;
(b) Written, sound, photographic and other visual presentations must not
exaggerate service, product or premium characteristics, such as performance,
speed, size, color, durability, etc.;
138

Id., section 13.
In March 2010, the ASC published a new Children’s Broadcast Advertising Clearance Guide, which is designed
to clarify standards and assist advertisers develop and present commercials that comply with the Children’s Code.
http://www.adstandards.com/en/Clearance/Childrens/kidsGuide.pdf (last visited May 1, 2016).
140
ASC Clearance Services reviews children’s advertising in non-broadcast media (which includes children’s
advertising appearing on the internet and in magazines).
141
Preclearance is given by the Children’s Advertising Section, made up of a board of nine members, including at
least: a chairperson, three public members, and a member nominated respectively by each of the Canadian Radiotelevision Telecommunication Commission (the “CRTC”), private broadcasters, the Canadian Broadcasting
Corporation (the “CBC”), and advertiser and advertising agency associations.
142
Advertising Standards Canada, Broadcast Code for Advertising to Children, section 1(b), Available at
http://www.adstandards.com/en/clearance/childrens/broadcastcodeforadvertisingtochildren.aspx (last visited May 1,
2016).
143
Id., section 1(a).
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(c) The relative size of the product must be clearly established;
(d) When children's advertising shows results from a drawing, construction,
craft or modeling toy or kit, the results should be reasonably attainable by an
average child144
According to the Code, it is prohibit to advertise to children products not intended for use
by children145 as drugs, proprietary medicines and vitamins in any pharmaceutical form, with the
exception of children's fluoride toothpastes,146 and to make undue pressure on children to
purchase or ask their parents to make inquiries or purchases of the advertised item.147 In addition,
the code give instructions regarding advertising Scheduling148 and prohibit the promotion by
Program Characters, Advertiser-Generated Characters, and Personal Endorsements,149 with few
exceptions.150
The code details the way price and purchase terms should be presented, the fact that cost
must not be minimized, and that the statement in audio, "it has to be put together" or a similar
phrase must be included when the viewer may assume that the product is delivered assembled. In
addition, it should be clear which toys are being sold separately, when more than one toy is
featured in a commercial message (this includes accessories).151

144

Id., section 3.
Id., section 4(a).
146
Id., section 4(b).
147
Id., section 5(a).
148
Id., section 6(a)(b)(c)(d).
149
Id., section 7. (“(a) Puppets, persons and characters (including cartoon characters) well-known to children and/or
featured on children's programs must not be used to endorse or personally promote products, premiums or services.
The mere presence of such well-known puppets, persons or characters in a commercial message does not necessarily
constitute endorsation or personal promotion. For example, film clips or animation are acceptable as a mood or
theme-setting short introduction to commercial messages before presenting the subject of the commercial message
itself. These puppets, persons and characters may not handle, consume, mention or endorse in any other way the
product being advertised).
150
this prohibition does not apply to puppets, persons and characters created by an advertiser which may be used by
advertisers to sell the products they were designed to sell as well as other products produced by the same advertiser
or by other advertisers licensed to use these characters for promotional purposes (section 7(b)) Professional actors,
actresses or announcers who are not identified with characters in programs appealing to children may be used as
spokespersons in advertising directed to children (section 7(c)), and Puppets, persons and characters well-known to
children may present factual and relevant generic statements about nutrition, safety, education, etc. in children's
advertising (section 7(d)).
151
Id., section 8(a)(b)(c)(d)
145
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It is forbidden to make comparisons with competitor’s product or previous year’s
model,152 or to portray adults or children in clearly unsafe acts or situations or to show products
being used in an unsafe or dangerous manner.153 Of special interest is the social values clause
determining that,
(a) Children's advertising must not encourage or portray a range of values that
are inconsistent with the moral, ethical or legal standards of contemporary
Canadian society.
(b) Children's advertising must not imply that possession or use of a product
makes the owner superior or that without it the child will be open to ridicule or
contempt. This prohibition does not apply to true statements regarding
educational or health benefits.154
ASC and its Consumer Response Councils reviews complaints made by the public. The
Council determines whether there was a violation of the Code. In case of violation, the
advertisers will be required to amend the advertisement or withdraw it. If the advertiser is not
complying with the Council’s decision, ASC may request the media to stop airing the
advertisement or publicly declare the advertiser to be found in breach of the Children’s Code.

152

Id., section 9(a)(b).
Id., section 10(a)(b).
154
Id., section 11; see Interpretation Guidelines for Clause 11 – (i) Child-directed messages for food products in
broadcast advertising that are inconsistent with the pertinent provisions of the Food and Drugs Act and Regulations,
or the Canadian Food Inspection Agency’s Guide to Food Labelling and Advertising shall be deemed to violate
Clause 11 (Social Values) of the Children’s Code. This Interpretation Guideline is intended, among other purposes,
to ensure that advertisements representing mealtime clearly and adequately depict the role of the product within the
framework of a balanced diet, and snack foods are clearly presented as such, not as substitutes for meals. (ii) Every
"child-directed message" for a product or service should encourage responsible use of the advertised product or
service with a view toward the healthy development of the child. (iii) Advertising of food products should not
discourage or disparage healthy lifestyle choices or the consumption of fruits or vegetables, or other foods
recommended for increased consumption in Canada’s Food Guide, and Health Canada’s nutrition policies and
recommendations applicable to children under 12. (v) The amount of food product featured in a "child-directed
message" should not be excessive or more than would be reasonable to acquire, use or, where applicable, consume,
by a person in the situation depicted. (vi) If an advertisement depicts food being consumed by a person in the
advertisement, or suggests that the food will be consumed, the quantity of food shown should not exceed the
labelled serving size on the Nutrition Facts Panel (where no such serving size is applicable, the quantity of food
shown should not exceed a single serving size that would be appropriate for consumption by a person of the age
depicted).
153
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According to section two of ASC Code it is not allowed to use a format or style in a way
that disguises the commercial intention of the advertisement.155 However, although it is more
relevant to children’s undeveloped ability to understand advertisements intent, such provision is
not included in the Children’s Code.156 According to section twelve of the ASC Code,
advertising directed at young children should not,
[e]xploit their credulity, lack of experience or their sense of loyalty, and must
not present information or illustration that might result in their physical,
emotional or moral harm.157
Since ASC publishes its decisions only in cases that a violation of the Code was found, it
is impossible to determine how the code provisions are applied.158 In addition, ASC dismisses
most complaints,159 and claims to receive “virtually no” complaints about advertising directed at
children.160 It would be prudent to assume that a very narrow interpretation of section twelve is
being applied by ASC,161 especially due to the large volume of unchallenged advertisements to
which children are exposed (many of which are pre-cleared by ASC).162
According to Janet Feasby, Vice President, Standards at ASC,
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Advertising Standards Canada, Canadian Code of Advertising, Standards § 2 (2004).
See ASC, supra note 142.
157
ASC, supra note 155, at ¶ 12.
158
Id., The Consumer Complaint Procedure, Advertising Complaints Report.
159
See Advertising Standards Canada, 2004 Ad Complaints Report 2 (2005), Available at
http://www.adstandards.com/en/consumerComplaints/2004AdComplaintsReport.pdf (last visited May 1, 2016)
(indicating that nearly 94% of challenged ads were absolved in 2004. Of all 860 ads challenged that year, complaints
were upheld against only 55 ads.).
160
ASC reported only ten complaints alleging violations of Article twelve (“Advertising to Children”) of the ASC
Code during the period 1997 until the first quarter of 2004 (Advertising Standards Canada, Previous Complaints
Reports, http://www.adstandards.com/en/standards/report.asp (last visited May 1, 2016)).
161
In 2011 only 12 television related complaints regarding clause 12 were pursued by ASC. Among which 1 was
upheld. For comparison, 604 complaints were pursued regarding clause 1 and 3 among which 98 was upheld (ASC,
AD
Complaints
Report
4
(2011),
Available
at
http://adstandards.com/en/ConsumerComplaints/2011AdComplaintsReport.pdf (last visited May 1, 2016)).
162
For example, ASC pre-clearance does not apply to print ads or commercials broadcast in purely local markets.
See Advertising Standards Canada, Broadcasting Code For Advertising To Children § II(7) (2004).
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ASC receives very few complaints about advertising directed to children.
Between 2009 and 2012, two complaints under Clause 12 (Advertising to
Children) were upheld about two radio commercials.163
In a recent case study,164 Goltz and Neufield detailed ASC’s response to a claim made by
the authors arguing that a television advertisement for Thomas Cook’s family vacation featuring
a child telling his mother that booking a family vacation through Thomas Cook’s website is “a
no brainer” – was undermining parental authority and therefore violating the Code. Rather than
dealing with the substance of the complaint or the advertisement, ASC insisted that the
advertisement does not fall under the Children’s Code. ASC strongly rejected the notion that
ThomasCook.ca ad is children advertising. According to ASC Family vacations are,
[n]ot a child directed message because it does not promote a product for
which children form a substantial part of the market as users.
The evidence, however, differs from the view expressed by ASC. Research asking
parents and children about children’s consumption choices concluded that the percentage
influence that children have is 36% in holiday destination“.165 Moreover, the fact that the
advertisement is aired during children’s shows indicates the importance of children as
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Email to the author dated Jan 29, 2013 [on file]. Upheld Complaints - Q2 2011, Clause 1: Accuracy and Clarity,
Clause 12: Advertising to Children: A radio commercial invited children between the ages of 6 and 17 to call the
advertiser if they wanted to be on the Disney Channel or in a television program. If they were one of the first 200
callers, they could become the next superstar. The complainant alleged that the commercial was misleading. The
clear impression conveyed to Council by the commercial was that children ages 6-17 were invited to audition for a
chance to appear on the Disney Channel or in a television program. In reality, the advertised event was an
information session about the John Robert Powers acting school and not an audition at all. Council, therefore, found
that the commercial was misleading and also exploited children’s credulity and lack of experience.
Upheld Complaints - Q2 2010, Clause 12: Advertising to Children, In a radio commercial directed to children
between the ages of 6 and 17 the advertiser claimed the first 100 children who texted “star at 2121” on their mobile
phones could be become the next superstar. The complainant alleged that the commercial was inappropriate for
children. The overall impression conveyed by this commercial was that children could become stars on a children’s
television channel if they were one of the first 100 to send mobile text messages to a certain telephone number. To
Council, this exploited a child’s credulity and lack of experience, contrary to the Code.
164
Goltz & Neufield, supra note 49.
165
John Hall et al., Influence of Children on Family Consumer Decision Making,
2 European Advances in Consumer Research 45-53 (1995); See also Kuo-Ching Wang et al, Who is the decisionmaker: the parents or the child in group package tours?, 25(2) Tourism Management 183–194 (April 2004)
("Results indicated that family has a tendency to make a joint decision in problem recognition and the final decision
stages").
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consumers, at least in the eyes of the advertiser. Nonetheless, ASC was not convinced and
responded as follows,166
Even if it can be argued that children form a substantial part of the market as
users of travel services, in ASC’s evaluation, the message was not presented
in a manner that was directed primarily to children…In addition, we
contacted the broadcaster, CORUS Entertainment, and learned that the
commercial was not aired during or immediately adjacent to a children’s
program…The holiday program, It’s a Spongebob Christmas, during which
you saw the commercial, was rated G by the broadcaster...ASC understands
from the broadcaster that this program was geared for family viewing – not
exclusively children”.167
(iii)

Other Industry Codes & Policies

Industry Codes and policies have been presented by several major networks and
companies with respect to children’s advertising. The CBC Policy 1.3.8 Advertising Directed to
Children Under 12 Years of Age168 and the Canadian Children’s Food and Beverage Advertising
Initiative (CAI),169 are two examples.
The Canadian Children’s Food and Beverage Advertising Initiative core principles
require organization members to devote all of their advertising (including video and computer
166
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games rated "Early Childhood" or "EC", for example) directed primarily to children under 12
years of age, to promote products that represent healthy dietary choices; reduce the use of third
party licensed characters in advertising unhealthy products; and avoid advertising food or
beverage products in elementary schools - pre-kindergarten through Grade 6.
The Canadian Broadcasting Standards Council (CBSC) was established by Canada’s
private broadcasters in August 15, 1990, and recognized by the Canadian Radio-Television and
Telecommunications Commission (CRTC) on August 30, 1991 in its Public Notice 1991-90. The
CBSC is a national voluntary self-regulatory organization that was created to deal with
complaints about programs made by viewers or listeners. There are seven industry codes
administered by the CBSC, covering various issues relating to ethics, violence on television,
equitable portrayal, journalistic ethics, cross-media ownership.170
(e) Recent Legal Developments
In December 6, 2011, Jennifer Stoddart, the Privacy Commissioner of Canada,
announced171 the publication of a new set of guidelines on Privacy and Online Behavioral
Advertising.172 Commissioner Stoddart said,
[t]o best address these complexities, all stakeholders in the advertising
community, including website operators and browser developers, have a role
to play to ensure that the issues of transparency and meaningful consent are
addressed.173
In June of 2012, the Office of the Privacy Commissioner published more specific
expectations in its Policy Position on Online Behavioural Advertising.174 In September 2013, the
170
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Canadian Self-regulatory Program for Online Behavioural Advertising website was launched by
the advertising industry led by the Digital Advertising Alliance of Canada (DAAC). The website
is geared to consumers and companies alike.175 This Program is based on the U.S. Digital
Advertising Alliance (DAA) Online Behavioural Advertising Ad Choices program and
principles.176 Some common principles are also shared with the European Advertising Standards
Alliance (EASA) Online Behavioral Advertising Framework.177 This “Ad Choices” program
uses the identifying icon consisting of a lower case letter i within a blue triangle.
The DAAC Program was structured to follow the Personal Information Protection and
Electronic Documents Act (PIPEDA)178 and the OPC guidelines. Advertising Standards Canada
(ASC) has the role of monitoring compliance, dealing with complaints, initiating investigations,
and publishing reports. The Program set the following Principles: Education; Transparency;
Consumer Control (over its data collection); Data Security; Sensitive Data (children and
sensitive personal information); and Accountability.179 However, not all types of activities are
covered by the Program. For example, online advertising of entities within a web site they own
or control and contextual advertising, including ads “based on the content of the Web page being
visited, a consumer’s current visit to a Web page, or a search query.”180

(f) Evaluation
Kent et al.181 assessed and compared the influence of the ban on advertising to children in
Quebec and the self-regulatory Children’s Food and Beverage Advertising Initiative (CAI) on
food manufacturer and restaurant websites in Canada. The presence of child-directed content in
147 French and English language food and restaurant websites was assessed. The research
175
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analyzed marketing features, games and activities, child protection features, and the promotion
of healthy lifestyle messages on those sites.
The research found equal child-directed content in the French and English language
websites, including marketing features indicating that the Quebec ban was not necessarily more
effective in preventing commercial content directed to children in those websites than the CAI.
In addition, equal child directed content was found in CAI websites compared to non-CAI
websites. However, The CAI sites included more healthy lifestyle messages and child protection
features compared to the non-CAI sites.
Kent et. al. conclude,
Systematic surveillance of the Consumer Protection Act in Quebec is
recommended. In the rest of Canada, the CAI needs to be significantly
expanded or replaced by regulatory measures to adequately protect children
from the marketing of foods/beverages high in fat, sugar, and sodium on the
Internet.182
Dhar and Baylis assessed the effect of the Quebec ban on advertising to children by
household consumption of fast food.183 They found that the advertising ban had a "statistically
significant effect on fast food consumption at the household level. The ban decreased the
probability of fast food purchase incidence by thirteen percent per week”.184

2.2 USA
Online advertising in the US is governed mainly by the Federal Trade Commission (FTC)
and the Federal Communication Commission (FCC), as well as by self-regulatory entities like
the National Advertising Division and enforcement by individual states.185
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(a) Legislation
Formed under the Federal Trade Commission Act,186 the FTC has created a regulatory
scheme that determines what is misleading advertisement. Overseeing the FTC decisions, the
federal courts187 also contributed to the legal framework used by the FTC to determine deceptive
advertising.188 The FTC has rulemaking authority to declare children’s advertising (embedded or
traditional) to be deceptive. An act is considered deceptive, “if it includes a representation or
omission that is likely to mislead reasonable consumers, and the representation or omission is
material”.189
As part of applying the Act to online advertisement, FTC staff ruled in a petition by
Commercial Alert,190 determining that product placement that was not disclosed is not deceptive
practice. According to the FTC, the complaint, “does not suggest that product placement results
in consumers giving more credence to objective claims about the product’s attributes.”191 The
FTC further argued that the complainant failed to demonstrate sufficiently that the product
placement involved, “false or misleading objective, material claims about the product’s
attributes.”192 Referring to product placement from the eyes of the “ordinary child,” the FTC
staff argued that,193
[i]f no objective claims are made for the product, then there is no claim as to
which greater credence could be given; therefore, even from an ordinary
child’s standpoint, consumer injury from an undisclosed paid product
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placement seems unlikely.194
This decision does not align with other past decisions of the FTC in which the deception
was related to the advertisement method and not to the product. One example is re
Encyclopaedia Britannica, Inc.,195 in which a sales representative claimed to be conducting an
advertising research, while trying to sell his products. In practice, the main goal of the sales
representative with the clients going from door to door was to sell them encyclopaedias.
Although the sales representative did conduct the research survey, the FTC concluded that it was
only, “a ploy to serve as an introduction to a sales presentation.”196 The FTC declared this
conduct deceptive because, “sales representatives misrepresented and failed to disclose the
purpose of the initial contact with prospects.”197
In 2009 the FTC expended sponsorship disclosure requirements by revising its
Endorsement Guidelines based on the principle that lack of disclosure, without any other product
claims, is deceptive.198 The FTC 2009 Endorsement Guidelines consider non-disclosure of an
advertising method as material, and therefore, misleading and deceptive. Finally, the scholarly
opinion in law reviews and marketing literature conclude that undisclosed sponsorship is
inherently deceptive.199 Additional legislation that is relevant, especially to embedded
194
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advertising, is the sponsorship disclosure obligations set in the Communication Act of 1934.
Nonetheless, this legislation is out dated and vague.200
Additional legislation dealing with deceptive advertising is the Lanham Trademark
Act,

201

creating a private cause of action. The Lanham Act enable businesses to make a claim in

federal courts against their competitors in case of deceptive advertisement. Similarly to the FTC
Act, the Lanham Act prohibits "false or misleading representation of fact" in advertising.202
When hearing cases under the Lanham Act, federal courts have adopted the same principle
applied in FTC deciding appeals of FTC cases.203 The FTC principle declares advertising claims
deceptive if they are "likely to mislead consumers acting reasonably under the circumstances"
and are “material”.204
In 1990 Congress passed the Children's Television Act (CTA).205 The Federal
Communication Commission (FCC), set to enforce the Act was of the opinion that the market
should regulate itself.206 The CTA introduced two main requirements: (1) standards regarding the
amount of television programs aired to children should be established by the FCC;207 and (2) the
amount of commercial time aired during children's television programs should be limited by
broadcasters to 10.5 minutes per hour or less on weekends and 12 minutes per hour or less on
weekdays.208 These limits apply to over-the-air commercial television broadcasters, cable209 and

J. Pub. Pol’y & Marketing 67 (2008); See also Zahr Said, Embedded Advertising and the Venture Consumer 89 N.
C. L. Rev. 107–17 (2010).
200
Id.
201
15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (2012).
202
15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (2012).
203
See, e.g., Cashmere & Camel Hair Mfrs. Inst. v. Saks Fifth Ave., 284 F.3d 302, 310-11 (1st Cir. 2002); Johnson
& Johnson * Merck Consumer Pharm. Co. v. Smithkline Beecham Corp., 960 F.2d 294, 297-98 (2d. Cir. 1992); B.
Sanfield, Inc. v. Finlay Fine Jewelry Corp., 168 F.3d 967, 971-72 (7th Cir. 1999). As this Part will discuss, the
courts have modified the FTC principles to better suit them to private actions, but these changes are relatively minor.
204
FTC, supra note 189.
205
Children's Television Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-437, 104 Stat. 996 (1990) (codified at scattered sections of 47
U.S.C.).
206
8 H.R. REP. No. 101-385, at 4 (1991).
207
The FCC requires broadcasters to air three hours of "core" children's programming per week. Policies and Rules
Concerning Children's Television Programming, Report and Order, 11 F.C.C.R. 10660, paragraph. 4 (1996).
208
47 U.S.C. § 303a(b).
209
FCC, Consumer Facts, Available at http://www.fcc.gov/cgb/consumerfacts/childtv.html (last visited May 1,
2016).

155

digital television suppliers.210 In 1991 the FCC adopted its rules to enforce the CTA211 and
revised these rules in 1996.212
Since the CTA requires separation between content and commercials in children’s
programs, advocates argued that embedded advertising violates the Act. They further argued that
programs with embedded advertising should be considered as program-length commercials and
adhere to the time limits for commercials in the CTA.213 The FCC refused to make a decision in
this matter and deferred it to the sponsorship disclosure docket, which remains open.214
In 2007 Congress passed the Child Safe Viewing Act (CSVA).215 The CSVA aim was to
instruct the FCC to encourage implementation of technologies that would allow parents to
control their children’s media use. To date, the FCC under the CSVA imposed no new rules,
concluding that all media have parental control technologies available, although no single
technology works across all media.216 Although stating that it would continue studying
technology solutions for parents217 the FCC has taken no action since issuing its mandatory
congressional report in 2009.

(b)The Federal Commission
The Federal Communication Commission (FCC) regulates communications media
according to the Communications Act.218 The FCC is granted general jurisdiction over certain
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media in title I of the Act, however the Act does not provide specific jurisdictional guidance.219
The FCC authority is further detailed in the other titles of the Act, based on the different media
method of transmission. Not surprisingly, the Communications Act of 1934 does not include
instructions regarding the Internet.220
In 2007, the FCC was authorized by the Congress to address risks to children in all
electronic media.221 Nonetheless, a year later the FCC refused to use this new authority over
embedded advertising to children online.222

(c) Code of Practice
The advertising industry in the United States has established an extensive system of selfregulation. According to Edelstein, the main goals of this system are to make sure that,
(1) advertising is truthful, accurate, and not misleading or deceptive, (2) all
claims are adequately substantiated, and (3) there is compliance with federal,
state, and local laws and regulations.223
The major components of the advertising industry self-regulation are: the National
Advertising Division (NAD) of the Council of Better Business Bureaus, Inc., its appellate body,
the National Advertising Review Board (NARB), and its children's division, the Children's
Advertising Review Unit (CARU); the national television networks; and trade associations in
many industries. Advertising is also regulated by some magazines and newspapers, some station
and cable television groups, and local Better Business Bureaus. There are also controls by
advertisers and advertising agencies.
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The National Advertising Division (NAD) and the National Advertising Review Board
(NARB) were established in 1971 to serve as a self-regulatory mechanism for the advertising
industry. The NAD and the NARB were established by four major associations: the Council of
Better Business Bureaus, the American Association of Advertising Agencies, the American
Advertising Federation, and the Association of National Advertisers. The Children's Advertising
Review Unit (CARU) was created in 1974 as a division of NAD. The NAD/CARU/NARB
mechanism has gained widespread acceptance in the advertising industry. This voluntary selfregulatory process has handled over 4000 cases.224
NAD investigates complaints about the truth and accuracy of national advertising. As
stated in the NAD/NARB/CARU Procedures, NAD is,
[r]esponsible for receiving or initiating, evaluating, investigating,
analyzing...and holding negotiations with an advertiser, and resolving
complaints or questions from any source involving the truth or accuracy of
national advertising.225
The Children's Advertising Review Unit (CARU), a division of the NAD, is responsible
for monitoring and reviewing national advertising directed to children under 12 for consistency
with CARU's Self-Regulatory Guidelines for Children's Advertising.226 CARU publishes in the
monthly NAD Case Reports a summary of its actions, other than formal cases, during the
preceding month. These reports include summaries of informal inquiries, summaries of proposed
advertising submitted to it for pre-screening, and commentaries, consisting of news or policy that
CARU believes is appropriate to disseminate to its readership.227 Formal cases are also published
in the NAD Case Reports.
CARU first published its Self-Regulatory Guidelines for Children's Advertising in 1974.
Since then, the Guidelines have been revised a number of times, most recently in December of
224
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2001. The guidelines cover such subjects as: sales pressure, comparative advertising, required
disclosures and disclaimers, endorsements, sweepstakes and premium offers, host-selling, and
product safety. Guidelines covering the use of telemarketing and pay-per-call 900/976 telephone
number marketing directed to children were adopted by CARU in 1989 and were incorporated in
the guidelines in 1991. In 1996, CARU added Guidelines for Interactive Electronic Media.
CARU follows the same procedures for formal cases as the NAD and also has a provision
for expedited procedures. If the advertiser responds within five business days to a letter of
inquiry from CARU and the advertising is substantiated, or if the advertising is modified to
comply with CARU's guidelines within an additional five business days, no formal case will be
opened, and the results will be published in the CARU Activity Report.228 Most CARU
investigations are informal inquiries. However, about one-third is published in the NAD Case
Reports. Currently, the vast majority of investigations involve web sites.229
Self-regulation, as defined by CARU, results in the, "review and evaluation of childdirected advertising in all media, and online privacy practices as they affect children."230 When
these practices,
[a]re found to be misleading, inaccurate, or inconsistent with CARU's SelfRegulatory Guidelines for Children's Advertising or relevant laws, CARU
seeks change through the voluntary cooperation of advertisers.231
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CARU revises its Guidelines in its attempt to, "ensure that they accurately reflect changes
in the children's media landscape and current industry 'best practices."'232 Therefore in 1996
CARU expended its guidelines to include provisions that, "highlight issues, including children's
privacy, that are unique to the Internet and online sites directed at children age 12 and under."233
Elizabeth Lascoutx, CARU's director, has described CARU’s purpose as, "ensur[ing] that
advertising directed to children is truthful, accurate and appropriate for its intended audience."234
Lascoutx emphasized that,
[i]t was never intended that CARU be the arbiter of what products should or
should not be manufactured or sold, or to decide what foods are 'healthy,' to tell
parents or children what they should or shouldn't buy.235
In its guidelines, CARU emphasize the promotion of, "responsible children's
advertising,"236 and the cognitive development of children as a factor in children’s ability to
grasp and understand basic methods and mechanisms of advertising including sales pressure,
program character endorsements, and product claims.237 While the nutritional content of
advertised foods is not part of CARU guidelines, there are specific food-related guidelines.238
CARU guidelines have resulted in some common practices in the advertising industry.
Examples include presenting breakfast cereals as part of a "balanced breakfast" (i.e., a meal that
includes milk, toast, and fruit); and the statement "No purchase necessary," (although usually
appearing in "mice type,”239 which is challenging, if not impossible, to read).240 The concern that
232
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advertisers might mislead children using deceptive methods brought CARU to publish a
commentary in 2003 that stress the importance of adherence to CARU guidelines.241 In this
publication, CARU reminded the advertising industry that children "are more credulous" than
adults.242 Therefore, when targeting children advertisers need to be particularly careful about the
winning chances disclosure, as well as the fact that no purchase is necessary to enter a
sweepstakes,243 "The necessity of having clear disclosure that no purchase is necessary cannot be
overstated."244
One of the cases dealt by CARU, illustrating the process and shading light on the conduct
of the regular players in this regulatory framework, is CSPI’s complaint to National Geographic
Society that,
[a]t a time when obesity, diabetes, and other nutrition-related health crises
plague our nation and especially our youth, it is unconscionable that the
National Geographic Society... has chosen to cram National Geographic Kids
Magazine (NGK) with ads for sugary cereals, candy, and snack foods.245
Following its procedure, CARU determined that CSPI had raised reviewable issues.
Therefore, NGS would be notified of the complaint and given an opportunity to reply. The reply
would then forwarded to CASPI for their reply. The finding of CARU would be then issued as a
case report. The case report will be released to the public as a press release. According to the
press release, the advertisers argued that their advertisements complied with CARU
guidelines;246 the advertiser not accept the claims raised both by the complainant and in CARU's
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findings;247 the advertiser claimed that the advertisement had run its course or had only a few
more appearances;248 and finally stated that it would take into consideration CARU's advice for
its next advertisements.249
NGK publisher stated,
We do accept advertising from these companies because, from a pure economic
standpoint, they're the ones with the advertising budgets and the marketing
dollars to reach kids this way. If this helps us to fulfill our mission to get
information out to young people in a respectful way, and in a way that adheres
to advertising and editorial guidelines, we will continue to do that.250

(d)Industry Codes
The Council of Better Business Bureaus has issued a Code of Advertising, outlining the
standards of basic advertisement in order to guide advertising media, advertisers and advertising
agencies. The Code covers a variety of topics as comparative price, credit, warranties and
guarantees, use or condition disclosures, company name or trade style, and unassembled
merchandise, among others.251 The Council also publishes a publication entitled, “Do's and
Don'ts in Advertising”, which is a comprehensive loose-leaf volume covering many advertising
topics, which is updated periodically.
Many industries have established advertising codes for their members through their
industry or trade associations. These codes generally contain moral or ethical proscriptions
instead of legal restrictions. For example, the Consumer Healthcare Products Association
(CHPA), a trade association which represents U.S. manufacturers and distributors of nonprescription, over-the-counter drugs and dietary supplements, has a Code of Advertising
Practices for Non-prescription Medicines. The Preamble to the CHPA Code states that,
247
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[a]dvertising should truthfully reflect the goals of self-medication and the
safety and efficacy of nonprescription medicines. Untruthful or misleading
claims or comparisons, which are inconsistent with the role of self-medication
or with the safety and effectiveness of nonprescription medicines, are to be
avoided. They do not serve the interests of consumers and cast doubt on both
the appropriateness of self-medication and the industry's willingness to live up
to its public trust.252
The Code requires compliance with the Federal Drugs Association and the Federal Trade
Commission labeling and advertising requirements, and contains many other requirements and
prohibitions. The CHPA reviews complaints regarding alleged violations, and takes appropriate
action to resolve them.
Other prominent industry codes are the "Code of Responsible Practice" of the Distilled
Spirits Council of the United States, Inc.253 and the Direct Marketing Association Guidelines for
Ethical Business Practice.254 These codes generally are effective self-regulatory mechanisms.
Voluntary compliance by members of each trade association tends to be high due to the force
placed upon the codes by the industry's imprimatur.
Launched in November 2006 and fully operational in July 2007, the Children's Food and
Beverage Advertising Initiative (CFBAI)255 was designed to specifically address ‘concerns about
food advertising and childhood obesity’256, and to ‘foster trust in the marketplace by promoting
balance in food and beverage marketing and truthful, responsible advertising to children under
12 years old’.257 CFBAI is a voluntary programme comprising food and beverage marketers who
pledge to re-craft their advertising and marketing tactics to encourage healthier dietary and
lifestyle choices for children under 12.
252
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Ten companies, representing two-thirds of children’s food and beverage television
advertising expenditures, signed on as charter Initiative members.258 Each participating company
chooses how to best implement changes to marketing strategies by crafting its own unique
Pledge, which then must be approved by CARU.
Regardless of the Pledge, all CFBAI members agree to follow five core principles:259 1.
directing at least half of their advertising to the promotion of healthy dietary choices and
lifestyles; 2. reducing or eliminating the use of product placement in marketing unhealthy food
and beverages to kids; 3. decreasing the use of licensed characters in advertisements when not
endorsing healthy eating and behaviours; 4. controlling the representation of food and beverage
products, and promoting healthy eating and lifestyle behaviours in interactive gaming; 5.
eliminate all food and beverage advertising in elementary schools.
In addition, these core principles were enhanced in January 2010 to require that all
advertising directed to children under 12 be for healthier dietary choices and ‘better-for-you’
foods. Media/marketing techniques targeting this age group were expanded to include video and
computer games, cell phone marketing and word-of-mouth advertising.260
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(e) Recent Legal Developments
A series of attempts have been done by the online advertising industry to self-regulate
behavioral tracking.261 The Digital Advertising Alliance (DAA), the main professional
association for the online advertisement industry, is a consortium of the leading national
advertising and marketing companies. The DAA was founded in 2009 and became the leader of
self-regulation efforts replacing the Network Advertising Initiative (NAI). NAI created a
program that enables users to block ads that are sent based on tracking data. These ads are
labeled by a label known as the AdChoices label.
Further regulatory efforts were initiated in 2007, when a campaign for a ‘Do Not Track
law’ was initiated by the World Privacy Forum. The campaign called the FTC to assemble a list
of third-party advertisers from which users will be able to opt out. Nonetheless, no progress was
achieved until 2010,262 when the FTC published a report entitled ‘Protecting Consumer Privacy
in an Era of Rapid Change: A Proposed Framework for Businesses and Policy makers’. The
report recommended a Do Not Track (DNT) mechanism.263
Another effort was initiated in 2011, when a Tracking Protection Working Group was
formed by the World Wide Web Consortium (W3C). This working group included academic
experts, industry members and privacy advocates and its goal was set to form standards for a
universal Do Not Track request tool. Unfortunately, since the W3C does not have any
enforcement power, even if these efforts are successful, the standards could end up as only
symbolic.264 Today, in most browsers, users can subscribe to a ‘Do Not Track list’ of third-party
advertisers, as well as a Do Not Track feature that allows users to request that Web sites do not
track them. However, Web sites were not required to comply-that is until the DAA announced in
February 2012 that all DAA members (about 80 in total) would begin honoring Do Not Track
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requests from users.265 Now any DAA member that does not comply will be subject to FTC
penalties.

(f) Evaluation
In 2004 the National Advertising Review Council (NARC) held an assessment of
CARU's thirty-year involvement in food advertising.266 The result of NARC assessment was
published as a White Paper detailing CARU's self-regulatory approach to food advertising
directed at children.267 NARC’s conclusion indicates that neither the interpretation nor
implementation of guidelines has been robust. Following the publication of the White Paper,
NARC have announced proposed changes to CARU guidelines.268
Fried269 assessed whether the Children's Advertising Review Unit of the Council of
Better Business Bureaus (CARU)270 actions had an impact on advertisers' behavior, through
subsequent advertisements compliance with the guideline violations raised by the Centre for
Science in the Public Interest (CSPI)271 and conclude that "The success rate claimed by CARU,
and therefore the effectiveness of the process itself, cannot be substantiated".
The main limitations of advertising self-regulation are the limited number of cases
addressed compared to the total number of advertisements, decisions coming too late to be truly
useful, and the mildness of penalties, which results in easily ignored guidance.272 Critics of
265
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advertising self-regulation in general, and CARU in particular, view such efforts as ‘toothless’ in
that compliance is totally voluntary. Armstrong273 concluded that CARU was ‘little more than a
token effort by the advertising industry’, which was seriously understaffed and underfunded to
accomplish its mandate.274
Prior research falls primarily into two categories: assessing compliance with guidance in
television commercials or analysis of case reports. Kunkel and Gantz275 found in their 1990 data
that 96% of all commercials complied. Ji and Laczniak276 analysed 297 children’s commercials
to examine the extent to which advertisers adhered to the 2003 core principles. They found that
advertisers followed some principles but still needed to pay attention to other aspects such as
violence or portrayals of aggression. Zwarun’s277 content analysis of a week’s worth of
children’s programming reported 18.7% of the ads were for food-related products, mainly
cereals, breakfast foods and fast-food restaurants. In keeping with CARU guidelines, the amount
of food/portion sizes portrayed were reasonable and predominantly portrayed responsible eating
habits. Zwarun concluded that the advertisements were generally in line with the guidelines.
Internal assessments of the CFBAI have been positive. In its six-month evaluation report,
the CBBB278 stated that pledge compliance was ‘excellent’. This evaluation was based on the
members’ submitted reports, as well as independent monitoring of company-owned childdirected websites and advertising that primarily targeted children under 12. The CBBB279 also
noted that advertisers, “diligently provided information to respond to issues that we flagged
through our monitoring.”280 Similarly, the second report281 found high compliance and that some
273
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companies had strengthened their pledges. The report notes that all of the members had either
pledged that, “100% of their child-directed advertising will be for better-for-you products or not
to engage in child-directed advertising at all.”282
External academic research has shown mixed results. Two studies assessed change in the
television advertising landscape. In their content analysis of data from 2005, 2007 and 2009,
Kunkel et al.283 assessed several aspects of the CFBAI core principles. On a positive note, the
number of food ads per hour declined significantly from 2005 to 2007 and, while not
significantly so, 2009 saw fewer ads. With respect to time devoted to food ads, there was a
significant decline for each of the three years as 2005 saw 4:22 minutes per hour (2005) to 3:29
(2007) to 2:44 (2009). Given that Initiative members account for approximately two-thirds of the
television advertising spending,284 this decline represents the impact of members easing their
television advertising to children under 12. Kunkel et al.285 specifically note they found no
advertising from the four members that pledged not to advertise food to children (Cadbury
Adams, Coca-Cola, Hershey’s and Mars).
Using the DHHS food rating system, instead of the USDA Dietary Guidelines and My
Pyramid referenced in the CARU 2006 and 2009 guidelines, Kunkel et al.286 found 68.5% of the
members’ advertising was for food of the lowest nutritional value.
In contrast to one of the core principles, use of licensed characters nearly doubled from
2005 to 2009. Further, nearly half of the members’ ads that used a licensed character were for
nutritionally poor foods. While the authors noted that the members had, “fulfilled the ‘letter of
the law’ based on their individual pledges”,287 they concluded that, “the marketplace of televised
food advertising of children remains dominated by products of the poorest nutritional quality.”288
Powell et al.289 took a different approach to assess trends in televised food advertising
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targeting children and the impact of the CFBAI. Rather than creating ‘composite days’,290 the
authors used TV advertising expenditure data from Nielsen to examine changes across 2003,
2005 and 2007. Similar to Kunkel et al.,291 they found a decrease in the number of food ads for
children under 12. Powell et al.292 note that,
[i]n line with the ‘better-for-you’ pledges … overall exposure to sweets fell …
with the largest decreases in exposure to candy bar and cookie ads [and] …
substantial decreases … for the most heavily advertised sugar-sweetened
beverages …Additional ‘better-for-you’ changes occurred with substantial
increases in exposure to ads for bottled water.293
In their assessment of CFBAI members versus non-members, Powell et al.294 comment
that the members showed what could be considered positive changes. However, like Kunkel et
al.,295 they were critical that self-regulation allowed individual companies to define what
constituted ‘better for you’ foods. Powell et al.296 also criticised the lack of standards in what
defined children’s programming. They noted that some companies appeared to be shifting their
advertising budgets from 2–5 year olds to 6–11 year olds. Both studies called for expansion such
that all food and beverage advertisers who market to children participate in the CFBAI.
Quilliam297 reported a content analysis of advergames on food and beverage websites.
The analysis compared the extent to which CFBAI members versus non-members adhered to
CARU guidance and the CFBAI core principles for advergames. More members included an ad
break disclosure (63%) than non-members (33%). Thirty-seven per cent of the games
incorporated a healthy lifestyle message. However, there were no differences between members’
and non members’ games. Surprisingly, the non-members’ games had more healthy foods
(33.3%) versus the members (11.9%).298 These results are consistent with reports from other
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domains of food marketing, such as licensed character promotions on food packages299 and
television advertising on children’s programs.300
In the review of this study of CARU’s cases from 2000-2010, in nearly all of the 94 cases
(91.5%), CARU was the challenger as it monitored the marketplace. Five cases came to CARU’s
attention from consumers and only three cases were brought from an advocacy group (the Center
for Science in the Public Interest).
Hoy et al.301 examined CARU cases from 2000 to 2010 involving US food and beverage
marketers. They conclude that,
The obvious question at this juncture is ‘Does self-regulation work with
regards to addressing the role food and beverage advertising may play in
influencing childhood obesity or is government regulation necessary?’
There is no denying the impact of federal regulation302…has promotion selfregulation improved? Has CARU been responsive to the emergence of
childhood obesity as a prominent public policy and societal concern? Based
on this study’s results, a qualifying answer is ‘yes’.
Stanford's Computer Science Security Lab examined the Ad Choices label program.
Analyzing the 500 most popular Web sites,303 the researchers found only 9 percent of the ads
examined (62 out of 627 ads) to contain the label.304 Another study by researchers from Carnegie
Mellon University examined the level of compliance by Web sites to the DAA principles
document, "Self-Regulatory Principles for Online Behavioral Advertising". The research
examined 66 NAI Web sites and the results indicated that only 35 percent of ads included the
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label, whereas industry estimates indicated that 80 percent were targeted ads.305
Further evaluation was voiced by Demaine306 with respect to the regulatory focus on
language whereas the advertisement industry have long ago shifted its focus to the visual,
Despite the nearly universal paradigm shift from language to visual imagery
in advertising, the FTC continues to focus its efforts on linguistic claims and
leaves visual imagery almost entirely unregulated.307

3. Conclusions
Advertising to children commercialize and commodify the children’s world and is an
intangible harm, often done virtually, hence a virtual and intangible harm similar to the harm to
the imagination development from virtual worlds use discussed throughout this dissertation. As
shown above, the realm of the harm from advertising to children is one that the regulators in
Canada and US looked at and tried to deal with it (e.g., the ban in Quebec). This is an ongoing
concern that involve the public opinion and public interest.
The analysis of the regulation of advertising to children online in Canada and USA as
detailed above, results in four main objects of referral: the regulatory regime (legislation, selfregulation and a ban), the overall structure of the regulatory framework (i.e., fragmentation), the
comparison between the approach in Canada and the USA, and finally the struggle to cope with
new and constantly evolving new technologies.
In both Canada and the USA legislation and self-regulation are the structure of the
regulatory regime in the regulation of advertising to children online. The main exception is the
ban on advertising in Quebec, a Canadian province. This variety of regulatory instruments and
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their failure to yield reasonable results, as demonstrated in the evaluation section, demonstrate
the challenging nature of the harm at hand and the need to find new and innovative ways to
address this harm since traditional means have proven to be ineffective.
Moreover, the question of whether more is better with regards to regulatory instruments
seems to be answered in the negative when it comes to the mix of federal and state/provincial
legislation, self-regulation and industry codes that are employed in the regulatory framework in
both Canada and the USA. While it seems that many regulatory instruments cover the subject
matter more closely, in fact, it appears that the opposite occurs and the regulatory over load just
complicates things, leaves dark corners and unattended matters and results in massive
fragmentation that has a negative effect on the regulatory effort.
With the exception of Quebec, the regulatory structure in Canada and the USA is very
similar and comprises three main elements: federal legislation, state/provincial legislation, and
self-regulation by national organizations and industry codes. Furthermore, despite the differences
in the nature and scope of their relevant legislations, the two federal agencies, the CRTC and the
FCC, have tended to follow a similar path with respect to intangible harms. Moreover, the two
jurisdictions are influenced by each other (mainly Canada influenced by the USA) and the main
industry actors are dominant in both jurisdictions (and usually worldwide).
With the privilege of observing the evaluation of the effectiveness of three regulatory
regimes (i.e., legislation, self-regulation and a ban) covering most of the regulatory spectrum and
the way they are dealing with a virtual and intangible harm as advertising to children online, the
conclusion echoes the previous conclusion set in chapter 3, supra – that traditional regulation is
not equipped to deal with this kind of harm. Emphasising the challenging nature of this harm is
the effect of the ever evolving technologies involved and the difficulty of regulators to keep pace
with these developments.
My conclusion from this examination is that the pressure to move to soft forms of
regulation codes and voluntary standards in dealing with harms to children is great. The situation
is hardly reassuring that the harms resulting from new forms of media can or would be dealt
with. Moreover, as concluded in chapters 1-3, supra, the most suitable regulation is in education,
mainly at home. Nonetheless, the entire regulatory structure in Canada and the US does not
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include any such regulatory initiative. The next and last chapter discuss the limits of regulation
and review the realm of regulation at home as a potential solution.
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Chapter 7 – The Limits of Regulation
There are many limits to regulation’s ability to steer human behavior. These limits may
be specific to a certain field1 or general2 in its nature. When dealing with the virtual world, a
relatively new sphere for regulation, these limits can be inherent and structural.3 Moreover, when
the regulated field is virtual and the actual harm is intangible4 – the limits of regulation may
reach a point that requires reconsideration.
Mayer-Schönberger is using physics to illustrate the limits of regulation in virtual
worlds.5 In 1927, physicist Werner Heisenberg explained how the position and the momentum of
a particle cannot both be measured with certainty.6 The more one pushes for precision of
measuring one variable, the less exactly one will know the value of the other. Therefore, MayerSchönberger argues,

1
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Stallworthy, Carbon sequestration and the limits of regulation: a UK perspective 64 N. Ir. Legal Q. 165 (2013);
James B. Jacobs & Kimberly A. Potter, Keeping Guns Out of the "Wrong" Hands: The Brady Law and the Limits of
Regulation 86 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 93 (1995-1996); Linda C. Dalton, The Limits of Regulation, Evidence
from Local Plan Implementation in California, APA Journal 151 (Spring 1989); Nicole Bolleyer & Anika Gauja,
The Limits of Regulation: Indirect Party Access to State Resources in Australia and the United Kingdom 28(3)
Governance: An International Journal of Policy, Administration, and Institutions 321-340 (July 2015); Richard A.
Wall, Financial Markets and the Limits of Regulation 9(1) Managerial and Decision Economics 65-73 (Mar., 1988);
Peyton L. Wynns, The Limits of Economic Regulation: The U.S. Experience, Federal Communications Commission,
International Bureau Working Paper Series, Working Paper No. 2 (June 2004); Fernando Casal Bértoa, Kevin
Deegan-Krause & Peter Ucen, Limits of regulation: party law and finance in Slovakia 1990–2012 30(3) East
European Politics 351-371 (2014); Peter Cleary Yeager, The Limits of Law, The public regulation of private
pollution, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge: Mass (1991); Ken Cruikshank, The Limits of Regulation:
Railway Freight Rate Regulation and the Board of Railway Commissioners, 1851-1933, Thesis, York University
(Oct 1988).
2
Stavros Mavroudeas, The Limits of Regulation, a critical analysis of capitalist Development, Cheltenham, UK:
Edward Elgar (2012); James F. Gatti (ed.), The Limits of Government Regulation, NY: Academic Press (1981).
3
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Government to Information Government, London, UK: MIT Press (2007).
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See, e.g., David Nelmark, Virtual Property: The Challenges of Regulating Intangible, Exclusionary Property
Interests such as Domain Names 3 Nw. J. Tech. & Intell. Prop. 1 (2004), Available
at http://scholarlycommons.law.northwestern.edu/njtip/vol3/iss1/1 (last visited May 5, 2016); Pratin Vallabhaneni
& James Kim, A Primer On Prudential Regulation for Virtual Currency Businesses 18(5) FinTech Law Report
(Sep/Oct 2015).
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even using the inclusive mechanism of co-regulation to regulate virtual worlds,
we encounter a somewhat similar barrier: Real-world regulators cannot coregulate for public values the way they have without eventually triggering
market-choice regulation that in turn triggers public-values regulation and so
forth. The more a regulator aims for market concentration to co-regulate
effectively for public values, the more this triggers market-choice concerns—
and thus regulatory action, and vice versa.
O’Laughlin7 refers to the boundary between the market and society in the context of
regulation by stating that this boundary is blurred, “because both are part of the same moral
order”. As Elam and Arrow put it,
[a]ll markets are liable to fail without some measure of moral regulation and . .
. all goods, therefore, are to some extent public goods.8
In this context, Rumbles9 demonstrates the thin and blurry border between the virtual and
the real in the a case of the Chinese Qui Chengwei (41), a player in the virtual world of Legend
of Mir II. Chengwei won a particularly rare weapon, a Dragon Sabre, in an online quest, and
subsequently loaned it to another man Zhu Caoyuan (26), who without permission sold the
weapon for approximately the equivalent of $1000.10 When Chengwei initially sought the
assistance of the police, he was told that the theft was not a crime, since virtual property is not
covered as a protected asset under the then current law.11 Tragically, Chengwei attacked
Caoyuan, stabbing him to death.12
Similarly, Abramovitch & Cummings13 argue that the Chinese case of Li Hongchen v.
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Beijing Arctic Ice Technology Development Co.14 exemplifies the recognition that intangible
goods have real world value and thus deserve protection by law. In this case, a third-party hacked
into Li’s account in the game Red Moon and stole his virtual property. Li consequently sued
Beijing Arctic, the developer of the game, for not protecting his virtual goods from theft by a
third party. The court of first instance held in favour of Li and ordered Beijing Arctic to, “pay
damages equal to the amount of money Li had spent on game subscription fees.”15
Another case demonstrating the spill over of virtual world legal issues into the real world
and the court’s approach towards intangible and virtual items is the American case of Blacksnow
Interactive v. Mythic Entertainment, Inc.16 Mythic was the developer of the MMORPG Dark
Age of Camelot. Blacksnow was a virtual-property farming company (“the activity of playing a
game to get valuable items to sell offline”)17 that ‘farmed’ for virtual property in the virtual
world Dark Age of Camelot. When Mythic prompted eBay to stop the auctioning of Dark Age of
Camelot items, Blacksnow sued Mythic for unfair business practices and interference with,
‘prospective economic advantage’. Blacksnow sought damages and a, “[c]ourt order declaring
that the sale of items and accounts outside the game [did] not infringe on Mythic’s copyrights.”18
According to Abramovitch & Cummings, although the case was settled in Mythic’s
favour before judgment,
[i]t is notable because the facts demonstrate that at least one party has
attempted to challenge the general legal position held by developers that realworld trading of virtual objects is not sanctioned.
Although the court cases mentioned above are dealing with theft of virtual and intangible
property, they provide an illustration of the struggle, on one hand, to deal with this new legal
field within the scope of regulation in general, and on the other hand, demonstrate the
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willingness of the regulatory system, namely the courts, to recognize and acknowledge rights
that used to be considered absurd, at best.
Surprisingly, the literature on the limits of regulation, in general, is not comprehensive. It
seems that scholars in the field prefer to deal with the capacity of regulation rather than with its
incapacity. When they do discuss the incapacity of regulation, it is usually done with respect to a
specific field and describes the failure of regulation to deal with a specific harm.
In this sense, the limits of regulation in the case of virtual and intangible harm, as
discussed in this dissertation, are unique mainly because of the structural and inherent nature of
the limits of regulation to deal with such harm. Not only is this a new field, different from
everything that regulation used to deal with before, but also the nature of the harm forces a new
approach. This new approach requires new tools and places traditional regulation in general and
traditional regulatory instruments in specific, as inferior and unsuitable to deal with these harms
in this new environment.
Nonetheless, the virtual is here to stay and the new and alarming regulatory issues it
raises will only be amplified with time, especially with the advances of virtual reality, a field that
will pose even more challenging regulatory challenges than the ones posed by virtual worlds
(being a more immersive and all encompassing technology). This is a twofold regulatory
challenge, virtual and intangible. In order to provide a suitable and efficient answer, we need to
approach the two heads of this challenge. Only one would not be sufficient.
The following section discusses and summarizes the previous chapters in this dissertation
in the context of the limits of regulation in the context of a virtual and intangible harm in general
and the virtual and intangible harm to children’s imaginative development in virtual worlds as
discussed in chapter 1, supra. The chapter ends with the suggested regulation.

1. Discussion and Conclusions
The harm identified here is the potential damage to children’s creative imagination that
arises from virtual-world play. The thesis focuses on the harm to children’s creative imagination
from specific types of virtual reality play games, but it also makes reference in chapter 6, supra,
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to the debates concerning potential harms arising from advertising directed to children. It could
be contested whether the harm that I describe as being to children’s creative imagination is as
serious as I suggest, but the problem that this thesis deals with is not confined to my
assessment. Other potential harms to children from media involvement have been identified
before, specifically the harm that might arise from exposure to a steady diet of violence, or the
harm that might arise from the promotion of unhealthy habits or foods or the harm that might
arise from exposure to obscenities. These harms have each caught the attention of regulators
either or both in Canada or the United States at some point in time. Like the potential harm of
primary interest here, all these harms are intangible, difficult to establish scientifically and
nonetheless significant in terms of both the public interest and public opinion. The growth of the
virtual world adds a further dimension to harms that have been suggested as arising from media
involvement. Here I am not alone in suggesting that the virtual realities created by the new,
seemingly social media, might have a negative impact that seems, in some minds, to call for
regulation. My task is therefore to examine the potential and limits of regulation to deal with
harms to children that are intangible and virtual.
New technologies pose new harms that makes their regulation evermore challenging. The
Internet has created harms that are virtual and intangible. This dissertation goal was to answer
the following question: how do we regulate a harm that is both virtual and intangible, more
specifically, the harm to children’s imaginative development in virtual worlds. This case study
presents the harm caused by virtual worlds, the most advanced technology (not including virtual
reality which is still in development and beyond the scope of this dissertation), to children, the
most vulnerable users.
Chapter 1, supra described the said harm to children’s imaginative development in virtual
worlds. The Artificial Medium Laws Theory’s fourth postulate predicts that the more dimensions
a medium possesses, the weaker a user’s imagination will be. As a medium, virtual worlds
currently have the most dimensions and children’s are the most vulnerable users.
The development of creative imagination in children has long-standing implications and
is nourished from unmediated sensory input. Play in general and pretend play in particular are
fundamental to children’s mental development, particularly creative imagination.
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The research on media effects on the creative imagination supports the Reduction Theory
in general and, especially relevant to the argument in chapter 1, supra, the Visualization Theory.
Sensory input from the media is replacing internal and external unmediated sensory input, thus
curtailing the development and functioning of creative imagination.
In addition, the Displacement Hypothesis occurs in children’s play in virtual worlds, not
only because virtual play displaces real, unmediated play, but because virtual-world play
pretends to be pretend play, while it is merely play with rules.
The harm to children’s creative imagination from virtual-world play identified in chapter
1, supra is alarming and relatively new. It represents several “digital-age” harms that are
inherently virtual and intangible and, thus, pose a challenge not only to traditional regulation but
even to modern regulations of virtual space.
Chapters 2-4, supra attempted to answer the dissertation’s main question: How should we
regulate a harm that is both virtual and intangible, such as the harm to children’s creative
imagination?
Assuming one takes the harm described in chapter 1 supra seriously, and that it affects
children, the first response might be to regulate one or more of the players and/or factors
involved in this realm, however difficult that might be. Chapter 2 supra looked closely at the
literature on regulation to see if, how and where it speaks to the problem described in chapter 1
supra.
Chapter 2, supra, concluded that given Black’s broad definition of regulation, the harm
described in chapter 1, supra, comes within this definition and is considered a realm to be
considered within regulation’s theoretical framework. With the goals of regulation in mind,
Gunningham and Sinclair’s regulatory design principles sets the framework to move to the
second step of the discussion brought in the next chapter – regulatory instruments.
Chapter 3, supra, detailed the regulatory instruments and their suitability for the harm
discussed in chapter 1, supra. As mentioned in the previous chapter, Gunningham and Sinclair19
19
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propose two necessary components of a successful regulatory design: regulatory design
principles20 and instrument mixes.21 The regulatory design principles were discussed in chapter 2
supra and the instrument mixes will be discussed below in light of the discussion regarding
regulatory instruments and in the context of the harm in question.
(1) preferring policy mixes incorporating a broader range of instruments and institutions,
The discussion above identified some regulatory instruments that can be employed as a
mix in order to deal with the intangible and virtual harm discussed. The scheme to be considered
in the following chapters is a combination of command-and-control measures incorporated into a
co-regulation regime that will enable the government to oversee a self regulatory regime by the
virtual-world companies that will act to reduce the harm, inform the users and their parents about
the potential harm, and educate the users and their parents in order to prevent more harm and
face future harm. To the said mix we should add risk regulation that should be efficient in cases
where the harm is hard to measure. It should be emphasized that this is only a general layout to
be considered in light of the factors and constrains discussed in the following chapters.
(2) preferring less interventionist measures which include the principle of low
interventionism,
Co-regulation and communication-based instruments as discussed above are measures of
low intervention and align well with the recommended regulatory mix. Moreover, as will be
discussed below, when dealing with a multi-factor, sensitive and complex regulatory sphere, soft
and less interventionist measures are always preferable. In addition, flexible and noninterventionist instruments align’s with the freedom of speech constraints discussed in details in
chapter 5, supra.
(3)

ascending a dynamic instrument pyramid to the level required to achieve policy

goals – including building in regulatory responsiveness,
The structure of co-regulation decoupled with communication based regulatory
instruments can create a dynamic instrument pyramid and regulatory responsiveness. The notion
20
21
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of decreasing the harm, rather than eliminating it all together, enables a pyramid approach to
regulation. For example, Co-regulation regime that will cause the virtual worlds companies to
create educational programs for users and their parents about the harm to the imagination and
how to prevent it. In case where the virtual world company fail to comply with this requirement,
the government can force more stringent measure as forcing the virtual world company to
incorporate mandatory online course in order to start using its services.
(4) empowering participants which are best placed to act as quasi regulators – including
the application of the principle of empowerment and maximizing opportunities for
win-win outcomes,
As said above, assigning the virtual worlds companies to educate children users and their
parents will empower participants as quasi regulators. This trend can be further extended to
consulting with the children and their parents on the desired educational measures, ways to foster
imagination in virtual worlds and programs for education at home and in school.
(5) including the consideration of whether firms will voluntarily go beyond compliance.
The option of firms going beyond compliance is remote. However, if the harm will be
acknowledged and widely accepted in the users and their parent’s awareness, the virtual worlds
companies can go beyond compliance. This can be done by employing exceptional educational
measures as well as features that suppose to enhance the user’s imagination, hence, creating
these companies competitive advantage in the market.
Chapter 4, supra, dealt with the virtual aspect of the harm to children’s imagination in
virtual worlds through the discussion of the regulation of the internet and the regulatory
instruments of ‘Code’ in the context of the Internet. The goal of this chapter was to address the
virtual aspect of the harm caused by virtual worlds to the development of children’s imagination
and the unique aspect of virtual and intangible harm in general. The first part addressed the
debate over the regulation of the Internet. The second part addressed code regulation in the
context of the Internet.
The chapter concludes that Internet regulation may account for the virtual aspect of the
potential harm discussed in this case study, but the intangible nature of this harm does not allow
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code regulation to prevent such harm. In the absence of identifiable and measurable factors
associated with the harm, code regulation is not a suitable solution for prevention. The only
factor directly associated with the harm is usage time, and this factor is problematic for several
reasons discussed in chapters 5 and 7, supra.
Chapter 5, supra, considered the regulation of the virtual and intangible harm in the
context of the freedom of speech. The chapter focused on the general approach taken in two
countries, Canada and USA.
Two aspects of freedom of speech and harm to children are important and illustrated in
the two cases presented: Irwin Toy v. Quebec and Brown v. Entertainment. The first aspect
demanding consideration in the context of this case study is the notion that freedom of speech
restrictions are crucial and imperative element of any regulator attempt to regulate content,
especially in the field of harm to children imagination development in virtual worlds.
The second aspect is what seem to be a different approach to the Freedom of Speech
interpretation between the Canadian and the American Supreme Court. In light of the decisions
in Irwin Toy and Brown it is suggested that in similar cases the Canadian Supreme Court will
tend towards flexibility with freedom of speech claims, especially as it relates to the
interpretation of section 1 of the Charter in the dawn of the Oaks test.22 Thus, tending towards
protecting the children.
The US Supreme Court, at the wake of Brown, is bound to continue in what seems to be
its ‘race to the crash’. Unless a surprise will occur and future American courts will adopt Justice
Alito’s side of the majority opinion in Brown – Justice Scalia’s rigid framework will rein and
with it the tendency not to allow regulatory interference with any content.
It should be mentioned that the US Supreme Court conclusions runs to the heart of ‘The
Law of the Horse’ debate of whether the internet require special regulation as discussed in
chapter 4, supra.23 One may argue, depending on those who favor the Internet’s special
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regulation, that the ‘special’ attitude towards internet new regulation should be also applied to
constitutional aspects.
Finally, and most important to the case study at hand, the cases analyzed in chapter 5,
supra, and the legal tradition demonstrates that the softer the regulation instrument, it is easier to
pass the constitutional master of freedom of speech. Moreover, there may be a need to take
different approach when it comes to Canada and the USA. While the Canadian Supreme Court
may approve co-regulation as not offending the freedom of expression in order to protect
children’s imaginative development in virtual worlds and virtual and intangible harm in general,
the US Supreme Court may reject such a solution regardless of the evidence to support the
existence of the harm.
It is also important to distinguish the two cases on the basis that while Irwin Toy deals
with the advertisement of the product, Brown deals with the actual access to the product. To
draw an analogy to the harm to children’s imaginative development in virtual worlds, it would be
permissible from a freedom of speech perspective to educate the children users and their parents
about the potential deleterious effects of virtual worlds but it would be extremely challenging to
restrict the access to these worlds. Nonetheless, while in Irwin Toy the potential harm is in the
advertisement itself and children’s poor ability to deal with it, in Brown it is the actual product
that poses the harm.
In this sense both cases deal with alarming consequences on children’s developing minds
and therefore are analogues to the case of the harm to imagination development in virtual worlds.
Chapter 6, supra, provides a background on advertising to children, especially online,
followed by an analysis of the legislative and regulatory framework concerning advertising to
children in two countries, Canada and United States. The chapter concludes that the pressure to
move to soft forms of regulation, codes and voluntary standards in dealing with harms to
children is great. The situation is hardly reassuring that the harms resulting from new forms of
participation in media can or would be dealt with. It is argued that the existing regulation can
perhaps deal with ‘old’ non-virtual advertisement, but it is not equipped to deal with ‘new’
virtual advertisement. The case of virtual advertisement regulation as reviewed in chapter 6 and
its suitability to address virtual and intangible harm to children is used to drew an analogy to
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virtual and intangible harm regulation in general and specifically to the harm to children’s
imaginative development in virtual worlds as described in chapter 1 supra.
Many characters of the potential harm in advertising to children, especially online,
resemble the characters of the harm to children’s imaginative development as detailed in chapter
1, supra. The virtual and intangible nature of the harm, the importance of the development stage
in children’s understanding as well as the evolving technologies and frequently changing terrain
– all makes the regulation of advertising to children online a suitable case for comparison and
lesson drawing when it comes to understanding the challenge in regulating a virtual and
intangible harm in general and the harm to children’s imaginative development in virtual worlds
in specific.
The analysis of the regulation of advertising to children online in Canada and USA as
detailed above results in four main objects of referral: the regulatory regime (legislation, selfregulation and a ban), the overall structure of the regulatory framework (i.e., fragmentation), the
comparison between the approach in Canada and the USA, and finally the struggle to cope with
new and constantly evolving new technologies.
In both Canada and the USA legislation and self-regulation compose the regulatory
regime in the regulation of advertising to children online. The main exception is the ban on
advertising in Quebec, a Canadian province. This variety of regulatory instruments and their
failure to yield reasonable results as demonstrated in the evaluation section, demonstrate the
challenging nature of the harm at hand and the need to find new and innovative ways to address
this harm since traditional means has proven to be ineffective.
Moreover, the question of whether more is better with regards to regulatory instruments
seems to be answered in the negative when it comes to the mix of federal and state/provincial
legislation, self-regulation and industry codes that are employed in the regulatory framework in
both Canada and the USA. While it seems that many regulatory instruments cover the subject
matter more closely, in fact, it appears that the opposite occurs and the regulatory over load just
complicates things, leaves dark corners and unattended matters and results in massive
fragmentation that have a negative effect on the regulatory effort.
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With the exception of Quebec, the regulatory structure in Canada and the USA is very
similar and comprised of three main elements: federal legislation, state/provincial legislation,
self-regulation by national organizations and industry codes. Furthermore, despite the differences
in the nature and scope of their relevant legislations, the two federal agencies, the CRTC and the
FCC, have tended to follow a similar path with respect to intangible harms. Moreover, the two
jurisdictions are influenced by each other (mainly Canada influenced by the USA) and the main
industry actors are dominant in both jurisdictions (and usually worldwide).
With the privilege of observing the evaluation of the effectiveness of three regulatory
regimes (i.e., legislation, self-regulation and a ban) covering most of the regulatory spectrum and
the way they are dealing with a virtual and intangible harm as advertising to children online, the
conclusion echoes the previous conclusion set in chapter 3, supra – that traditional regulation is
not equipped this kind of harm. Emphasizing the challenging nature of this harm is the effect of
the ever evolving technologies involved and the difficulty of regulators to keep pace with these
developments.
My conclusion from this examination is that the pressure to move to soft forms of
regulation codes and voluntary standards in dealing with harms to children, is great. The
situation is hardly reassuring that the harms resulting from new forms of participation in media
can or will be dealt with. Moreover, as concluded in chapters 2-4, supra, the most suitable
regulation is in education, mainly at home. Nonetheless, the entire regulatory structure in Canada
and the US does not include any such regulatory initiative. The next and last chapter explores the
realm of regulation at home.
Considering the conclusion of the previous chapters, children’s Internet use regulation at
home by their parents seems to be the most appropriate solution for a virtual and intangible harm
in general and especially to the harm to children’s imaginative development in virtual worlds as
discussed in chapter 1, supra. Parents regulation at home as a ‘light’ educational regulatory
instrument is the most suitable measure for a virtual and intangible harm as discussed in chapters
2-4, supra; there are no significant implications in the context of the freedom of speech as
discussed in chapter 5, supra; and, parent’s regulation at home seems to align with the

185

conclusions of the analysis of the regulation of advertisement online as discussed in chapter 6,
supra.
There are many intangible harms that are impossible to prove and regulators have a
history of thinking and dealing with them. This thesis takes the harm that I am concerned about
and check whether regulators can deal with it – my conclusion is that they cannot but this is not
the only intangible harm that regulators were asked to deal with in the Canada and US; other
examples includes the harm from obscenity – there is an extensive discussion about this
intangible harm; or the intangible harm in children exposure to sexually explicit material.
There are all kinds of intangible harm arising from media involvement of children and
they are especially dominant in virtual worlds. Regulators demanded that there will be
regulation. In this thesis I have taken one harm and explored whether regulation can deal with it.
My conclusions are generalizable to the issues of intangible harm from media involvement by
children especially in the virtual worlds where regulators have historically been concerned and
where there is a public interest and public pressure for regulation.
The discussion below deals with the regulation of children’s Internet use at home by their
parents in the context of harm in general and in specific in the context of virtual and intangible
harm. This discussion details the research findings on parental regulation of children Internet use
at home and drew conclusions regarding the regulation at home in the context of virtual and
intangible harm and more specifically with respect to the harm presented in chapter 1, supra –
the harm posed to children’s imaginative development in virtual worlds.
In general, the regulation of children’s Internet use at home reflects the regulatory
framework discussed in chapters’ 2-4, supra. The relationships in the modern family, the
regulatory instruments and code regulation are prevalent in the regulation field in general, as
much as they are dominant in the relationship between parents and children over the regulation
of the use of the Internet at home.
Therefore, there is no surprise in the findings that traditional forms of regulation are not
effective when dealing with virtual and intangible harm, both by regulators and by parents at
home. It is the the regulatory measures at the other end of the regulatory spectrum, namely ‘soft
regulation’ involving understanding the terrain, discussing it with the children and offering
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advice and guidance which seems to be the most efficient in reducing the risk of the virtual and
intangible harm posed by the Internet.
Although parents are positioned in the best spot to regulate their children’s Internet use,
few obstacles make this task challenging: the knowledge gap, children’s privacy, parent-child
relationship in general and more. To this end, guiding the parents and exposing them to the
research results in this field as well as training them to engage authoritative mediation is
warranted.
While parents stand at the forefront of the regulation of children’s Internet use being best
positioned to deal with the prevention of the virtual and intangible harm, they should not be left
alone in this crucial battle. As will be discussed in the conclusions of this dissertation and
suggested in the future research in Appendix A, infra, parents should receive every assistance
possible, from all relevant stakeholders, in order to perform their task in the best way possible.
Finally, one may ponder: if the potential harm is so severe, why am I proposing such a
‘soft’ measure as parental regulation? The answer is not a simple one. Even if we set aside the
constraints of freedom of speech, the inefficiency of traditional regulation and the incapacity of
virtual regulation – the question remains: can we do more? I argue that we can, but first we need
to change the regulatory paradigm as stated in the prolog of this chapter. Once changed, we can
employ the technology itself to help with its regulation (see the suggested future research in
Appendix A, infra). This paradigm shift takes us back to the question posed in the outset of this
paragraph to teach us that in the realm of virtual and intangible harm there is no ‘soft’ or ‘hard’
regulation, but a different and new spectrum of regulatory instruments – the regulatory spectrum
of new technologies.

2. Parental Regulation
Considering the conclusion of the previous chapters, children’s Internet use regulation at
home by their parents seems to be the most appropriate solution for a virtual and intangible harm
in general, and especially to the harm to children’s imaginative development in virtual worlds as
discussed in chapter 1 supra. Parental regulation at home as a ‘light’ educational regulatory
instrument is the most suitable measure for a virtual and intangible harm as discussed in chapters
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2-4, supra; there are no significant implications in the context of the freedom of speech as
discussed in chapter 5, supra; and, parents regulation at home seems to align with the
conclusions of the analysis of the regulation of advertisement online as discussed in chapter 6,
supra. As Harden24 observes, ‘while anxieties about risk may be shaped by public discussion, it
is as individuals that we cope with these uncertainties’.
Therefore, the following chapter will discuss the regulation of children’s Internet use at
home by their parents in the context of harm in general and in specific in the context of virtual
and intangible harm. The chapter will detail the research findings on parental regulation of
children’s Internet use at home and will draw conclusions regarding regulation at home in the
context of virtual and intangible harm, and more specifically with respect to the harm presented
in chapter 1 supra – the harm posed to children’s imaginative development in virtual worlds.
The research findings regarding the parental regulation of children’s Internet use at home
should be evaluated carefully. Cultural differences between countries, children’s age, and the
date of the research compered with the development level of the Internet are some influential
factors in assessing these research findings. Therefore, as much as possible, this chapter attempts
to distinguish the findings according to these factors and draw conclusions accordingly.

2.1 Parents and Children
According to Giddens25 and Beck,26 in the modern family, there is a shift from the model
of authority and hierarchy to a relationship of democracy and ‘friendship’. Instead of rules and
rewards as a mean of control exercised by parents over their children, a relationship based on
trust and negotiation are formed. In this context, the regulation of children’s media use at home
is a way of ‘working’ the family relationship, rather than responding to an external threat. As
Buckingham observed,
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Since it is the new media that mark the key transition for parents from the
norms of their own childhood to those of their children’s childhood, these
discussions center on new media and have a strongly nostalgic flavor.27
Some of the concerns parents have with respect to their children’s Internet use includes:
becoming isolated from others, exposure to sexual and/or violent images, the displacement of
more important activities, and risk to privacy.28 Nonetheless, most parents believe that the
Internet can assist their child do better at school and help them learn worthwhile things. Indeed,
this is why the parents acquire access to the Internet in the first place29.
Ho and Zaccheus30 argue that parents are encouraged to monitor and supervise their
children’s Internet use. However, as Tripp notes, since children often have much more
knowledge about technology than their parents, effective monitoring is challenging.31 Moreover,
as children are using the Internet through their mobile phones, parents find it harder to supervise
their children’s Internet use.32
Paus-Hasebrink et al.33 have identified four main patterns of relationship between parents
and children in the context of the Internet use: the “digital native vs. digital immigrant family”—
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children have better understanding of the Internet than their parents; the “unskilled family”— the
children and the parents are lacking basic Internet skills; the “triple C family”— Confident,
Caring and Communicative parenting style; and the “protective family”— parents’ employ
active and restrictive mediation beyond the average. It is the ‘triple C Family’ that is best able to
regulate the Internet use of children.
Parents of children aged 7–12, according to Shin,34 were confident regarding their ability
to manage their children’s Internet use. However, this confidence led parents to be less engaged
in purposeful and communication-based parental mediation and to fail to keep up with their
knowledge of the Internet.
The breadth of opportunities to use the Internet almost everywhere and anytime using a
variety of device, makes the regulation of children’s Internet use at home even more challenging.
According to a study conducted by the Keiser Family Foundation, 84% of the children in the
United States35 use the Internet at home. Similar results (67%) were found among Australian
children36 and children in the European Union, (65%).37 Livingstone and Bober’s38 UK study
further indicates that regardless of the computer location – in a public or private room – children
are looking to use the internet in privacy, with 79% mostly using the Internet alone.
Livingstone and Bober,39 conclude that,
In terms of media regulation, therefore, it may be that the stakes have never
been higher, as society seeks to strike a balance between the failure to
minimize the dangers and the failure to maximize the opportunities.40
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The following section reviews the research findings regarding the regulation of children’s
Internet use at home. This section is comparative in order to account for cultural differences and
will serve as the ground for the next section that will summarize and analyze the findings in the
multiple countries. The parents and children’s positions will first be presented followed by the
research findings on the use of technology as a tool of regulation at home. Further, the research
results regarding parent’s practice of setting rules of Internet use by their children will be
discussed and finally the research results regarding the outcome of different parental Internet
mediation types will be detailed.

2.2 Parent’s Position
In a study conducted in Canada at the beginning of the millennium, most surveyed
parents (94%) considered educating children about safe, responsible Internet use as a top
priority. 91% of these parents indicated the importance of educating parents about strategies for
managing the Internet. 55% of the parents believe in taking responsibility for family Internet use,
and 44% said that the content of the Internet should be controlled.41 Many of the parents
supported a collaborative approach that would involve public libraries, schools, Internet service
providers (ISPs), community institutions, government and police. 42
In a similar study conducted in the European Union,43 most parents suggested the
following to enhance their children’s safety online: “more/better teaching and guidance on the
Internet use in schools” (88%), “more awareness raising campaigns on online risks” (87%),
“more/better information and advice for parents on website children use” (87%), “stricter
regulation for businesses that produce online content and services” (86%), “contact points where
parents and children can receive individual advice about how to stay safe online” (84%),
“improved availability/performance of monitoring software” (80%) and finally, “training
sessions organized for parents by NGO’s, government, local authorities” (70%). Livingstone and
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Bober44 further found that only 41% of EU parents to 9-17 year-olds, were confident that their
child has learned how to judge the reliability of online information.
In a more recent study, Cassidy et el.,45 found that there is a gap between Canadian
children and their parents’ experience of Internet use. While 6% of the parents say that their
child spends 5 hours or more on the Internet per day, 11% of the children reported this length of
time. It was further reported that 31% of parents do not supervise their child’s Internet use at all.
Moreover, those 69% of parents who report supervising their child’s Internet use are using some
of the methods similar to what Turow46 found, and which were labeled as, “fleeting at best”.47
According to Cassidy et el.,
Although these parents were familiar with older types of technology (e-mail
and cellular phones), they were less knowledgeable about newer forms of
technology such as Facebook, Blogs, and YouTube. The parents were even less
familiar with these forms of technology than the participating educators, whose
knowledge was also limited.48
Livingston et al.49 found that 87% of parents in Spain report the use of active mediation
of their child’s Internet safety. When it comes to the mediation of Internet use, 91% of the
parents use active mediation. In addition, 93% of the parents reported using restrictive mediation
of their child’s Internet use, and 67% reported using monitoring of their child’s Internet use.
These findings align with the Eurobarometer 24850 for Spain, in which 85% of parents
44
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reported talking to their children about the Internet (compared with 74% for all 27 EU member
states); 74% of the parents further reported that they always or frequently remained close to their
children while they were online (compared with 61% for all 27 EU member states). Interestingly,
only 48% of parents reported imposing no restrictions on online access (compared to a much
lower percentage of 25% for the Europe-wide average).
According to Garitaonandia and Garmendia,51
[t]he main concern of Spanish parents was the amount of time children spent
online, not the content of the pages their children were visiting or any online
relationships they may be maintaining.
Yet, in another Spanish study,52 surveying families with children (10-16), it was found
that 27.6% of parents asked always or almost always what their children were doing online.
Similarly, a study done in Argentina found that there is a very low level of parental supervision,
with parents underestimating the risks of Internet access.53
The results of parental mediation of Internet use amongst fifth and sixth grade in Belgium
show a predominance of the restrictive mediation style (59.4%). Mediation differs in accordance
with parents’ gender, educational level and age. Mediation styles are also linked to how much
parents themselves use the Internet, their attitude to it and their experiences on the net.54
Ihmeideh and Shawareb55 interviewed parents of age 7-8 children in Jordan about their
mediation style. Authoritative mediation was most commonly used, followed by the permissive
and authoritarian parenting styles, and the neglectful parenting style being used the least.
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As evident from the research findings parents are confused with regard to many factors
involved in the regulation of their children’s Internet use. What is the best mediation approach?
Who should regulate their children’s Internet use? And how to bridge the knowledge gap
between the generations are only some of the questions posed. These challenges combined with
the rapidly evolution of the Internet (and technology in general) as well as cultural differences
and traditional versus modern parental approaches, make this regulatory sphere highly contested.

2.3 Children’s Position
The research indicates that the patterns, places and regulation of Internet use vary as
children age and develop.56 Before they reach the age of 12, children are more likely to access
the Internet at home using a computer located in a communal area and have their access
supervised. In contrast, a more specialized and diverse Internet practices are developed by
adolescents, with more places and devices they use to access the Internet, more time spent
online, less supervision, and greater variety in their online activities. Younger children tend to
visit few sites and often return to familiar sites; and they are more likely to use the Internet for
doing homework or to play online games rather than communicate or seek out information.57
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According to Livingstone and Bober,58 many children in the EU do not have the basic
skills needed to evaluate online content. Among children age 9-19, 40% said that they trust most
of the information on the Internet, while 50% trust some of it. Only 10% of the research
participants said that they are skeptical about much information online and only one third of the
participants said that they have been told how to judge the reliability of online information.
Mascheroni,59 studying the interaction of Italian children and parents in parental
mediation of smartphones use, found that children are active recipients of parental mediation:
they negotiate, resist or ignore parental attempts to regulate their relationship with their
smartphone,
What parents perceive positively, as a way of engaging in their children’s
everyday lives and guiding them towards safer Internet uses, is rather
understood by children as a clear infringement of their privacy. For example,
the practice of friending children on Facebook is acknowledged as a form of
parental surveillance, to which children, especially young girls, resist by
selecting privacy settings that exclude parents from their online conversations.
According to Duerager and Livingstone,60 EU children underestimate their parents’ use
of monitoring and filtering. 27% said that their parent’s involvement in Internet mediation was
very active and 43% thought it was ‘a bit’ positive. 32% of the children said that their parents
knew a lot about their activities online and 36% said their parents knew ‘quite a lot’.
Nonetheless, 11% said that their parent’s mediation limits their online activities ‘a lot’ and 33%
said it limits their activities ‘a little’. 29% of the children said that they ignore their parents a
little and 8% said they ignore a lot what their parents say about using the Internet.61 5% would
like their parents to take more interest in their online activity, and 10% would like a little more
interest.
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These research results show that children are an active and not always negative part of
the regulation at home interaction. While the children perceive part of their parent’s mediation as
invading their privacy, they also appreciate this mediation as long as it takes a more educational
approach rather than an arbitrarily controlling the amount of time children spend online.
Moreover, children’s underdeveloped ability to determine the reliability of online content makes
parental mediation an important component.

2.4 Technology Measures
In Spain, 28% of parents report use of parental controls or other means of blocking or
filtering websites.62 Most U.S. parents with children using the Internet would be willing to pay
for online protection measures, such as filtering software.63 33% of parents report using some
type of filtering or blocking software.64 According to Mitchell et al.65 parents to younger children
(10-15) were more likely to use Internet filters.
According to a survey done in the European Union,66 half of the parents say that they
install filtering software on the computer that their child uses at home. 37% of the parents used
monitoring software. 27% said they used both filtering and monitoring software. According to
Kirwil,67 28% of EU parents use technical safety tools to moderate their children Internet use.
Overall, parents prefer social mediation over technical restrictions and monitoring.
According to Dooley et al.,68 Australian parents use of filtering software is moderate.
Similar results were found in a report prepared for the Australian Broadcasting Authority (now
ACMA). More than third (35%) of parents reported using software filters to help mediate their
children’s Internet use. Almost one third of these parents (29%) use filtering software on a
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regular basis and 6% on an occasional basis.69 Fleming et al.,70 in a more recent Australian
research, found Internet filter usage levels considerably lower at approximately 20%.
Inherently, technology measures are not fine or focused tools to regulate children’s
Internet’s use. By their nature, these measures may work well in protecting children from sexual
content but would work poorly when dealing with an intangible and virtual harm as the harm
described in chapter 1 supra, the harm to children’s imaginative development in virtual worlds.
These are quantity tools rather than qualitative tools and as such are inefficient in protecting
children and thus unpopular among parents.

2.5 Setting Rules
Mitchell et al.71 studying US parents of 10-17 years old, found that parents of
preadolescent children (10–12) tend to control and supervise their online behavior more (by
restricting online time and using filters) than parents of teenagers (aged 12–17). Rosen et al.,72
surveying parents and children online found that parents of teenagers tend to adopt the
permissive and negligent styles more than parents of preadolescent children.
According to a study done by the Kaiser Family Foundation,73 the majority of 8 to 18
year olds living in the US, report that their parents do not set any rules regarding the type of
media content they can use or the amount of time they can spend with the medium. However,
52% reported that their parents set rules regarding what they are allowed to do on the Internet.
26% of the children report some media rules and say their parents generally enforce those rules
most of the time. 39% of the children report having some rules, but say those rules aren’t always
enforced.74
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According to Wang et al.75 American parents report more monitoring of their teen
children (61%) than the teens report (38%). Rideout et al.76 found that 60% of American parents
have set rules regarding what their children (8-14) can watch on television and do on computer.
A European Commission survey77 found that in the EU, 25% of the parents reported to
talk with their children always or very frequently talked with their son or daughter about their
online activities. 25% of the parents said that there were no rules or restrictions about their
child’s use of the Internet. Approximately 80% of the parents listed online shopping (84%),
talking to strangers (83%) and spending a lot of time online (79%) as activities that were not
allowed for their child. 78
Duerager and Livingstone79 found that 89% of EU parents impose rules about whether
their child can give out personal information online; 82% of parents discuss their children online
activities with the children and 58% stay nearby when the child is online. Parents also restrict
children’s disclosure of personal information (85%), uploading (63%) and downloading (57%).
In the UK, parents prefer to use restrictive forms of guidance than evaluative or
conversational forms.80 42% of children say that they have to follow rules about for how long
they can use the Internet and 35% of the children say they have to follow rules about when they
can go online. Parents provided the same answers. However, parents claim a greater degree of
domestic control than their children recognize.
Livingston and Helsper81 found that 53% of parents in the UK reported rules concerning
the amount of time their children are allowed to spend online. Parents talk to their child about
Internet use (64%), watch their child online (46%), stay nearby when their child is online (34%),
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check which sites their child visited (30%), check the child’s e-mail accounts (17%) and sit with
their child while online (16%). They conclude that:
Parents have a preference for social over technical forms of mediation,
preferring active co-use over technical restrictions, interaction restrictions, and
monitoring practices.82
In Spain, the importance of rules regarding Internet use by children is recognize by
70.4% of parents, and 67.4% of children. However, parents emphasis is placed on controlling the
time of day and amount of time spent online (64.1% and 59.6%, respectively), whereas the
control on inappropriate content was less frequently used (11.9%).
According to Sureda et al.,83 53% of Spanish children (6 – 14) and 62% of teenagers (15
– 16) reported to use the Internet with no restrictions by their parents. When the parents use
rules, it is mainly regarding to the amount of time spent online. Alvarez et al.84 found that many
parents used Internet access as a form of reward or punishment for their children’s good or bad
behavior, reflecting little concern of effective regulation of their children’s Internet use.
While the literature shows that rules are made and enforced in many cases, these rules
seems to be technical in nature covering mainly issues as the amount of time the children are
allowed to use the Internet, disclosing personal information and shopping online, to name a few.
These rules are not effective when considering an intangible and virtual harm as the harm to
children’s imaginative development in virtual worlds. In fact, these rules are a less technical
reflection of the technology measures mentioned in the previous section. To use the terms
discussed in chapter 3 supra, these rules are generally a way to employ a command and control
regime at home.

2.6 Parental Mediation
The research on parental mediation shows that parents regulate their children media use
in a variety of ways. These studies were initially aimed at exploring television viewing, assessing
82
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its consequences on media use in general, media literacy and, more specifically, media effects.85
As discussed in chapter 3 supra, two aspects of regulation are positive regulation
(encouraging, facilitating or requiring certain activities – ‘green light’) and negative regulation
(discouraging, impeding or prohibiting certain activities). The research on parental mediation of
children’s use of media, shows that parents combine positive and negative strategies, from the
flexible strategy of parent-child co-viewing, on one end of the spectrum, to a more restrictive or
controlling strategies at the other end of this spectrum.86
Three types of parental mediation styles were defined in the literature:87 factual mediation
(parents explaining to their children how Internet content is created), evaluative mediation
(assessing the content while engaging with it together with the child and discussing the possible
effects of the content on children) and restrictive mediation (promoting parental rules governing
the use of the Internet by the children).
Livingstone and Helsper88 suggest four main types of parental mediation: social
mediation (combining active mediation and co-use); interaction restrictions (restricting
children’s interactions online); technical restrictions, (parental controls limiting online activities
and time spent online); and active monitoring of children’s online practices.
More recently, the EU Kids Online survey89 offered the distinction between active
mediation (the parent is present or nearby, discussing or sharing internet activities) and safety
85
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guidance (the parent actively promotes safer and responsible uses of the internet). This
distinction led to the identification of five practices of parental mediation: active mediation of
internet use; active mediation of internet safety; restrictive mediation; monitoring; and technical
mediation.
Types of mediation are influenced by parents’ gender, education and socio-economic
background, as well as by children’s characteristics.90 Liau et al.91 found that the supervision
techniques eployed by parents regarding their children’s Internet use were unrelated to youth
engaging in risky online behavior. However, when parents set limits, children spend less time
with media.92
Eastin et al.93 studying single and married mothers of teenagers in large Midwestern US
states, found correlation between parenting styles and Internet mediation strategies. Authoritative
style parents were more likely to use the evaluative strategies of watching and discussing Internet
content with their children, while authoritarian and negligent parents were more likely to use
restrictive techniques, such as blocking access.
Lwin et al.94 distinguished between strategies of restrictive mediation and active
mediation of US parents95 overseeing their 10-12 years old children Internet use. Findings
indicate that the simple act of a parent talking to the child about not providing personal
information online greatly reduces the likelihood that children will disclose personal information.
In addition, it was found that setting rules for Internet use was not as effective as talking to
children about the dangers of giving out such information.
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According to Duerager and Livingstone96 active mediation of Internet use (where parents
talk with the child about the internet, stay nearby or sit with the child while they go online),
reduces EU children’s exposure to online risks without reducing online opportunities. These
activities also reduce young children’s (9-12 years) reports of being upset when they encounter
online risks. Interestingly, parental technical mediation such as using a filter is not shown to
reduce online risk encounters among children.
According to Valcke et al.97 the highest level of Internet use among adolescents in
Belgium is observed when parents adopt a permissive mediation style, and the lowest level is
observed when they adopt a restrictive mediation style. Parents’ behavior and cultural level
significantly predict Internet use among adolescents in the home. In another study Valcke et al.98
found that Belgium adolescents unsafe Internet use is not tempered by increased parental control.
These results contradict those obtained by Padilla-Walker and Coyne,99 who found that parents
do influence Internet regulation.
A research conducted in Australia100 concluded that, “as children become teenagers direct
supervision and rules become less effective and education and trust play greater roles”.101
According to Fleming et al.,102 the fact that parents of teenagers age 13-16 in Australia were
aware of the risks of the Internet was not associated with the use of more controlling styles, such
as the authoritarian or authoritative styles. However, the authoritative style was linked to lower
levels of online risk behavior by children.
In their research on the affect of parental mediation on private information disclosure
online by Korean Tweens, Shin et al.103 found no significant impact of parental mediation on
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tweens’ personal information disclosure behaviors. This is contrary to previous findings in the
parental mediation research on children’s television use104 and on teenagers’ perceptions of
online safety.105
A significant relationship was found between parent-tween disagreement on restrictive
mediation and tweens’ information disclosure. Buijzen et al.106 argued that parent-child
agreement on parental mediation reflects the child’s accurate perception of parental mediation.
Shin et al.107 finding seems to suggest that tweens’ inaccurate perception of what parents do to
limit their access to commercial Web sites can account for tweens’ information disclosure online.
Lee and Chae108 surveying 566 Korean children between the ages of 10 and 15 found that
association with online risks was moderated by Internet skills and parental restrictive mediation.
Finally, according to Ihmeideh & Shawareb109 found that children whose parents adopt the
authoritative parenting style, in which they define the rules, discuss them with their children, and
encourage their children to talk about their Internet use, have higher exposure to the Internet at
home than those with parents who adopt other parenting styles.

2.7 Conclusions
In general, the regulation of children’s Internet use at home reflects the regulatory
framework discussed in chapters’ 2-4 supra. The relationships in the modern family, the
regulatory instruments and code regulation are prevalent in the regulation field in general, as
much as they are dominant in the relationship between parents and children over the regulation
of the use of the Internet at home.
Therefore, there is no surprise in the findings that traditional forms of regulation are not
effective when dealing with virtual and intangible harm, both by regulators and by parents at
104
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home. It is the the regulatory measures at the other end of the regulatory spectrum, namely ‘soft
regulation’ involving understanding the terrain, discussing it with the children and offering
advice and guidance which seems to be the most efficient in reducing the risk of the virtual and
intangible harm posed by the Internet.
Although parents are positioned in the best spot to regulate their children’s Internet use,
few obstacles make this task challenging: the knowledge gap, children’s privacy, parent-child
relationship in general and more. To this end, guiding the parents and exposing them to the
research results in this field as well as training them to engage authoritative mediation is
warranted.
While parents stand at the forefront of the regulation of children’s Internet use being best
positioned to deal with the prevention of the virtual and intangible harm, they should not be left
alone in this crucial battle. As discussed in the conclusions of this dissertation and suggested in
the future research in Appendix A, parents should receive every assistance possible, from all
relevant stakeholders, in order to perform their task in the best way possible.

3. Prolog
For me, this dissertation is a landmark milestone of a journey initiated 20 years ago. I
first became aware of the potential harm of virtual worlds to children imaginative development
through the Artificial Medium Laws Theory; Secondly, I explored the regulatory framework of
children’s virtual worlds in my Masters thesis, and now I was able to embrace the four relevant
fields: law, technology, psychology and communication, in order to reconcile the inherent
tension between the need to protect children and the limits of regulation, its suitability and
efficiency, and the constitutional requirements.
This circular journey from the virtual and intangible harm posed by new technology,
through regulation in its many forms, and back to the starting point, regulation at home,
underlines the depth of the change that new technology brings to these fundamental systems:
childhood, home, regulation and law and the interaction between them. Identifying the limits of
regulation in the case of virtual and intangible harm not only touches on the foundations of every
democratic society, but also challenges and redefines the basic notions of control.
204

It is time to change our perceptions about regulation. As in many other fields, new
technology is forcing us to think different, look deep into the conventions adopted in the field of
regulation since the establishment of the new state and change the way we think about
regulation. It is not a question of choice, but one of necessity. Failing to adapt and employ
creativity and innovation in the creation of new regulation for new technologies will, and already
has unprecedented implications. As detailed in chapter 1, supra, it is our children’s imagination,
among other, that is at stake. Losing this battle will leave little to fight for, if any.
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Appendix
Creative Regulation for Creative Industry
Innovating the Regulation of New Media: Towards Education-Based Co-Regulatory Model to
Reduce Virtual-Intangible Harm to Children

Summary description
This project goal is to explore and innovate the regulation of new media, especially
regarding the virtual-intangible potential harm to children, by developing, implementing and
measuring the effectiveness of an education based Co-regulatory model. In light of its scale,
importance and innovative nature, the project is divided into two parts: (1) Infrastructure, and
(2) Implementation. The goal of part one (24 months) – infrastructure, is to prepare the
grounds for the second part – implementation, by creating a master plan, drafting an initial
report on the legal landscape of new media regulation, and exploring stakeholder positions
and education-based, Co-regulatory models. The goal of the second part (24 months) is to
develop an education-based Co-regulatory model that will innovate and improve the
regulation of new media as it relates to virtual-intangible harm to children. The project will
last 48 months. The main activities of the first part consist on the mapping of the legal
landscape, identifying the potential virtual-intangible harms to children, reviewing the
literature on the theoretical framework of education based Co-regulation, networking and
obtaining funding for the second part. Expected results include the formulation of the second
part implementation plan, research questions based on accessible data, expert network from
the countries involved, funding accessibility, and theoretical framework towards development
of the education-based Co-regulatory model. The project will involve a variety of
stakeholders from the industry, the public, education system and regulatory agencies.
Deliverables of the first part include: a) a master plan for the second part, b) Initial report on
the legal landscape of the industry, stakeholder positions and education-based, Co-regulatory
models. Deliverables for the second part include: a) detailed report on the legal landscape of
the industry, stakeholder positions and education-based, Co-regulatory models, b) innovative,
specifically designed education based Co-regulatory model, c) a dedicated website with
resources for the implementation of the model, d) publications on scientific journals; e) at
least one international conference. In addition, depending on resources: databank, network
and monitoring program to measure the effectiveness of the model.
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1. Rationale for the project
Regulatory systems are influential and complex ‘objects’ of analysis.1 Regulatory systems
for new media (digital and creative media) are particularly influential and complex by virtue
of the growing presence and fundamental impact of digital communication in our
contemporary societies,2 especially among the younger generations.3
The speed of technological innovation, and the pervasiveness and intensity of the effects
associated with the use of digital media among youths unite in creating a serious need of
reliable knowledge about the optimal features of regulatory systems in this field. Moreover, in
a virtual and intangible terrine, regulation becomes evermore challenging.4
This project goal is to conduct an empirical research that will effectively analyse the
regulation of new media in order to develop an innovative education-based Co-regulatory
model to efficiently address the potential harm of virtual-intangible harm to children. The
complexity and the importance of this objects recommends, in our view, an exploratory study
capable of providing the material and immaterial background conditions for the effective
implementation of the project.
More precisely these conditions include – for the first part - infrastructure:
•

Mapping the nature of available data and prepare for the construction of additional
data;

1

Nachshon Goltz & Aleksander Nikolic, Global-Regulation – Drawing Future Regulatory Tools from the
Experience of the Past 3 The European Journal of Risk Regulation (2013).
2
Nachshon Goltz, Simulacra’s Day in the U.S. Supreme Court: Brown v. Entertainment Merchants Association
and United States v. Stevens Ent’, Comparative Research in Law & Political Economy, Research Paper No. 36
(2013).
3
Tracey Dowdeswell & Nachshon Goltz, Virtual Worlds Use and the Harm to Children’s Imagination
Development, In Matteo Stocchetti (ed.), Storytelling in the Digital Age, Media and Education in the Digital Age
[Forthcoming]; Nachshon Goltz, Protecting Children’s Privacy in Virtual World Games: The Threats of Smart
Advertising, In Lesley Jacobs, Privacy Rights in the Global Digital Economy: Everyday Legal Problems and
Canadian Paths to Justice, Toronto: Irwin Law (2014); Nachshon Goltz, Is there anybody out there? Analyzing
the Regulation of Children’s Privacy Online in the US and the EU According to Eberlein et al. (2014) TBGI
analytical Framework, Journal of International Media and Entertainment Law, Vol. 6(1) 21-42 (2016);
Nachshon Goltz & Peter Neufield, Undermining Parental Authority, Unethical Advertising and the
Accountability of self–regulation: ThomasCook.ca as a Fable, Osgoode Hall Law School, Comparative Research
in Law & Political Economy (CLPE) (2013); Nachshon Goltz, ‘ESRB Warning: Use of Virtual Worlds by
Children May Result in Addiction and Blurring of Borders’ – The Advisable Regulations in Light of Foreseeable
Damages 11(2) PGH. J. Tech. L. & Pol'y (Fall 2010).
4
Nachshon Goltz, The Limits of Regulation, PhD Dissertation, Osgoode Hall Law School, York University
(2015) [forthcoming].
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•

Establishing a network of agencies and individuals capable of supporting the
comparative analysis of the regulatory landscape of new media;

•

Performing preparatory theoretical overview (e.g. identifying the relevant dimensions
of the phenomenon, mapping current research, evaluate the nature and value of
competing traditions, formulating a preliminary set of research questions and working
hypothesis, etc.)
This project seek to shift the paradigm in new media regulation as the current situation

begs for a new model to better protect children which are becoming evermore vulnerable
to the new media. The potential virtual-intangible harm posed by new media, especially to
children, as identified by the Artificial Medium Laws Theory,5 cannot be overstated. Thus
the urgent and crucial need to address this virtual-intangible potential harm.

2. Research Questions and Working Hypotheses
The goal of this first part is to design and establish the preparatory grounds or
‘infrastructure’ for a second part of the project. The research should therefore distinguish the
research questions addressed by the first part from those that will inspire the research
activities of the second part. The latter will result from the activities of the former and cannot
be anticipated in detail at this stage. The main research questions inspiring the first part are
summarised as follows:
•

Who are the stakeholders, what are their needs, interests and resources in the debates
and processes concerning regulatory models of the activities of digital and creative
media industry, especially with respect to potential virtual-intangible harm to
children?

•

What is the nature and quality of the available data in the relevant dimensions of the
phenomenon in question?

•

What is the scope and depth of a research initiative aiming at the comparative analysis
of different regulatory systems?

•

What are the conditions of sustainability for a research network capable of performing
a comparative research with these ambitions?

5

Goltz & Dowdeswell, supra note 2.
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•

What are the key research questions that the second part should address?
Although the working hypotheses of the second part cannot be anticipated here, one

can anticipate that some of the questions addressed will include the following:
•

What is the nature of the arguments deployed in support of alternative regulatory
models for the activities of digital and creative media industry regarding children?

•

What are the legal instruments, problems and solutions affecting the evolution of these
systems?

•

What is the relative efficacy of alternative regulatory models for the activities of
digital media & creative industries?

•

What is the role of education in alternative models of Co-regulation?

•

Can education-based Co-regulation substitute other, more formal and centred
regulatory instruments?

3. Expected Results and Their Utilization
The main expected result of the first part is the facilitation of the second part on regulatory
systems, virtual-intangible harm and practice in the domain of digital media. In concrete terms
the first part will be a preparatory exercise to identify a) the stakeholders involved in the
regulatory realm, their needs, interests and the potential benefits of education-based Coregulatory models emerging from the empirical research and the nature and deleterious
potential of virtual-intangible harm; b) nature and accessibility of relevant data as an
empirical grounds for construction of these models; c) suitable research partners to establish
the international network for the comparative research and d) extension of the research
partnership and obtaining funds for the second part of the research.

4. Publication and Dissemination of the Results
The first part will generate two main texts: a) a master plan for the second part, b) Initial
report on the legal landscape of the industry, stakeholder positions, education-based, Coregulatory models and virtual-intangible harm. The first text will be circulated among
stakeholders and research partners and will be used to perform coordination functions in the
implementation of the second part. The second text will be used primarily in the
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communication with potential partners while its content will be a resource in the design and
implementation of the second part.

5. Conceptual framework
The conceptual framework of the first part includes several aspects of regulation deeply
rooted in the rich literature developed in this field. In this short overview I will first discuss
the definition of regulation, secondly, notions of Co-regulation, thirdly, media regulation,
fourthly creative regulation and finally the virtual-intangible harm to children.

(i)

Regulation

At its simplest, regulation refers to the promulgation of an authoritative set of rules,
accompanied by some mechanism, typically a public agency, for monitoring and promoting
compliance with these rules.6 The term regulation has been defined in a number of ways,7 and
might go as far as to consider, “all mechanisms of social control – including unintentional and
non-state processes – to be forms of regulation.”8
Selznick defines regulation as sustained and focused control exercised by a public agency
over activities that are valued by a community. This definition is considered to express the
core meaning of the concept,9 albeit other notions are also commonly used.10 Levi-Faur
defines regulation as a policy instrument,11 while Hartle12 sees it as, “[t]he most general

6

R Baldwin, C Scott & C Hood, A Reader on Regulation 3 New York: Oxford University Press (1998).
See B. M. Mitnick, The Political Economy of Regulation: Creating, Designing, and Removing Regulatory
Forms, New York: Colombia University Press, ch. 1 (1980); A. Ogus, Regulation: Legal Form and Economic
Theory, New York: Oxford University Press, ch. 1 (1994); G. Majone (ed.), De-Regulation of Re-Regulation?
Regulatory Reform in Europe and the United States, London: Pinter (1989).
8
Baldwin et al., supra note 6, at 4.
9
P. Selznick, Focusing Organizational Research on Regulation, In R. Noll (ed.), Regulatory Policy and the
Social Science, Berkeley: University of California Press 363 (1985).
10
M. Power, The Risk Management of Everything: Rethinking the Politics of Uncertainty, London: Demos 23
(2004); R. Baldwin & M. Cave, Understanding Regulation – Theory, Strategy and Practice, Oxford: Oxford
University Press 2 (1999).
11
David Levi-Faur, Regulatory Governance, In Paolo Graziano & Maarten Vink (eds.), Europeanization: New
Research Agendas, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, (2006).
12
Douglas G. Hartle, Public Policy Decision Making and Regulation, Toronto: University of Toronto xii (1979).
7
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policy instrument,” and Scott13 argues that in North America there is a long tradition of the
deliberate use of regulation as an instrument of public policy.14 Scott further contends that,
“[t]he image of independent regulatory agencies, capable of making technically expert and
correct decisions, isolated from politics and from the courts, is illusory.”15 Contemporary
governance, according to Scott16, is characterized by fragmentation of power, rather than its
concentration in independent agencies.17 This observation, Scott argues, substantially
undermines many of the claimed virtues of regulation as a public policy instrument.18
Sarre and Johnstone19 argue that these broader definitions of regulation recognize that
regulation can be carried out by non-government actors — including corporations,
professional firms (auditors, accountants and lawyers), international interest holders, nonprofit organizations,20 other community groups, and citizens. In these broader conceptions of
regulation, the state is ‘decentred’, so that it is no longer necessarily dominates regulatory
processes, but shares regulatory control with other sub-centers.21
From the standpoint of the industry and market-regulated activities, regulation is often
thought of as an activity that restricts behavior and prevents the occurrence of certain
undesirable activities (a 'red light' concept22) but the influence of regulation may also be
enabling or facilitative ('green light') as, for example, where the airwaves are regulated so as

13

Colin Scott, Regulatory Fragmentation, In Patrice A. Dutil & Michael McConkey (eds.), Dreaming of the
Regulatory Village, Speaking of the Regulatory State, EBRARY CEL - York University, Institute of Public
Administration of Canada 149 (2006).
14
M.A. Eisner, Regulatory Politics in Transition, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press (2000).
15
Scott, supra note 13, at 149.
16
Id.
17
Julia Black, Decentring Regulation: The Role of Regulation and Self-Regulation in a 'Post-Regulatory' World
54(1) Current Legal Problems 103-146 (2001); C. Scott, Analysing Regulatory Space: Fragmented Resources
and Institutional Design, Public Law 329-353 (Summer 2001).
18
Scott, supra note 13, at 149.
19
R. Sarre & R. Johnstone (eds.), Regulation: Enforcement and Compliance 57 Research and Public Policy
Series,
Australian
Institute
of
Criminology
4
(2004),
Available
at
http://www.aic.gov.au/documents/B/A/0/%7BBA0FC2D0-B43E-4CB6-A5AD-95ACE70542AA%7DRPP57.pdf
(last visited May 6, 2016).
20
See D. Brereton, Emerging Forms of Corporate and Industry Governance in the Australian Mining Industry,
In Sarre & Johnstone, supra note 19.
21
See L. Mazerolle & J. Ransley, Third Party Policing: Prospects, Challenges and Implications for Regulators,
In Sarre & Johnstone, supra note 19.
22
On 'red light' and 'green light' rules and regulation see C. Harlow & R., Rawlings, Law and Administration,
London: Pergamon Press, ch. 2, 3 (2nd ed. 1997) ; A. Ogus, supra note 7, at ch. 2.
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to allow broadcasting operations to be conducted in an ordered fashion rather than left to the
potential chaos of an uncontrolled market.23
Anthony Ogus24 argues that one of the aims of regulation is to correct perceived
deficiencies in the market system in meeting collective or public interest goal. In the analysis
of Ogus, under the market model, the law has a primarily facilitative function: it offers a set of
formalized arrangements with which individuals can 'clothe' their welfare-seeking activities
and relationship. The arrangements carry with them mutual rights and obligations which, if
necessary, a court will enforce. Although the law may be said to control conduct, private law
is distinct from regulation in two fundamental respects: it is left to individuals and not the
state to enforce rights; and obligations are incurred voluntarily in the sense that they can
always be displaced by agreements between the affected parties, if they are found to be
inappropriate. For the same reasons, Ogus argues that the private law is largely decentralized.
It is important to note that by definition, public law is centralized.
Ogus further contends that regulation is not always directive, public, and centralized. In
some areas it is formulated and enforced by self-regulatory agencies, rather than by a public
body. Occasionally, collective goals are pursued by means of instruments, such as franchise
contracts, which resemble private legal obligations. Finally, regulation can take the form of an
'economic instrument' which is not directive: individuals or firms are legally free to undertake
certain activities which, from a public interest perspective, are regarded as undesirable, but if
they do so, they must pay a tax or charge.
Parker et al25 contends that for scholars of regulation, the core area of study is 'regulation'
in the sense of, “the intentional activity of attempting to control, order or influence the
behavior of others.”26 This definition is broad in the sense that 'regulation' is not limited to
targeted rules that are enforced and monitored, nor is it limited to state intervention in the
economy and/or civil society. It incorporates three basic requirements for a regulatory regime:
the setting of standards; processes for monitoring compliance with the standards; and
mechanisms for enforcing the standards. It is important to note that most standards have no
mechanisms for compliance enforcement.

23

See for example, David A. Moss, & Michael R. Fein, Radio Regulation revisited: Coase, the FCC, and the
Public Interest 15(4) Journal of Policy History 389-416 (2003).
24
Ogus, supra note 7, at 2.
25
C. Parker, et al. (eds.), Regulating Law, Oxford: Oxford University Press 1 (2004).
26
J. Black, Critical Reflections on Regulation 27 Australian J of Legal Philosophy 1 (2002).
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According to Ellickson,27 systems of social control typically employ both rewards and
punishments – both carrots and sticks – to influence behavior.28 In administering these
positive and negative measures, enforcers usually apply rules that divide the universe of
human behavior into three categories: (1) good behavior that is to be rewarded, (2) bad
behavior that is to be altered, and (3) ordinary behavior that warrants no response.29
Ogus30 recognizes two general types of regulation: social regulation and economic
regulation. Social regulation is the public interest justification for regulation, which deals with
such matters as health and safety, environmental protection, and consumer protection. Social
regulation tends to centre on two types of market failure. First, individuals in an existing, or
potential, contractual relationship with firms supplying goods or services often have
inadequate information concerning the quality offered by suppliers; in consequence, the
unregulated market may fail to meet their preferences. Secondly, even if this information
problem does not exist, market transactions may have spillover effects (or externalities) which
adversely affect individuals who are not involved in the transactions.
A third type of market failure, not mentioned by Ogus, is the inability of individuals to
refrain from the harm embedded in the service they are consuming. The market failure
approach assumes that the market is able to address every problem – but sometimes fail to do
so. As markets evolve, this assumption needs further observation for failures that are
constructed in the market and can hardly be referred as market failures. According to Goltz,31
this is especially true when dealing with intangible and virtual harm relating to children. The
more the harm is intangible, the harder it is to prove it and identify its characteristics. In
addition, there is an inherent inclination to treat virtual harms as less dangerous than non-

27

R.C. Ellickson, Order Without Law: How Neighbors Settle Disputes, Cambridge: Harvard University Press,
124 (1991).
28
Rewards are goods, services, or obligations to which a person would assign a positive monetary value;
punishments are goods, services, or obligations that a person would pay to be rid of. The distinction between
punishments and rewards is well developed in behavioral psychology, where the two are sometimes referred to
as positive and negative reinforcement. Sociologists, since Durkheim, have distinguished between penal and
compensatory (restitutive) modes of social control. These are two different forms of punishment. What
sociologists sometimes call therapeutic social control is a reward system; the person who seeks help from others
is rewarded for recognizing and trying to remedy his plight. On these and other sociological distinctions, see
Donald Black, The Behavior of Law, New York: Academic Press 4-6 (1976).
29
For a fuller inquiry into the function of these three categories, see R. C. Ellickson, Alternatives to Zoning:
Covenants, Nuisance Rules, and Fines as Land Use Controls 40 U. Chi. L. Rev. 728-733 (1973); See also Saul
X. Levmore, Waiting for Rescue: An Essay on the Evolution and Incentive Structure of Affirmative Obligations
72 Va. L. Rev. 879 (1986); Donald Wittman, Liability for Harm or Restitution for Benefit 13 J Legal Stud. 57
(1984).
30
Ogus, supra note 7, at 4.
31
Goltz, Supra note 4.
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virtual or non-intangible harms. This inclination is not only wrong, but dangerous and could
be proved to the contrary for intangible and virtual harms and its consequences especially
since these harms and their consequences tend to be hidden from the eye; hence harder to
prevent or protect from and cause damages that will be detected only when the harm is
already done.
The OECD defines regulation as 'the full range of legal instruments by which
governing institutions, at all levels of government, impose obligations or constraints on
private sector (regulation is often aimed at the public sector) behavior. Constitutions,
parliamentary laws, subordinate legislation, decrees, orders, norms, licenses, plans, codes and
even some forms of administrative guidance can all be considered as 'regulation'.32
The governments of Canada and Australia adopt a similar definition.33 Everything that
government does that is not done through legislation or delegated legislation is thus not
'regulation'. In contrast, the UK government's Better Regulation Task force defines regulation
as 'any government measure or intervention that seeks to change the behavior of individuals
or groups, so including taxes, subsidies and other financial measures.34 Government is,
however, a notoriously fragmented thing. Whilst the Better Regulation Task force sees only
government actions to be regulation, the UK office of telecommunication includes in its
definition of regulation the operation of market forces.35
According to Black,36 academics are even less disciplined in defining regulation. They
(including Black) vary as to which of the definitions to adopt: (1) regulation is the
promulgation of rules by government accompanied by mechanisms for monitoring and
enforcement, usually assumed to be performed through a specialist public agency; (2)
regulation is any form of direct state intervention in the economy, whatever form that
intervention might take; (3) regulation is all mechanisms of social control or influence
affecting all aspects of behavior from whatever source, whether they are intentional or not.

32

OECD, Recommendation of the Council of the OECD on Improving the Quality of Government Regulation,
OCDE/GD(95)95, Note 1; OECD, The OECD Report on Regulatory Reform: Synthesis (Paris, 1997).
33
Canada: Regulatory Affairs Guide, Assessing Regulatory Alternatives 63 (Ontario, 1994); Australia:
Productivity Commission, Office of Regulatory Review, A Guide to Regulation (Canberra, 2nd ed. 1999).
34
Better Regulation Taskforce, Principles of Better Regulation 1 Cabinet Office, London, undated.
35
Office of Telecommunications, Encouraging Self- and Co-Regulation in Telecoms to Benefit Consumers 2
London (June 2000).
36
Black, supra note 26, at 12-13.
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Baldwin, Scott and Hood adopt all three definitions in the introduction to their 'Reader on
Regulation';37 Baldwin and Cave adopt the first two in their book 'Understanding Regulation,'
although add 'decentered' potential with the variation that regulation is also the making,
monitoring and enforcing of rules by non-governmental actors.38 Hood et al adopt only the
first definition in their book, 'Regulation inside Government', with the additional twist that the
'regulator' has some kind of official mandate to scrutinize the behavior of the 'regulatee' and
seek to change it.39 Hall, Hood and Scott however implicitly adopt the third definition in their
book on telecommunications regulation when they talk of regulators being 'regulated' by
culture.40 Finally, Black41 defines regulation as, “[t]he sustained and focused attempt to alter
the behavior of others according to defined standards or purposes with the intention of
producing a broadly identified outcome or outcomes, which may involve mechanisms of
standard-setting, information-gathering and behavior-modification.”

(ii)

Co-Regulation

Co-regulation refers to industry-association self-regulation with some oversight and/or
ratification by government.42 Enforced self-regulation is different from co-regulation since in
enforced self-regulation, negotiations take place between the state and individual firms to
establish regulations that are tailor-made to each firm.43 In co-regulation, these negotiations
are conducted between the government and the industry association combined with the
individual firms. This “centralization” of self-regulation enhances standardization and can
make it more efficient for the government to enforce compliance. Nonetheless, this kind of
generic approach might be a less distinctive approach than the individual approach that can be
employed in enforced self-regulation.

37

Baldwin et al., supra note 6.
C. Hood et al., Regulation Inside Government: Waste-Watchers, Quality Police, and Sleaze-Busters, Oxford:
Oxford University Press (2000).
39
Id., at 8.
40
C. Hall, C. Scott & C. Hood, Telecommunications Regulation: Culture, Chaos and Interdependency Inside the
Regulatory Process 5-7 London: Routledge (2000).
41
Black, supra note 26, at 26.
42
P. Grabosky & J. Braithwaite, Of Manners Gentle; Enforcement Strategies of Australian Business Regulatory
Agencies, Melbourne: Oxford University Press 83 (1986).
43
See also I. Ayres & J. Braithwaite, Responsive Regulation: Transcending the Deregulation Debate, Oxford:
Social Legal Studies 101 (1995); Baldwin & Cave, supra note 44, at 125-127.
38
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According to Baldwin and Cave,44 self-regulation is, “The exercise of control by a group
of firms or individuals, over its membership and their behaviour. Variables of self-regulation
consist of the governmental nature of self-regulation, the level of involvement of selfregulators and the extent of the binding legal force which is connected to self-regulatory
rules”.45 Claims in favour of self-regulation or the incorporation of components of selfregulation into governmental regulation are based on arguments related to expertise and
efficiency.46
In his seminal work, "The Problem of Social Cost" – the most cited law article – the
economist Ronald Coase suggested as a fundamental example a conflict between a rancher
running cattle and neighbouring farmer raising crops.47 This Parable was used by Coase to
illustrate what has come to be known as the Coase Theorem.48 In its strongest form, this
counterintuitive proposition states, that when transaction costs49 are zero a change in the rule
of liability will have no effect on the allocation of resources. For example, assuming these
assumptions are met, it is Caose’s theorem prediction that holding a rancher liable for damage
done by his trespassing cattle would not cause the rancher to take precautionary measures as
reducing his herds size, erecting more fencing, or keeping a closer watch on his livestock. In
theory, a rancher who is liable for trespass damage has a legal incentive to implement all costjustified measures to control his cattle. But Caose argues that even if the law were to decline
to make the rancher liable, the potential trespass-control victims would pay the rancher to
implement the identical trespass-control measures. In short, market forces internalize to the
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parties involved in the transaction all costs regardless of the rule of liability. This theorem has
undoubtedly been both the most fruitful, and the most controversial proposition to arise out of
the law-and-economics movement.50
Coase was fully aware that negotiating agreements, obtaining information, and litigating
disputes are all potentially costly. Therefore his Farmer-Rancher Parable might not portray
accurately how landowners in rural areas would respond to trespass law change.51
Nonetheless, law-and-economics scholars believe that when only two parties are in conflict,
transaction costs are indeed often trivial.52 These scholars therefore might assume, as Coase
likely would not, that the Parable accurately predicts how rural landowners would resolve
cattle-trespass disputes.
In an account of how residents of rural Shasta County, California, resolve a variety of
disputes that arise from wayward cattle, Ellickson's53 principle finding is that Shasta County
neighbours apply informal norms, rather than legal rules, to resolve most of the issues that
arise among them.
According to Ellickson,54 “Shasta County neighbours, it turns out, do not behave as Coase
portrays them as behaving in the Farmer-Rancher Parable.55 Neighbours in fact are strongly
inclined to cooperate, but they achieve cooperative outcomes not by bargaining from legally
established entitlements, as the parable supposes, but rather by developing and enforcing
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adaptive norms of neighbourliness that trump formal legal entitlements. Although the route
chosen is not the one that the parable anticipates, the end reached is exactly the one that Coase
predicted: coordination to mutual advantage without supervision by the state”.
Ellickson further contends that order often arises out of mutual understanding. Although
many other writers have recognized this point,56 it remains counterintuitive and cannot be
repeated too often. It is not surprising that the those who favor expanding the role of
government in regulation do not appreciate non-hierarchical systems of social control, as
these pointed out by Ellickson.
Although Coase's writing tends towards decentered regulation, in "The Problem of Social
Cost", he adopts the "legal centralist" view arguing that the state functions as the sole creator
of operative rules of entitlement among individuals. In so doing Coase repeated a an approach
dating back to Thomas Hobbes.57 According to Hobbes, all would be endless civil strife
without a Leviathan (government) to issue and enforce commands. The Shasta County
evidence shows that Hobbes was much too quick to equate anarchy with chaos.
Ellickson58 argues that many entitlements, especially workday entitlements, can arise out
of mutual understanding. People may supplement, and indeed preempt, rules of their own
with the state's rules.59
Ellickson concludes that, “A centerpiece of the theory is the hypothesis that, to govern
their workaday interactions, members of a close-knit group tend to develop informal norms
whose content serves to maximize the objective welfare of group members. This hypothesis
suggests that the choice of informal custom over law is done not only because custom tends to
be administratively cheaper but also because the substantive content of customary rules is
more likely to be welfare maximizing”.60
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As the potential harm to children’s imaginative development in virtual worlds is a
consequence of an interaction between unequal forces – virtual worlds operators and children
users – Ellickson’s norms based regulation might be irrelevant.

(iii)

Media Regulation

Livingstone and Bober61 argued regarding the internet that, “In terms of media regulation,
therefore, it may be that the stakes have never been higher, as society seeks to strike a balance
between the failure to minimize the dangers and the failure to maximize the opportunities.” In
this context, Kirby62 notes that, Napoleon reportedly observed a principle of never responding
to letters for at least a year. He adopted this principle on the footing that, if the problem still
existed a year later, it would be time enough for it to receive the Emperor's attention. Whether
by default or by design, many issues presented to the law by contemporary technology appear
to receive the same treatment. One suspects that, in many instances, it is because of the
complexity and sensitivity of the issues rather than a strategic policy of lawmakers to
postpone lawmaking or clarification of regulation until the contours of the necessary law have
become clear.
An attempt to employ individual actors in the regulation of their children’s Internet use
was done by the European Commission in its ‘Green Paper on the Convergence of
Telecommunications, Media and Information Technology Sectors’.63 The Commission sought
to instigate a shift from direct control by government to governance through ‘action at a
distance’ by regulating parents, for example through discursively-established norms of ‘good
parenting’ and ‘appropriate children’s conduct’.64
The goal was an expectation that individual actors – parents, teachers and even children –
will become informed through the dissemination of appropriate expertise and so empowered

61

Sonia Livingstone & Magdalena Bober, Regulating the Internet at Home: Contrasting the Perspectives of
Children and Parents, In D. Buckingham & R. Willett, Digital generations: children, young people and new
media, Mahwah, N.J.: Lawrence Erlbaum 94 (2006).
62
Michael Kirby, The Fundamental Problem of Regulating Technology 5 Indian J. L. & Tech. 9 (2009).
63
European-Commission, Green Paper on the Convergence of the Telecommunications, Media and Information
Technology Sectors, and the Implications for Regulation Towards an Information Society Approach (Green
Paper No. COM(97)623), Brussels (1997).
64
D. Oswell, The Dark Side of Cyberspace: Internet Content Regulation and Child Protection 5(4)
Convergence: The Journal of Research into New Media Technologies 52 (1999).

268

to regulate themselves and each other in their internet use. Harden65 observes, “while
anxieties about risk may be shaped by public discussion, it is as individuals that we cope with
these uncertainties.”
When asked what would contribute to safer and more effective use of the Internet for your
child, most of the surveyed parents in the European Union66 said ‘more/better teaching and
guidance on the Internet use in schools’ (88%).
A great majority of surveyed Canadian parents67 (94%) said educating children about safe,
responsible Internet use is a top priority. Another 91% mentioned the importance of educating
parents about strategies for managing the Internet while 55% of parents believe that users
have to take responsibility for family Internet use, and 44% think that Internet content needs
to be controlled.
According to Livingstone and Bober,68 many children, it seems, lack key skills in
evaluating online content: four in ten 9-19 years old say that they trust most of the
information on the internet, half trust some of it, and only one in ten are skeptical about much
information online. Only 33% of 9-19 year-olds who go online at least once a week say that
they have been told how to judge the reliability of online information, and among parents of
9-17 year-olds, only 41% are confident that their child has learned how to judge the reliability
of online information.
When asked what would contribute to safer and more effective use of the Internet for your
child, most of the surveyed parents in the European Union69 said ‘more/better teaching and
guidance on the Internet use in schools’ (88%), ‘more awareness raising campaigns on online
risks’ (87%), ‘more/better information and advice for parents on website children use’ (87%),
‘stricter regulation for businesses that produce online content and services’ (86%), ‘contact
points where parents and children can receive individual advice about how to stay safe online’
(84%), ‘improved availability/performance of monitoring software’ (80%) and finally,
‘training sessions organized for parents by NGO’s, government, local authorities’ (70%).
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A great majority of surveyed Canadian parents70 (94%) said educating children about safe,
responsible Internet use is a top priority. Another 91% mentioned the importance of educating
parents about strategies for managing the Internet while 55% of parents believe that users
have to take responsibility for family Internet use, and 44% think that Internet content needs
to be controlled.

(iv)

Creative Regulation

The word governance comes from the Latin gubernare which means ‘to steer’. So we can
think of the purpose of governance and regulation as steering us into conformity with the
principles which will keep the planet and the earth community healthy.71
Rivers argues that, “We need to replace our current mechanistic view of regulation with a
biological model. Biological systems have innate ways of regulating themselves.72 For
example, through the process of homeostasis, biological organisms regulate their processes eg
temperature control. James Lovelock’s gaia theory, whereby the planet is seen as an entity
with its own self-regulating mechanisms, can provide an important source of inspiration for
framing our governance systems.”73
Rivers74 provides an example of good design from the field of social entrepreneurship
describing the ‘Good Earth’ project in Italy. Mafia land that has been confiscated is handed
over to a social justice programme. Recovering drug addicts (drug addiction is a problem
fuelled by Mafia organized crime) farm the land, and the food produced is then sold
throughout Italy under the ‘Good Earth’ brand. People who buy this brand know that they are
making a stand against the Mafia. The addicts often have little education and would struggle
to find other work, but ordinary farm work is seen as low status and does not fit with the selfimage of an addict. However, withstanding a degree of intimidation and harassment from the
Mafia, who want to undermine the project, makes the addicts feel heroic and builds their self
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esteem, thus aiding recovery. Before this programme was started, Mafia land that was
confiscated was sold at auction but usually found its way back into Mafia hands.75
Walter Morton define Creative Regulation as,76 “…the art of guiding human affairs
toward constructive ends…There is indeed no substitute in human affairs for experienced and
enlightened judgment based on available facts and knowledge. It is only the inexperienced
who would trust the fate of any company, nation or institution to a mechanical formula based
upon an abstraction. Human judgment, of course, is not infallible but it is all that we have and
has brought us as far as we have come.”77
Bronwen et al.78 argues that continuity and change in the practice and debates surrounding
regulation may be illustrated by comparing Marie Antoinette’s indignant response to
complaints about rising bread prices in pre-revolutionary France, to France Telecom’s
contemporary response to complaints about fears of rising local telephone call charges in rural
France as a consequence of telecommunications privatization. Like the latter’s protestations
that international calls would be so much cheaper,79 Marie Antoinette similarly claimed, “But
then let them eat cake.” In other words, both justified the potentially negative distributional
impact of a refusal to regulate the price of important goods by invoking the expansion of
choice available to citizens. Yet both failed to give credence to the incapacity of particular
sectors of the community to avail themselves of essential commodities, be they bread or local
phone calls. Such a failure demonstrates that insensitivity to the political and moral
dimensions of regulatory policy and practice has endured, despite the long sweep of time
separating the two events.

(v)

Virtual-Intangible Harm to Children

The theoretical basis for the identification and exploration of the virtual-intangible harm
to children is based on the Artificial Medium Laws Theory,80 grounded in the literature of
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“medium theorists,” to use Meyrowitz’s term.81 This term is a variant of the more common
and widespread term “media ecology,” which Meyrowitz studied but renamed in his writing.
Media ecologists do not suggest that means of communication wholly shape culture and
personality but that changes in communication patterns are one very important contribution to
social change, a contribution that has generally been overlooked.82 Medium theorists argue
that the form in which people communicate has an impact that goes beyond the choice of
specific messages. Marshall McLuhan described media as extensions of the senses and
claimed that the introduction of a new medium to a culture, therefore, changes the “sensory
balance” of the people in that culture and alters their consciousness.83
However, according to Meyrowitz,84 “the greatest problem with medium ecologists is that
they ultimately provide more of a perspective for studying the effects of media on behavior
rather than a detailed theory. The insights, observations, and evidence they collect point to the
need to study media environments in addition to studying media messages, but they do not
form a clear set of propositions to explain the means through which media reshape specific
behaviors”.
An example of this criticism is McLuhan’s laws of the media.85 The discussion among
scholars on the Media Ecology Association Listserve on this topic is illuminating. While
some argue that the laws are nothing but a joke, others claim that they help structure a
medium’s influence and even that these laws create a “new science.” Moreover, it has been
argued that McLuhan’s laws apply to any object that conveys meaning.
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The Artificial Medium Laws Theory concurs with medium ecologists who, like
Postman,86 recognize the hazards of new media, and the theory argues that the advancement
of artificial media poses hazards to humans. Nonetheless, the theory tries to avoid the
criticism mentioned above regarding the lack of empiricism in medium theory, by presenting
linear, logical, and empirically supported laws that are easily applicable and produce clear
insights and understanding of artificial media and their effects.
For the purpose of this theory, an artificial medium is defined as a man-made mechanical
or electronic object of communication that transfers information using one or more of the
following perceived psychological dimensions: photos, sounds, moving photos, time, and
interaction. Television, radio, newspaper, films, the Internet, cell phones, virtual reality, and
similar objects are a few examples. These artificial media are also referred to as advanced
technologies, electronic media, and other names. Users assume that these dimensions reflect
reality, but as will be illustrated below, the dimensions perceived from the media are often
distorted and deceptive.
The theory includes two components: the perceived psychological dimensions and five
artificial medium laws. The theory is treated as a whole and works as a framework for
understanding artificial media and as a method for drawing insights on the future of artificial
media’s influence on humans and society. The theory’s laws and the perceived dimensions
they refer to are intertwined: Each artificial medium poses one or more perceived
psychological dimension: picture (newspaper); sound (radio); sound and moving picture
(TV); sound, moving picture, and time (Internet); and sound, moving pictures, time, and
interaction (virtual worlds). These dimensions have a hierarchical order, from the weakest
(picture) to the strongest (interaction). For example, a user’s exposure to a low-level
dimension (the sound of the radio) is considered less influential than a user’s exposure to a
silent movie (moving picture as a higher-level dimension).
The first law, The Truth in a Medium is Context Dependent, argues that the context
(news, comedy, website, etc.) defines the credibility of a message and that the more
dimensions a medium possesses, the more difficult it becomes for the user to define the
context. Postman argued, “Philosophers may agonize over the questions ‘What is truth?’
‘What is intelligence?’ ‘What is the good life?’ But in Technopoly there is no need for such
86
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intellectual struggle. Machines eliminate complexity, doubt, and ambiguity.”87 Thus, the only
indicator a user has to discover whether the information he or she perceives via a medium is
true or false is whether the information comes, for example, from a comedy website (the
information is most likely false) or from a news website (assumed to be credible).
In his book Amusing Ourselves to Death, Postman argues that, “The concept of truth is
intimately linked to the biases of forms of expression. Truth does not, and never has, come
unadorned. It must appear in its proper clothing or it is not acknowledged, which is a way of
saying that the ‘truth’ is a kind of cultural prejudice.”88
Furthermore, according to Postman, “Truth, like time itself, is a product of a conversation
man has with himself about and through the techniques of communication he has invented.”89
Wartella et al.90 argue that the frame of a message includes knowledge of its point, topic,
and relevant background information; it provides the context for interpreting communication.
As Goffman91 and others have pointed out, the impact of experience is a function of how that
experience is interpreted, or framed. Bransford and McCarrell92 provided a classic
demonstration, showing that what people learned from narratives depended on the frame they
were given. Wartella et al.93 concludes that, “The general rule for communication theory,
then, is that the effects of communication content are mediated by the frames people use in
processing that content.”
Moreover, as described by McAllister in ‘”Selling Survivor, The Use of TV News to
Promote Commercial Entertainment,”94 identifying and determining the context become
increasingly problematic. In his article, “What is the difference between The Hobbit and the
news? Not as much as there should be,” Brooker wonders, “News reports are looking more
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like movies – and movies are looking more like news reports. How are we supposed to tell
them apart?”95
Brooker gives the example of reports that an audience of cult movie buffs reacted
negatively to test footage from Peter Jackson’s forthcoming Hobbit movie, “The Hobbit is
shot at 48 frames per second – twice as many frames as standard films. The studio claims this
gives it an unparalleled fluidity. The viewers complained it was too smooth – like raw video.
Some said it looked like daytime TV. What they meant, I guess, is that it seemed too ‘real,’
and therefore inherently underwhelming”.96
Two examples of this confusion between fact and fiction are the story of North Korea’s
Kim Jong-un having his uncle eaten by 120 wild dogs, which may have started in a satirical
tweet and ended up on NBC news, Fox news, and other news networks and websites,97 and
Sweden’s justice minister posting a spoof article on her Facebook page about marijuanalinked deaths, along with comments about her zero-tolerance policy on drugs.98
Two other recent examples include an activist group’s fictional blog showing a blondhaired, 12-year-old, Norwegian girl planning her wedding to a 30-something-year-old man.
The blog was created to promote awareness of the very real phenomenon of child marriages
around the world.99 Another example is the “hero boy” video created by Norwegian activists
portraying a Syrian boy saving a girl from a shooting.100 The video generated five million
views before it was discovered that it was staged and filmed in another country to increase
awareness about children’s suffering in the Syrian civil war.
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The second law of the Artificial Medium Laws Theory is The Stronger Dimension
Prevails, which argues that given the hierarchy of the perceived psychological dimensions, a
combination of a low-level dimension (voice) with a high-level dimension (interaction) will
result in the higher dimension’s greater influence on a user. It is further argued that there is a
complex system of interaction among the dimensions that can bring powerful results. This law
will be illustrated through the YouTube video KONY 2012, to argue that while the sound
dimension describes Joseph Kony’s war crimes in Uganda, the moving picture tells a different
story about the power of social media. I suggest that this combination of dimensions made
this video the most-watched moving picture ever, with an amazing 99 million views within a
week.101
The third law, Medium with Time Dimension Determines its Usage Length, argues that a
medium that possess the basic dimensions, including the time dimension, will determine the
user’s usage time. Moreover, the more dimensions a medium possesses, the more the
determination of the length of the usage time will shift from the user to the medium. It is the
medium that determine how long the user is using it – not the user. This law is illustrated
through the correlation between Internet addiction and usage time. Moreover, it will be
demonstrated that this correlation is even more alarming when measured in a stronger
medium: virtual worlds.102
Internet addiction illustrates the third law. Like other forms of addiction, Internet
addiction consumes an addict’s time and energy, harms his personal relationships, restricts his
academic, professional, and social potential,103 and may result in physical problems stemming
from self-negligence (lack of sleep, little exercise, malnutrition, and more).104 Researchers
have found that 90-95% of self-defined Internet addicts reported mild to severe distress at
work, in school, and in financial matters. 105
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Internet addiction is a cross-cultural syndrome, and the amount of time the user spends
online is its best predictor. Several studies indicate a significant correlation between the
amount of time spent surfing the Internet and the risk of developing Internet addiction, among
American college students, Chinese and Taiwanese people, Internet users from Pakistan, and
Australian students.106 The results found in a study of Italian Internet users, however, did not
support this correlation.107
Numerous studies have tracked the frequency of Internet addiction. In a study of 1,078
college students, it was found that 9.8% of the subjects possessed characteristics consistent
with Internet addiction diagnoses.108 Similar results were found in a study of 576 students,
revealing a 9.26% addiction rate.109 Nonetheless, a conservative research study using two
diagnostic tools (Diagnostic Questionnaire – DQ and Internet Related Addictive Behavior
Inventory – IARBI) found a 6% addiction rate.110 These results were supported by the result
of a US nationwide survey of 17,251 Internet users visiting abcnews.com, which indicated a
6% addiction rate.111
While many negative side effects result from Internet addiction, it seems that addiction to
virtual worlds, a stronger artificial medium, is a far more serious problem. Research
conducted with 3,989 users of the virtual world Everquest.com indicated that 15.4% of the
subjects reported experiencing symptoms of withdrawal when not able to use the virtual
world, 23.8% experienced mood modification while using the virtual world, 28.8% used the
virtual world even when they did not enjoy the experience, and 18.4% reported problems with
academics, health, finances, or relationships.112 A follow-up survey of 2,237 Massively
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Multiplayer Online Role Playing Game users concluded that 40.7% of the subjects considered
themselves addicted to the game experience.113
There are numerous documented deaths resulting from fatigue due to extended,
continuous use of virtual worlds. Li Syong Saup of South Korea died after using the virtual
world Starcraft.com for more than 50 hours continuously.114 Kso Yan of China died after
using virtual worlds for more than 15 days continuously, during the New Year holiday.115
Another Chinese individual died after using virtual worlds for three days straight.116
Hu Bin, a 16-year-old Chinese teenager from the province Anhuvi in Lujiang County,
died two days after he swallowed an insecticide he brought with him to an Internet bar.117
Before Hu committed suicide, he had used virtual worlds at the Internet bar for 11 days
straight. According to reports, the words “even the gods cannot save me” were written on the
family door. Hu’s father said that when Hu was about to die, he said, “I drank it [the
pesticide] because I wanted to make sure that you could not save me. I have played enough.”
Three-month-old Sa-rand (“love” in Korean) died as a result of her parents neglecting her
in order to raise a virtual baby in a virtual world;118 a 22-year-old was arrested for clubbing
his 53-year-old mother to death after she criticized his online gaming habit;119 twenty-threeyear-old Taiwanese Chen Rong-yu lay dead in an Internet café for nine hours before anyone
noticed. He had been playing a virtual game continuously for 23 hours;120 and finally, a
Chinese teenager was rushed to the hospital after chopping off his hand in a desperate attempt
to cure his addiction to the Internet.121
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The fourth law, The More Dimensions a Medium Possesses, the Weaker the User’s
Imagination, suggests that Virtual worlds brings to the extension of the visualization
Hypothesis further, from the senses – vision and sound – to the other perceived psychological
dimensions (i.e., time and interaction), weak and almost irrelevant in TV, stronger in video
games and dominant and supreme in virtual worlds. It is no longer about the photo’s and
sound that replaces the images that could have been created by the imagination as in TV, but
in these powerful mediums it is time and interaction from the artificial medium that replace
the natural time and interaction within the person’s mind. The most internal object, the mind,
becomes external, nourishing falsely from the artificial medium perceived psychological
dimensions, leaving little space, if any, for the imagination. For this law implication and harm
to children’s imaginative development in virtual worlds see Goltz & Dowdeswell122 and
Goltz.123
The fifth and last law, The User is Bound to All the Laws, argues that the user of an
artificial medium is inherently bound to all of the other laws. Furthermore, when a user is
involved in creating content, the laws’ influence is even stronger. This law applies to those
who are using a medium actively. For example, an actor in a movie is using the medium,
while the viewer is passive. An example of a user-actor’s subordination to the medium laws
would be male and female actors playing a loving couple in a movie and then becoming a
couple in reality. Another example is the meltdown of the KONY 2012 director as a result of
abusing the medium laws (albeit unintentionally), as described above.124
The same phenomenon occurs on the Internet and virtual worlds when most of the users
are active. The law predicts that under these circumstances, the law’s impact will be more
intense, and the line between the virtual and real will be completely blurred. Veteran New
York journalist Seth Kaufman’s125 findings illustrate this point. Kaufman has explored the
suicide rate of US reality show contestants and compared it to the national average suicide
Available at http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/china/11386325/Chinese-teen-chops-hand-off-tocure-internet-addiction.html (last visited May 6, 2016).
122
Goltz & Dowdeswell, Virtual Worlds Use and the Harm to Children’s Imagination Development, supra note
2.
123
Goltz, Nachshon, The Limits of Regulation, A Case Study of Virtual and Intangible Harm, PhD Dissertation,
Osgoode Hall Law School, York University 2015 [forthcoming].
124
Daily Mail, ‘You're the devil, you're the devil': New footage of Kony video director emerges 'ranting at traffic
while naked on busy street' (19 March 2012), Available at http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article2116981/Jason-Russell-arrested-New-footage-Kony-2012-video-director-ranting-naked-emerges.html
(last
visited May 6, 2016).
125
Seth Kaufman, Suicide Rate for Reality Contestants Three Times the National Average, TheKingofPain.com,
(April 1, 2013), Available at http://www.thekingofpainbook.com/2013/04/01/tkop-exclusive-suicide-rate-forreality-contestants-three-times-the-national-average/ (last visited May 6, 2016).

279

rate. Kaufman determined that the number of contestants on US reality shows since 2005 is
34,080, 14 of whom have committed suicide. The national average rate for suicides is 12.4 per
100,000 people, according to the American Foundation for Suicide Prevention. Therefore, the
suicide rate among US reality show participants is more than three times the national average.
The theory suggests that the gap between the real and the virtual and the natural urge to
bridge it are causing these dramatic results.

6. Research methods
The first part is a preparatory initiative whose main goal is to set the grounds for the
second part. The main research method of the second part will be a qualitative comparison of
the regulatory systems applied to the activities of digital and creative media industry,
especially in the context of virtual-intangible harm aiming at children and using this data in
order to develop an education-based Co-regulatory model. This qualitative comparison will be
based on a theoretical framework, surveys and interviews with the relevant stakeholders and
an analysis of the dimensions involved.

7. Implementation schedule
The first part will start in September 2016 and should be concluded by August 2018. The
second part will start in September 2018 and should be concluded by August 2020. At least in
principle, the activities described in the working packages will be performed simultaneously
or through successive rounds of approximation.

8. Work Packages
The main activities of the first part can be described in terms of at least four work
packages (WP)
•

WP1 - Mapping stakeholders. The first step is to identify the nature of the actors
directly or indirectly affected by the regulatory process in the field of digital media
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and to assess the nature of their interests in the process as well as the virtual-intangible
harm to children.
•

WP2 - Data procurement. The preparation for the second part and the research
questions that this can credibly and reliably assess should also include a review of
accessible data. The use of a comparative method, for example, pose question of data
comparability or, put simply, the idea that the data and indicators available from
different systems actually measure the same properties.

•

WP3 – Networking. This activity consists in establishing contact with researchers and
institutions in the countries included in the comparison. During the first step I will
identify the most suitable partners and whenever possible establish research
partnerships to support the implementation of the second part e.g. in the access to
national data, in the application for international funding, etc.

•

WP4 – Funding. During the first part I will also identify suitable sources of funding
for the second part and, whenever possible, apply for research appropriations.
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